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Abstract
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers in household economics.
Each uses an empirically tractable life-cycle model of consumption and family
labor supply to study aspects of economic behavior of households, such as
the allocation of expenditure among household members or the allocation of
spousal time across paid and non-paid activities. Emphasis is put on modelling
intra-household interactions.
The opening chapter examines how married people’s allocation of time
responds to wages and the gender wage gap. It develops a life-cycle collective
model for spouses who allocate time across market work, home production, and
leisure. The model features lack of commitment to lifetime marriage and the
gender wage gap affects intra-family bargaining power. Results from the PSID
suggest that the narrowing gender wage gap since 1980 improved women’s
bargaining power in the family resulting in a shift of household work from
women to their husbands. The model is used to assess, counter factually, the
implications of gender wage equality for family time allocations.
The second chapter studies how individual and aggregate consumption in
the family respond to idiosyncratic wage shocks using a collective life-cycle
model that features public and private consumption, endogenous family la-
bor supply, asset accumulation, correlated wage shocks, and lack of spousal
commitment to lifetime marriage. Preliminary results from the PSID suggest
strong labor and consumption response to wage shocks and that hours and con-
sumption are substitute goods at the intensive margin of labor supply. Wages
have an economically significant effect on intra-family bargaining powers.
Abstract 5
The last chapter studies theoretically the transmission of income shocks
into consumption across households that exhibit unobserved preference het-
erogeneity. Heterogeneity is nonparametric and nonseparable from household
preferences. I show how any moment of the distribution of consumption and
labor supply elasticities can be identified with readily available household panel
data. Identification does not rely on any specific parametrization of household
preferences or their distribution.
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Introduction
A household is a fundamental economic unit where some of the most impor-
tant economic decisions are made, such as decisions pertaining to the level
and type of household expenditure, the allocation of such expenditure among
household members, the allocation of the members’ time endowments across
paid and non-paid activities, household investment in human capital, the level
of investment in various risky and risk-free assets, child rearing, and many
more. Analyzing such decisions involves, often, understanding the interac-
tions among decision-making household members, their preferences, as well as
factors affecting such interactions.
In this thesis I develop methods to study some of these issues, both theo-
retically and empirically, and I apply such methods to rich survey data from the
United States. The emphasis of the first chapter is on the allocation of spousal
time across different activities, whereas the second chapter puts emphasis on
the allocation of expenditure among household members and, therefore, on
intra-household consumption inequality. The third chapter looks theoretically
into how observed household behavior can convey information about spousal
preferences for consumption and time, even if such preferences exhibit unob-
served cross-sectional heterogeneity.
In more detail, the first chapter studies the allocation of married people’s time
across various activities and how such allocation responds to wages and the
gender wage gap. In the US, the gender wage gap has narrowed down by as
much as 25% over the last three and a half decades. At the same time, women’s
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labor supply has increased and, while couples spend less time on household
work, men’s share of household work has risen. In this chapter I develop a
life-cycle collective model for individuals in a household (spouses) who differ
in preferences and bargaining power but share a common budget constraint.
The spouses allocate their time across market work, home production, and
leisure, and they also decide about public consumption and savings. The
model features lack of commitment to lifetime marriage and the gender wage
gap can affect the spouses’ bargaining power in the household. I estimate
gender-specific preferences and how intra-family bargaining power responds to
the gender gap using data on married and divorced individuals from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics in the US. The results suggest that the narrowing
gender wage gap improved women’s bargaining power in the family resulting
in a shift of household work from women to their husbands. The model is used
to assess, counter factually, the implications of gender wage equality for family
time allocations. If the gender gap was eliminated altogether, the proportion of
women in full-time market work would increase by up to 32% whereas couples’
time into home production would decrease by up to 21% as women would
reduce their household work by up to 7 hours per week.
The second chapter studies how individual and aggregate consumption in
the family respond to idiosyncratic wage changes using a collective life-cycle
model for a household of two decision-making spouses. The model incorporates
endogenous family labor supply, public but also private consumption, asset ac-
cumulation, correlated wage shocks, and general nonseparable, spouse-specific
preferences. Contrary to the first chapter, the model in the second chapter ab-
stracts from home production. Wages enter the household budget constraint,
but also the spouses’ intra-family bargaining powers implying lack of spousal
commitment to future allocations. I derive analytical expressions for the dy-
namics of earnings and consumption using a novel approach developed by
Blundell and Preston (1998) and other papers; this approach relies on Taylor
approximations to the lifetime budget constraint and the first-order conditions
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of the household problem. I show how such analytical expressions can be used
to identify the household structure (spouse-specific preferences, allocation of
consumption between spouses, a rich set of bargaining effects) with panel data
on hours, earnings, assets, and household-level consumption only. The identi-
fying assumption is that spouses have the same preferences with their single
counterparts. Preliminary evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
suggests strong labor and consumption response to wage shocks and that hours
and consumption are substitute goods at the intensive margin of labor sup-
ply. Wages have an economically significant effect on intra-family bargaining
power, but not statistically so.
The last chapter studies the transmission of income shocks into consump-
tion across two-earner unitary households with unobserved preference hetero-
geneity. The treatment of heterogeneity is general as heterogeneity is non-
parametric and nonseparable from household preferences. I derive analytical
expressions for cross-sectional earnings and consumption inequality following
the approximations approach developed in Blundell and Preston (1998) and
other papers. I show how these expressions can be used to identify any mo-
ment of the distribution of policy-relevant parameters, such as the consump-
tion and hours elasticities with respect to wages, if panel data on consumption,
hours, and earnings are available. Identification does not rely on any specific
parametrization of household preferences or their distribution. Finally, I pro-
pose a test for unobserved preference heterogeneity that is straightforward to
implement using panel data.
The first chapter contributes to our knowledge of collective household decisions,
in this case time allocation decisions, in a dynamic setting without commit-
ment. It builds on the initial static implementations of the collective model by
Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Blundell et al. (2005), as well as the subsequent
extensions to the dynamics case by Mazzocco (2007), Lise and Yamada (2014),
and Voena (2015). The second chapter complements the first one by focusing
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on consumption rather than time allocation decisions. It too builds on the
aforementioned literature on the collective model, as well as on the literature
that studies the transmission of wage/income shocks into consumption (for
example, Blundell et al., 2008; Heathcote et al., 2014; Blundell et al., 2016).
This is the literature to which also the third chapter contributes, advancing
our understanding of identification of, effectively random, spousal preferences.
I hope the methods developed and findings presented in this thesis put
future research in a better position to understand household decisions and
serve as a basis to analyze the effects a wide variety of policies may have on
household outcomes.
Chapter 1
Wages and Family Time
Allocation
1.1 Introduction
How do wages affect married couples’ allocation of time? What does a nar-
rowing gender wage gap imply for the bargaining power spouses have in their
households? How does their bargaining power affect their allocation of time?
How would gender wage equality impact such allocation? To address these
questions, I develop a rich life-cycle collective model of family time allocation,
consumption and savings. Decision makers in the household (the spouses)
choose jointly how to allocate their time across market work, work in the
household (home production) and leisure in the presence of uncertainty in their
wages and family composition.1,2 The model features lack of commitment to
lifetime marriage meaning that the spouses do not commit to staying together
for life. Changes in wages, and specifically changes in the gender wage gap,
can induce shifts in the bargaining power that one or another spouse has in
the household decision process. Such shifts reflect better or worse options that
a spouse may have outside the household (for example in case of divorce) as
a result of a changing gender wage gap. I estimate the model using data from
1I use the terms ‘household’ and ‘family’ interchangeably throughout this chapter. The
same applies to the terms ‘decision makers’, ‘spouses’, ‘partners’, or ‘individuals’.
2The importance of distinguishing between leisure and non-market work is stressed in
Becker (1965).
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the PSID. I exploit cross-sectional variation in wages and family composition
as well as the sharp decline in the gender wage gap that favored women after
1980. Focusing on one cohort whose life-cycle spans years 1980-2009, I find
that the narrowing gender wage gap improved women’s intra-family bargaining
power resulting, primarily, in a shift of household work from women to their
husbands. Such change in intra-family bargaining power is not consistent with
full commitment between spouses. Finally, I use the model to investigate the
likely implications the elimination of the gender wage gap has for family time
allocations. In such counterfactual environment, the rate of female full-time
market work would increase strongly by up to 32% even during the child-
bearing years and women would enter the labor market when they previously
would not participate. Moreover, the allocation of time into home production
would become more equal between spouses (primarily with women reducing
their much higher hours) but their joint total time into home production would
decrease by as much as 21%.
Since 1980 the gender wage gap in the US, as measured by the ratio of
male to female hourly wages, has fallen sharply by as much as 25%.3 This de-
cline has occurred systematically over most of the last three and a half decades
even if one accounts for cohort effects, spousal education, fertility and other
factors. It is the result of growth in male and female real wages, with the
latter outperforming the former. Over the same period of time, the propor-
tion of women in full-time market work has increased strongly with women
switching away from part-time work as well as entering the labor market when
they previously did not participate. Women also halved the time they devote
to home production whereas men’s household work has remained flat. The
chapter revolves currently around a single cohort whose life-cycle spans the
period when the biggest changes in the gender wage gap and family time al-
locations occurred, namely the 3 decades after 1980. The chapter, therefore,
focuses currently on how the narrowing gender gap affected married people’s
3This figure is based on raw data from the PSID described in section 1.2.
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time allocations over their life-cycle and serves as a first only step towards
understanding how wages affect family time allocations over time.
I hypothesize that the narrowing of the gender wage gap has a direct ef-
fect on family planning (by increasing women’s monetary reward for market
work) as well as an indirect one through impacting on the way decisions be-
tween spouses are made in the household. The channels through which wages
likely affect family time allocations are the following. First, an increase in
one’s hourly wage may render work in the labor market more attractive, along
both the extensive (participation) and the intensive (hours) margins. Second,
keeping labor supply fixed, a wage rise implies higher income and, in turn,
higher expenditures and savings. If purchased goods (expenditures) are the
material inputs to home production, higher expenditures may reduce or boost
the time inputs to home production depending on the nature of complemen-
tarity between material and time inputs. Third, shifts in relative wages within
a family may alter the task specialization spouses engage in; for example, a
spouse with a relatively higher wage may engage fully in the labor market
whereas the other one in home production. Fourth, shifts in relative wages
may make a spouse’s outside option more or less attractive. To deter a per-
son from exercising their outside option, their partner may consent to increase
that person’s weight (bargaining power) in the family decision process which,
in turn, is likely to affect a number of time allocation and other household
outcomes. These channels are all interrelated reinforcing or mitigating each
other making it harder to analyze the relationship between wages and married
people’s allocation of time outside a structural model.4
The model allows for all the aforementioned channels. Two spouses5 have
4Another potential effect of wages and the gender wage gap is on the selection of in-
dividuals into marriage and, in general, on marital patterns. This chapter abstracts from
this feature taking marriage as given. To some extent, Chiappori et al. (2015) address this
question developing an equilibrium model of education, marriage, and labor supply. Ex-
pected returns in the labor market affect education and marital choices people make early
on in their life-cycles; however, the paper shuts down many of the aforementioned channels
through which wages (returns) affect choices, such as shifts in intra-family bargaining powers
resulting from lack of commitment.
5I use the terms ‘spouses’ to refer to two decision making individuals in the model;
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their own, gender-specific, preferences over private leisure (in the spirit of Chi-
appori, 1988, 1992) and a public consumption good (in the spirit of Blundell
et al., 2005).6 The public good is produced in the household with inputs raw
materials purchased in the goods market (‘public expenditures’) and time de-
voted to home production by each individual (‘household work’). The spouses
are separately endowed with a fixed amount of time which they allocate across
work in the labor market, work in the household, and leisure. An hour of work
in the labor market is compensated by a gender-specific stochastic wage which
individuals take as exogenous; earnings are used to purchase raw materials in
the market or save for the future.
The spouses choose public expenditures/savings and their allocation of
time to maximize the (expected, discounted, and inter-temporally separable)
weighted sum of their respective, gender-specific, utility functions over their
lifetime. The weights on their utilities can be seen as the bargaining power
the spouses have in the household decision process; such bargaining power is
not necessarily constant over time due to lack of commitment in the spirit of
Mazzocco (2007) and Lise and Yamada (2014). Lack of commitment restricts
choices by a set of marriage participation constraints, one per partner and time
period, that ensure spouses receive at least as much utility from inside their
joint household as they can possibly get from their outside option. To help
fix ideas I take divorce to be the relevant outside option available to them,
even though, strictly speaking, I do not have to specify this explicitly. I make
the value of divorce for each spouse depend on their own wage offers, which
reflect the value of their skills in the labor market, and on family composition
regarding the presence and age of children. Wages and family composition are
exogenous and subject to uncertainty.
the model applies equally to traditional nuclear families as well as more modern forms of
cohabitation.
6The model in this chapter belongs to the family of ‘collective’ models as introduced
by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988). These models treat the family as a
group of individuals who act together under common constraints and, therefore, respect the
fundamental principle of methodological individualism (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy
and Horney, 1981).
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Using cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in wages and cross-
sectional variation in family composition I identify time-use preferences for
married men and women as well as how intra-family bargaining power changes
with the gender wage gap over time. A major difficulty arises because wages
affect the budget set and bargaining powers simultaneously. I distinguish
between the two channels by fixing, essentially normalizing, intra-family bar-
gaining power at the start of the life-cycle. Specifically, I form a proxy for the
initial intra-family bargaining power by comparing married spouses’ lifetime
earnings in the hypothetical scenario of divorce. I estimate their hypothetical
earnings should they get divorce using reduced-form information on divorcees
in the PSID (divorcees because I treat divorce as the relevant outside option)
rather than solving the divorcees’ problem explicitly.
I estimate the model by the method of simulated moments using data
from the PSID after 1980. Currently focusing on one cohort, the model repro-
duces life-cycle patterns of time allocations of married men and women. I find
that, especially for families with young children, women’s disutility from full-
time market work is greater than the disutility from part-time work, which,
in turn, is greater than the disutility from work in the household. Consump-
tion and leisure are substitute goods for the majority of women; however for
approximately 1/4 of them they are complements. Finally, men suffer greater
disutility from work in the household than women do if the two supply the
same amount of household hours.
The data reveal that both mechanisms (monetary reward and changes in
bargaining power) are important when the gender wage gap narrows down.
A 10% closing of the gap favoring women decreases women’s household work
by 14% and increases their rate of full time market work by approximately
4%. Half of the decrease in women’s household work is due to the higher
monetary reward of market work, thus to women switching to some form of
market work. The other half is due to women becoming relatively stronger in
the household decision process, and therefore able to extract more leisure. The
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rise in women’s market work is the result of two opposite forces: the higher
monetary reward pushes women’s market work up (dominating force) whereas
their improved bargaining power pushes work down replacing it with leisure.
As the income women bring in the household rises, the spouses are in a
better financial position to replace household chores such as child care or clean-
ing with similar services purchased from the market. In principle this could
benefit men too by cutting down their household work (an income effect). In
reality, however, men keep their household work unchanged as their weaken-
ing bargaining position counterbalances the income effect. As women become
more powerful thanks to a narrower gender wage gap, they shift household
work from themselves to their husbands.
These findings are suggestive of the likely implications gender wage equal-
ity would have for family time allocations. If women were paid on average their
husbands’ wage, female market participation would increase strongly through-
out the life-cycle. The most striking effects would occur in the childbearing
years when the rate of female full-time market work would rise to approx-
imately 75% compared to 57% in the data (this change corresponds to an
increase by approximately 32%). Only 1/8 of this increase comes from women
switching from part- to full-time work; the rest comes from women entering the
labor market when they previously did not participate. Gender wage equality
would render the allocation of spousal time into home production more equal
between spouses but it would also decrease the total time into household work
by as much as 7 hours per week during the childbearing years (a decrease of
21% compared to the data). The timing of establishing gender wage equality
in the life-cycle matters for the severity of the effects especially in the child-
bearing years. Perhaps not unexpectedly, the largest effects occur when wage
equality is established early on in the partners’ lives.
Relation to the literature This chapter builds on two strands of lit-
erature. On one side is the literature on models of household decision making
with Chiappori (1988)’s and Apps and Rees (1988)’s collective concept being
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the most prominent representation. As I illustrate below, there is a number
of recent papers that extend the original static collective model to allow for
life-cycle dynamics.7 On the other side is the literature that, from a unitary
standpoint, studies the evolution of male or female life-cycle labor supply usu-
ally alongside a number of other choices such as consumption or retirement.
The papers in the first strand of literature that this article is mostly re-
lated to are Lise and Yamada (2014), Knowles (2013), and Mazzocco et al.
(2014). Lise and Yamada (2014) use a dynamic collective model of the house-
hold with which the model in my article shares common features. They study
how intra-family bargaining power varies across as well as within households
when wage shocks hit. They estimate the parameters of the model using the
first-order conditions and a unique panel dataset from Japan with expenditure
information for each spouse. They find that relative wages affect intra-family
allocations in the cross-section and large wage shocks induce changes in those
allocations from one period to the next; the latter, they argue, serves as ev-
idence against full intra-household commitment. Unlike Lise and Yamada
(2014), I allow for extensive- as well as intensive-margin labor supply and I
solve explicitly for spousal choices over the entire life-cycle. This is likely to
be important if one expects the impact of wages -or of wage-related policies-
on time allocations to vary with age and family composition.
Knowles (2013) asks how important bargaining between spouses is for la-
bor supply since the 1970s. He develops a stylized two-period model in which
the bargaining power depends on a marriage market equilibrium; he abstracts
from life-cycle features such as savings or fertility. He finds intra-family bar-
gaining is critical for explaining trends in gender-specific labor supply but he
does not separate changes occurring across cohorts from changes occurring
within cohorts. The present chapter, by contrast, uses a life-cycle model with
savings, fertility, extensive as well intensive labor choices, and, finally, does
not specify a form for intra-family bargaining (other than assuming ex-post
7Early empirical implementations of the static collective model include Browning et al.
(1994) and Fortin and Lacroix (1997).
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efficiency).
Mazzocco et al. (2014) investigate the interconnectedness of family labor
supply, savings, and marital decisions using PSID data between 1984-1996.
They develop a dynamic collective model with intensive and extensive labor
supply and home production but abstract from public expenditures. Moreover,
their paper does not allow changes in the gender wage gap to affect intra-family
bargaining powers.
Ferna´ndez and Wong (2014) use a life-cycle collective model to study
the increase in female labor supply in the second half of the 20th century.
They abstract from home production and men’s time allocations, and impose
full commitment between spouses. Voena (2015) explores how divorce and
property division laws impact married people’s intertemporal choices using
policy reforms in the US in the 1970s and 1980s. She specifies a life-cycle
collective model for female market participation without home production;
although laws controlling divorce and property division affect spouses’ outside
options in her model, serving as distribution factors, wages or the gender wage
gap do not. Her findings support lack of intra-household commitment as in
Mazzocco (2007), one of the first implementations of a dynamic collective
model.8
There are several papers in the second strand of literature that this article
relates to. French (2005) studies the labor supply and retirement behavior of
men using a life-cycle model with wage and health uncertainty. He focuses
particularly on the behavioral effects of social security benefits. Attanasio et al.
(2008) study the strong increase in American women’s labor force participation
after the 1970s using a life-cycle model of labor supply, savings, and human
capital. They argue that a narrowing gender wage gap and a declining cost
of child care can explain the aforementioned increase. Eckstein and Lifshitz
8In addition, Gemici (2011) uses a dynamic collective model with Nash bargaining to
study household migration decisions. A recent review of this literature, including static
and dynamic collective models, is provided by Browning et al. (2014) and Chiappori and
Mazzocco (2014). Lise and Seitz (2011) and Chiappori and Meghir (2014) argue why the
intra-household allocation of resources should not be ignored.
1.1. Introduction 26
(2011) also study women’s employment rates, paying particular attention to
the differential patterns that married and singles have experienced. Blundell
et al. (2013) study the implications that welfare programs have in the short
(labor supply) and the long run (human capital accumulation) using a life-cycle
model of female labor supply, education, human capital, and savings. Finally,
in an earlier paper Francesconi (2002) estimates a dynamic model of female
labor supply allowing for endogenous fertility decisions but not savings.9
The papers in the second strand of literature, with their various specifi-
cations and assumptions, have three features in common: they focus on male
or female labor supply, they abstract from home production, and they ignore
intra-family allocations. By contrast, this chapter reserves, in principle, an ex-
plicit role for all these features. However, I abstract from endogenous human
capital (that several of those papers model explicitly) for reasons pertaining
to identification of the collective household structure (and which are discussed
in section 1.3.2).
In relation to the literature, this chapter is the first one to (i) study female
labor supply, on the intensive and extensive margins, using a collective life-
cycle model with lack of commitment, home production, and household-level
public expenditure; (ii) investigate the relationship between the gender wage
gap and intra-family bargaining power, (iii) assess the implications of equal
pay between men and women through eliminating counterfactually the gender
wage gap.
The chapter is arranged as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data and the
empirical facts that motivate this research. Section 2.2 develops the model of
household decision making. Section 1.4 discusses technical aspects of the model
and section 1.5 discusses identification and estimation. Section 2.5 presents
the results. Section 1.7 discusses the implications of the model for behavior
and section 1.8 describes the policy experiment. Section 1.9 concludes.
9Important earlier papers in this strand of literature also include Eckstein and Wolpin
(1989), who model women’s labor force participation and fertility choices when current
participation affects future earnings, and van der Klaauw (1996), who models women’s
labor force participation jointly with their marital choices.
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1.2 An Empirical Overview
This section overviews the data used in this chapter, lays out the family time
allocation facts this study aims to reproduce, and discusses the evolution of
the gender wage gap over time. Section 1.2.1 presents the data and some
baseline summary statistics, section 1.2.2 illustrates the time allocation facts,
and section 1.2.3 is devoted to the gender wage gap.
1.2.1 Data
This chapter uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This
provides rich income and employment data for households and their members
since 1968 as well as information on time devoted to home production.
The PSID10 started in 1968 tracking a -then- nationally representative
sample of households; repeated annually until 1997 the survey collected de-
tailed information on incomes, market work, food consumption, and demo-
graphics of adult household members and their linear descendants should they
split off and establish their own households. Over time the scope of the PSID
widened allowing the collection of even richer information such as amounts of
time devoted to household work (from late 1970s onwards). After 1997 the
survey became biennial but also added information on a variety of household
expenditures and wealth. I make no use of the expenditure or wealth informa-
tion as this spans a relatively short period of time only.
I select men and women aged 25 to 65 from the core sample (‘Survey
Research Center’) between years 1980 and 2009. I impose the aforementioned
age restriction because the model in this chapter does not deal with early-life
(education) or late-life (retirement) decisions. I split this into two distinct and
non-overlapping samples: (i) a major sample of households of continuously
married men and women throughout the years they are observed, and (ii) a
minor sample of singles of both genders. I use the former for the main part of
my analysis and I describe it in more detail below. I postpone a discussion of
10Detailed information on the PSID, as well as access to the data, is available at psidon-
line.isr.umich.edu.
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Table 1.1: Major sample descriptive statistics
Men Women
% some college 0.63 0.55
% working 0.94 0.80
Annual earnings 65846 31352
Annual work hours 2255 1610
Hourly wage rate 28.86 18.73
Num. of kids 1.25
Observations (household-year) 15917
Notes: ‘some college’ is defined as any education above the 12th grade. ‘% working’ is defined
as the proportion of those working in a given year. Earnings and working hours are presented
for those working. Hourly wages are for those working using the central 96% of the relevant
distribution. All monetary amounts are expressed in 2010 dollars and all descriptive statistics for
stable households are calculated across all stable household-year observations.
Source: Major PSID sample.
the latter sample until section 1.5.3.
In the major sample I follow households headed by a married opposite-
sex couple.11 The analysis in this chapter revolves currently around one only
widely-defined cohort. Additional cohorts will be added in future work. I
define this cohort as those households whose male spouse is born between
years 1943 and 1955. The average age of the male spouse is 30 in 1980 and 59
in 2009. A narrower definition of a cohort would be desirable but this is not
possible without running into small sample sizes. Given that the age difference
between spouses in approximately two thirds of households in this cohort does
not exceed ±3 years, I do not explicitly condition on similar years of birth
for the female spouse. I remove inflation from all monetary values12 and, to
account partly for measurement error, I drop households for which earnings of
a working spouse fall below 1% or above 99% of the (gender- and time-specific)
distribution. Finally, I require that households are stable in that they do not
experience compositional changes in the head couple. The resulting dataset is
an unbalanced panel of 1279 households observed over at least two consecutive
11I also consider couples that are permanently cohabiting (a tiny proportion in the data).
12I express all monetary amounts in 2010 dollars. To deflate I use the All-Urban-
Consumers CPI available by the BLS at www.bls.gov/cpi.
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years. More than 55% of households are observed for at least 10 years and
more than 30% for at least 20. Some key descriptive statistics are presented
in table 1.1; appendix A.1 provides further details.
I concentrate on continuously married (stable) couples because I do not
solve explicitly for the divorcees’ problem (see sections 2.2 and 1.5). The main
caveat is whether excluding unstable couples (i.e. couples that separate or
divorce) biases my results. I discuss the direction of this potential bias in
section 2.5.
1.2.2 Time Allocation Facts
In this section I illustrate the main facts about married men’s and women’s
life-cycle time allocations. Specifically I focus on the time they spend working
in the labor market and in the household.
Figure 1.1 plots average annual hours of market work for workers and non-
workers. Three features stand out. First, women work much less in the market
than men. Second, over the first two thirds of their life-cycle, men’s labor
supply is flat at approximately 2,250 hours annually; women’s labor supply
on the other hand increases steadily from less than 1,000 hours annually to a
peak of 1,550 hours at mean age 50. Third, both men and women decrease
their hours of market work in the last third of their life-cycle, possibly due to
retirement.
To understand these trends better, figure 1.2a plots the proportion of
people who participate in the labor market over the life-cycle. A person is
classified modestly as participating if he/she reports working at least 10 hours
and earning at least $10 in any given year. For women the picture is clear.
There is a big increase in labor market participation over the first two thirds
of their life-cycle and a subsequent decrease in the last third; this extensive
margin shift is the main force behind the strong increase in women’s working
hours reported in figure 1.1. For men things are different. A nearly full par-
ticipation in the first years is followed by a sudden downwards jump around
mean age 43. Participation then flattens out again (at around 90% now) until
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Figure 1.1: Average annual hours worked in the market
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Notes: This figure plots average annual hours of market work for workers and non-workers. A
95% confidence interval appears in gray shade.
Source: Major PSID sample.
it starts declining in the last few years.
A careful look at the data flags up an inconsistency in the measure of
male earnings that occurs in 1993 and affects men in the main sample at mean
age 43 onwards. The definition of earnings changes slightly after 1993 and the
available measure excludes some previously included earnings components such
as the labor part of business income (see appendix A.1 for further information).
This seems to be the reason behind the downwards jump in male employment
at mean age 43. Indeed, until 1993 around 10 men in the major sample report
0 earnings every year and the majority of them also reports 0 working hours.
After 1993, however, the number of men reporting 0 earnings jumps to around
70 every year with only 20% of them also reporting 0 hours. Among those
reporting 0 earnings after 1993, mean annual working hours are around 1,800,
i.e. sufficiently close to the unconditional mean of figure 1.1. I conclude that
men’s employment jump at mean age 43 is the result of a data design flaw and
it does not reflect a true incident in men’s labor supply.
Figure 1.2b delves deeper into the employment trends and plots the pro-
portions of people working full- or part-time in the labor market (among all
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Figure 1.2: Employment trends: market participation, FT and PT work
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Notes: This figure plots the proportion of people who participate in the labor market, and the
proportions of people working full- and part-time. A 95% confidence interval appears in gray
shade. Data for men after mean age 43 suffer from a data design flaw (see main text for details).
Source: Major PSID sample.
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workers and non-workers). A person is classified as working full-time (part-
time) if he/she participates in the market and reports working more than 1,000
(up to 1,000) hours annually. The figure paints an opposite picture for mar-
ried men versus women: men work full-time for most of their life-cycle (with
the same caveat about employment around mean age 43) and they only start
reducing slowly their full-time work in the last third of the life-cycle. Even
then, a noticeable proportion seems to revert to part-time work rather than
quit the market totally. Women, on the other hand, increase their full-time
work by more than the overall increase in their participation, partly because
they move gradually away from part-time work. Hence, the increase in female
working hours in figure 1.1 is a combination of a strong increase in the exten-
sive margin of labor supply (figure 1.2a) and a smaller increase in the intensive
margin (figure 1.2b).
Turning to household work (time devoted to home production), figure 1.3
plots weekly hours of household work for married men and women including
those who report 0 such hours. Household work refers to any work in and
around the household, such as cooking or cleaning, but excludes time spent
with children. Two features stand out. First, men supply much fewer hours
than women. Second, women’s hours drop dramatically over the first two
thirds of their life-cycle and they level off in the last third. Men’s hours, on
the other hand, remain flat at approximately 7 weekly hours throughout the
life-cycle.
To investigate these patterns further, figure 1.4 plots the proportion of
people over time who report supplying 0 weekly hours to home production.
To improve legibility, I plot the actual proportions (squares and circles) as
well as separate smoothing curves that pass through the scatters. Around
13% of men do not participate in household chores whereas for women this
proportion is effectively 0. As there are no obvious trends in the extensive
margin of household work, one infers that the big drop in women’s house-
hold work reported in figure 1.3 is almost exclusively due to a decrease in its
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Figure 1.3: Average weekly hours worked in the household
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Notes: This figure plots average weekly hours of household work for household workers and non-
workers. A 95% confidence interval appears in gray shade.
Source: Major PSID sample.
intensive rather than extensive margin.
As one would expect, family time allocations vary across different sub-
groups of the population. The presence of kids in the household is likely to be
one of the most important factors impacting their parents’ time use. Indeed fig-
ure 1.5 redraws the initial graphs for market and household hours splitting the
sample by the parental status of the household (parents versus non-parents).
Two facts emerge. First, men’s time allocation is not affected by the presence
of children. Second, women’s time allocation is affected severely by children,
with childless women experiencing trends very similar to men (albeit at differ-
ent magnitudes). These facts are true for work in the market and work in the
household.
1.2.3 The Gender Wage Gap
As the chapter focuses currently on one cohort, the gender wag gap statistics I
report below refer to that cohort only (see section 1.2.1 for sample selection).
I study the evolution of the wage gap over calendar years 1980-2009; these
correspond to the lifespan of the aforementioned cohort. Note that the re-
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Figure 1.4: Non-participation in home production
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Notes: This figure plots the proportion of spouses who report 0 weekly hours of household work.
A 95% confidence interval around the original (non-smoothed) proportions appears in gray shade.
Source: Major PSID sample.
Figure 1.5: Annual hours worked in the market and weekly hours worked
in the household by parental status
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(a) Hours in the market
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Notes: This figure plots average annual hours of market work for market workers and non-
workers as well as average weekly hours of household work for household workers and non-workers.
Confidence intervals have been suppressed to ease legibility of the graphs.
Source: Major PSID sample.
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striction to one cohort implies that calendar time coincides with the mean age
of the household head. I calculate the unconditional gender wage gap in two
alternative ways: (a) as the ratio of median male-female hourly wages in the
economy (‘economy-wide’ gender gap); (b) as the median ratio of male-female
hourly wages in the family (‘within-household’ gender gap). Figure 1.6 plots
these measures of the gender wage gap against calendar time (and, therefore,
mean age). I plot the actual estimates of the gap (circles) as well as separate
smoothing curves that pass through the scatters.
The gender wage gap narrowed down steadily in favor of women through-
out their lifespan: in the start of the 1980s the ‘median’ man commands an
hourly wage around 1.7-1.8 times higher than the ‘median’ woman; in 2009
the gender gap is around 1.3 or 25% lower. Within the family, the median
ratio of spousal wages was approximately 1.55 in 1980 but only 1.35 in 2009
(13% lower). For completeness, figure A.1 in the appendix reports the levels
of wages (medians and means) by gender. The narrowing of the gender gap
is not specific to this particular cohort only. An earlier cohort13 also experi-
ences an improvement in women’s relative wages, at least in the second half
of their lifetime, even though the gap between genders had been everywhere
wider than in the cohort of focus.
The narrowing of the gender wage gap is robust to a number of richer
specifications. Figure 1.7, panel (a), plots the evolution of the gender (log)
wage gap after controlling for spousal education and number of children, and
after correcting women’s wages for selection into the labor market. In this
graph I define the gender wage gap as
GWGt = median(w˜1it)−median(w˜2it)
where w˜jit is the log hourly wage of a married person of gender j (j = 1
for men, j = 2 for women) after removing the effects of the aforementioned
13The earlier cohort consists of stable households whose male head is born between 1933
and 1945; his mean age is 30 in year 1970. The same exactly selection criteria apply to the
earlier cohort as to the cohort of focus.
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Figure 1.6: Unconditional gender wage gap
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(a) ‘Economy-wide’ gender wage gap
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(b) ‘Within-household’ gender wage gap
Notes: This figure plots two alternative definitions of the gender wage gap over time. Only the
central 96% of the wage distribution by gender and time is used.
Source: Major PSID sample.
observable characteristics and correcting women’s wages for self-selection in the
labor market.14 Figure 1.7, panel (b), plots the gender (log) wage gap within
the family after controlling for spousal education and number of children, and
after correcting it for women’s selection in the labor market. In this graph I
define the gender wage gap as
GWGt = median(∆˜wit)
where ∆˜wit is the within-household gap in log hourly wages after removing the
effect of observable characteristics and correcting for women’s participation
selection. Appendix A.1 provides the details of these calculations, including
the correction for women’s selection in the labor market.
Across all figures the picture that emerges points to an improvement of
the economic status of women relative to that of men (at least as reflected upon
their wages). Such improvement is robust to a number of factors that poten-
tially affect the gender wage gap, such as women’s education, labor market
participation, or number of children.
In a series of papers, Blau and Kahn (1997, 2006) investigate the reasons
14I do not correct male wages for selection into the labor market due to men’s very high,
almost full, participation rate throughout of this study (see figure 1.2a).
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Figure 1.7: Conditional gender wage gap
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(a) ‘Economy-wide’ gender wage gap
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Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the gender wage gap over time in a number of different
specifications. In graph (a), the gender wage gap is defined as median(w˜1it) − median(w˜2it)
where w˜jit is the log hourly wage of a married person of gender j (j = 1 for men, j = 2 for
women) conditional on observable characteristics and after correcting women’s wages for market
participation selection. In graph (b), the gender wage gap is defined as median(∆˜wit) where ∆˜wit
is the within-household gap in log hourly wages conditional on observable characteristics and after
correcting for women’s participation selection. Only the central 96% of the wage distribution by
gender and calendar time is used.
Source: Major PSID sample.
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behind the narrowing of the gender wage gap in the 1980s and 1990s (the years
most of my data also come from). Using the PSID, they provide evidence of
sex-biased institutional and technical change contributing to a faster growth
in women’s wages relative to men’s. Such factors include improvements in
the relative treatment of women in the labor market (possibly in response to
the federal government’s anti-discrimination policies in the 1970s) or demand-
driven increased rents in industries where women had a comparative advantage
(for example, services). In the light of this evidence, the present chapter aims
to investigate the extent to which an exogenous narrowing of the gender wage
gap can help explain household time allocations.
A caveat is due here. As the chapter currently focuses on one cohort only,
one cannot separate calendar-time from life-cycle effects on the evolution of
the gender wage gap or time allocations. The patterns in the figures above
are likely to embody both types of effects. Therefore, the present chapter
should be seen as investigating the relation between wages and family time
allocations within one cohort’s life-cycle, and this is only a first step towards
understanding how the gender wage gap may affect family time allocations
over time and across cohorts.
1.3 A Life-Cycle Collective Model without Com-
mitment
This section develops the life-cycle collective model of family time allocation,
public consumption and savings, which features lack of commitment to lifetime
marriage. Two spouses are characterized by their own, gender-specific, prefer-
ences; each of them is fit to work in the labor market and earn a gender-specific
hourly wage that is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
The life-cycle consists of two distinct periods: the working period, when
the couple may also have children, and the retirement period. In section 1.3.1
I summarize the key features of the model during the working period. The
details are given in section 1.3.2, where I lay out the model’s building blocks
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including its recursive formulation, and in section 1.3.3, where I detail the
model’s specification. Section 1.3.4 describes the retirement period.
1.3.1 Illustration of Key Features
The decision making spouses, subscripted by j = {1, 2}, consume a public
(non-rival) good and allocate their time to leisure, market work, and home
production. There may be children in the household but children are not
decision makers.15 Spouse j has preferences Uj given by
Uj
(
Q, lj; zj
)
.
HereQ is the public consumption good and lj is j’s private leisure. zj is a vector
of observable taste shifters affecting j’s preferences; possible taste shifters are
j’s education or the number and age of his/her children. An extension to
preferences over private consumption goods is considered in appendix A.2.
The public good Q is produced domestically via a home production func-
tion given by
f
(
K, τ1, τ2; Z
)
with inputs public expenditures K and time τj devoted to home production
by each partner. The public good comprises items such as food at home or
a clean house. In the former case K can be viewed as the amounts paid in
grocery shopping whereas τj as the time each partner spends cooking. Here Z
is a vector of production shifters for which the obvious candidates are again
the number and age of children in the household.
The partners stay together as members of the same household from period
t = 0 (age 30) until the deterministic end of their working (T ; 30 years later)
and retirement lives (TR; 40 years later). For simplicity I assume that both
individuals are of the same age and post the schooling periods of their lives.
I do not model marriage decisions; instead the focus of this chapter is on
15See Dauphin et al. (2011) and Dunbar et al. (2013) for static collective models where
children act as decision makers.
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the partners’ choices after they have formed a household (i.e. conditional on
marriage). The model accounts for initial conditions that arise from assortative
patterns in the marriage market (see the wage process in section 1.3.3).
The spouses do not commit ex ante to one another for life. In each period
that they stay together, they do so because each of them satisfies, among other
things, their participation constraints in the household. Such constraints take
the form of lower bounds that the utility each partner enjoys from inside the
household must respect in each time period. The participation constraints
essentially ensure that both partners enjoy at least as much utility from in-
side their joint household as they could possibly enjoy from their best outside
option, which I take to be divorce.16 The outside options (the lower bounds)
are not constant over time or across different states of the world; this chang-
ing nature of theirs imposes limits to commitment and risk sharing between
spouses and affects household behavior. In this chapter, I make the outside
options depend on the wages the spouses can command in the labor market
to reflect the possibility that higher paid individuals may be able to attract
better outside options.17
During the working period of life, I model annual choices over public con-
sumption/savings and the allocation of time across leisure, market work, and
work in the household. Market work generates income to fund public expen-
ditures in the goods market or save for the future; work in the household con-
tributes to the home production of the public consumption good. Publicness
of consumption is an important element in the model as it permits economies
of scale and complementarities between partners’ preferences regardless of the
specific functional forms that will represent them.
The value of each individual’s time in the labor market is captured by the
16Consistent with most of the literature (Chiappori et al., 2002; Knowles, 2013; Voena,
2015) I choose divorce as the spouses’ most relevant outside option. Other papers, however,
consider non-cooperative cohabitation as a more realistic outside option (see, for example,
Lechene and Preston, 2011).
17By contrast, I assume that savings or labor supply during marriage do not affect spouses’
outside options. This simplification ensures the model’s tractability and permits identifica-
tion of the household structure.
1.3. A Life-Cycle Collective Model without Commitment 41
hourly wage they can earn. Inside the model individuals cannot affect their
wage and the model abstracts from human capital accumulation and similar
features. The wage is seen as the exogenous gender-specific price of one’s skills
in the labor market and the individuals take it as given in each period.18 Wages
can affect the trade-off among the different activities one can engage in and,
therefore, the extent to which one or another individual specializes in market
versus household work.
Family composition regarding children is an important determinant of in-
dividual choices during the working period of life. To capture the impact of
children on behavior I model an exogenous stochastic ‘fertility’ process that
reproduces the dynamics observed in the data over the life-cycle. Individuals
make choices conditional on their family composition rather than choosing ‘fer-
tility’ explicitly (something that would complicate the model considerably).19
1.3.2 Model
Given the previous points, the household in the working period of life can be
seen as solving
max
{Qt,At+1,ljt,τjt}t=Tt=0,j={1,2}
E0
T∑
t=0
βtU1
(
Qt, l1t; z1t
)
(1.1)
subject to the following constraints
E0
T∑
t=0
βtU2
(
Qt, l2t; z2t
) ≥ U2(x1,x2) (1.2)
At +
2∑
j=1
wjthjt = Kt + CCt
(
h2t, Nt
)
+
At+1
1 + r
At+1 ≥ At+1 (1.3)
U1
(
Qt, l1t; z1t
) ≥ U¯1(w1t; d1t; z1t) (1.4)
18The wage may be a function of prior educational choices but these are outside the control
of individuals in the time frame of this model. See Blundell et al. (2013) or Chiappori et al.
(2015) for a treatment of schooling choices in the context of a dynamic unitary or collective
model respectively.
19Francesconi (2002) and Keane and Wolpin (2010) are examples of studies that endog-
enize fertility, both in a unitary context.
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U2
(
Qt, l2t; z2t
) ≥ U¯2(w2t; d2t; z2t) (1.5)
Qt = f
(
Kt, τ1t, τ2t; Zt
)
(1.6)
ljt + hjt + τjt = T j = {1, 2}. (1.7)
Constraints (1.3)-(1.7) must be satisfied in every period t. Expression (1.1)
involves the maximization of the first individual’s time-0-expected discounted
lifetime utility; βt is the common discount factor at t. Expression (1.2) is
a promise keeping constraint, essentially an agreement set out at t = 0 that
individual 2’s expected discounted lifetime utility will not fall below a minimum
level U2 (more on this to follow). Equation (1.3) is the sequential budget
constraint linking available resources to expenditure and savings in each period
of working life, (1.4)-(1.5) are the participation constraints in the household,
(1.6) is the household production function, and (1.7) is the time budget per
individual for a total time endowment T . Much of the notation is already
introduced; the remaining notation is as follows: (i) in the budget constraint
At is household common assets, wjt is spouse j’s hourly wage at t, hjt is his/her
hours of market work, CCt
(
h2t, Nt
)
is child care costs that families with young
children may have to meet (Nt summarizes the family composition; more on
this to follow), r is the deterministic and known market interest rate, and A
is a borrowing limit; (ii) in the participation constraints U¯j(·) is the utility
individual j can get from his/her outside option at t. The above program
is written as if household member 1 makes all the choices in the household
which obviously goes against the collective spirit. Decentralization is feasible
but requires a combination of Lindahl (personal) and shadow prices for Q
because this is a good that is both public and domestic (see Chiappori and
Meghir, 2014).
In writing the outside options I have assumed that only exogenous vari-
ables enter U¯j, mainly the wage, the observable taste shifter zjt, and a vector
of distribution factors djt. By distribution factors I refer to any exogenous
variables that affect choices through shifting partners’ outside options but not
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their preferences or the budget set.20 Allowing the outside option to depend
on individual choices while married would lead to inefficient allocations of time
and would jeopardize the model’s tractability. To see why, suppose U¯j is an in-
creasing function of one’s market work (say, through the dependence of wages
on past labor supply). In this case the individual supplies labor for two rea-
sons: first, labor generates income that can be used to buy current and future
goods; second, labor improves one’s outside option and boosts, consequently,
his/her bargaining power in the household. As a result labor is over-supplied
in this family beyond what is Pareto optimal and both partners can be better
off if they agree to supply less. For a detailed illustration of this point see
section 6.2.3 in Browning et al. (2014).
The assumption that only exogenous variables enter U¯j serves also an-
other purpose, that of simplifying the representation of the model (1.1)-(1.7).
Consider representing the problem by its Lagrangian formulation. Let ν2 be
the Lagrange multiplier on (1.2); also let ν˜1t be the Lagrange multiplier on
participation constraint (1.4) and ν˜2t on (1.5). Then the above problem is
equivalent to
max
{Qt,At+1,ljt,τjt}t=Tt=0,j={1,2}
E0
T∑
t=0
βt
[(
1+
ν˜1t
βt
)
U1
(
Qt, l1t; z1t
)
+
(
ν2+
ν˜2t
βt
)
U2
(
Qt, l2t; z2t
)]
or, written more compactly, to
max
{Qt,At+1,ljt,τjt}t=Tt=0,j={1,2}
E0
T∑
t=0
βt
[
µ1tU1
(
Qt, l1t; z1t
)
+ µ2tU2
(
Qt, l2t; z2t
)]
(1.1’)
subject to constraints (1.3), (1.6) and (1.7) only (section 3.1, Chiappori and
Mazzocco, 2014). Then, µjt = νj +
ν˜jt
βt
is individual j’s bargaining power in the
household at time t (ν1 = 1) or, equivalently, the weight his/her preferences
carry in the household decision process at that time. Moreover, if one imposes
20Chiappori et al. (2002) and Voena (2015) provide examples of distribution factors such
as the sex ratio in the local marriage market or laws governing divorce and property sharing.
See also Bourguignon et al. (2009).
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the normalization µ1t + µ2t = 1 then µjt can be seen also as the Pareto weight
a social planner attaches to member j’s preferences at t.21
What determines the weights µjt is given by the nature of the constraints
that their underlying elements serve as Lagrange multipliers to. νj is the
weight attached to individual j’s expected lifetime utility at the beginning
of time, hence the lack of a time subscript. This may be a function of the
individual’s predetermined characteristics, some economy-wide attributes, as
well as beginning-of-time expectations about possible changes in these charac-
teristics/attributes in the future. I denote such variables by vector xj; candi-
date variables may include spousal education, occupation, or parental income.
These individual characteristics at t = 0 determine U2 in (1.2) and, as a conse-
quence, contribute to determining the initial weight νj each spouse’s expected
lifetime utility carries. ν˜jt is the multiplier on j’s participation constraint in
period t. Whatever affects the outside option U¯j at t will affect ν˜jt too. Pooling
all the components of µjt together and normalizing the weights to add up to 1
implies
µjt = µj(x1,x2, w1t, w2t,d1t,d2t, z1t, z2t).
The aforementioned normalization of the sum of the weights to 1 is an addi-
tional reason why both partners’ wages, distribution factors and pre-determined
attributes enter µjt.
The Pareto weights µ1t and µ2t summarize the allocation of bargaining
power in the household. Starting, hypothetically, from µ1t = µ2t =
1
2
, partner
1 becomes relatively more (less) powerful when µ1t > µ2t (µ1t < µ2t). If the
partners commit fully to never exploit their outside options, which is equiv-
alent to removing the participation constraints, ν˜jt = 0 and µjt = νj in each
period (‘full commitment’ benchmark). If such commitment is not possible,
j’s bargaining power will shift when any of the time-dependent factors affect-
ing the outside options, therefore affecting ν˜jt too, shifts (‘no commitment’
21This normalization is possible if βt is appropriately redefined in each period to avoid
distorting the intertemporal incentives when µ1t + µ2t 6= µ1s + µ2s for t 6= s.
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benchmark). As an example, an increase in j’s wage will improve her outside
option and result in ν˜jt > 0; this will raise her bargaining power by
ν˜jt
βt
and
decrease her partner’s power by the same amount.
Note that the model in this chapter cannot distinguish between lack of
commitment (‘no commitment’) and limited commitment. The dependence
of intra-family bargaining power on contemporaneous wages and distribution
factors is, strictly speaking, consistent with the ‘no commitment’ framework
of Mazzocco (2007) because the spouses adjust their bargaining power after
any of the factors affecting their outside options changes (for example, after
any change in their wages). Formally this implies that one spouse has their
participation constraint always bind. By contrast, limited commitment, as de-
veloped in Ligon et al. (2002), requires that intra-family bargaining power shift
only after a person’s participation constraint binds, which will not necessarily
be true after any wage change. In this chapter I model lack of commitment
and I test it against full commitment that is nested within it. Rejection of full
commitment, however, may be due to lack of commitment being a reasonable
representation of the data or, alternatively, due to lack of commitment serving
as a proxy for limited commitment.
Pareto efficiency The participation constraints prohibit the spouses
from reaching the first-best or ex-ante efficient allocation of their resources.
The solution to the above problem is ex-post efficient as the household still
maximizes the weighted sum of their static utilities in each period. Ex-post
efficiency implies that no better allocation of resources can take place once
information at time t is revealed without violating the prevailing participation
constraints; for details see Chiappori and Mazzocco (2014) or section 6.2.2 in
Browning et al. (2014).
Recursive formulation Let St = {z1t, z2t,Zt,x1,x2, w1t, w2t,d1t,d2t}
be the set of exogenous state variables at time t; current period assets At is the
endogenous state variable. Moreover, let Ct = {Kt, l1t, l2t, τ1t, τ2t} be the set
of choice variables alongside next period’s assets At+1 (a total of 6 variables).
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Finally, let U denote the weighted sum of the partners’ intra-temporal utility
functions given by
U (Ct,St) =
2∑
j=1
µj(x1,x2, w1t, w2t,d1t,d2t, z1t, z2t)Uj
(
f(Kt, τ1t, τ2t; Zt), ljt; zjt
)
Program (1.1’) can be written recursively as
Vt(At,St) = maxCt,At+1
{U(Ct,St) + βESt+1|StVt+1(At+1,St+1)}
subject to constraints (1.3) and (1.7). Vt is the value function of the married
household at t; ESt+1|St denotes expectations over the exogenous state space at
t+ 1 conditional on its realization at t. Discounting is assumed geometric.
I do not write the value function for if the spouses divorce and I do not
solve for the value of divorce numerically. The gender-specific value of divorce,
which I only approximate using a reduced-form approach, enters the problem
through dictating a normalization of the Pareto weight in the first few years of
the family life-cycle (this point is discussed in section 1.5.3). Once this initial
normalization takes place, I allow intra-family bargaining power to change
subsequently with the gender wage gap and no further information on divorcees
is used. This shortcut eases the computational needs of the model (saving the
burden of solving the divorced man’s and woman’s life-cycle problems) but
comes with the cost of restricting the estimation sample to stable households
only (as shown in section 1.2.1). I discuss the implications of this restriction
in section 2.5.
1.3.3 Parametrization
In each period of their life in the household, which I take to be one year,
the partners maximize expected lifetime utility (1.1’) taking as given their
individual characteristics and their economic circumstances. Their individual
characteristics are described by their education (educ1, educ2) and the woman’s
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Table 1.2: Time into market and household work
Activity Intensity Abbrev. Daily hours
Hours per day 24
Sleep & personal care 8
Remaining productive hours 16
Market
no work NW 0
part time PT 4
full time FT 8
Household
low L 0.4
low middle LM 1.6
high middle HM 3
maximum MAX 6
utility costs of work (θ2);
22 their economic circumstances are described by
age (t), their common assets (A), the presence of kids in the household and
the age of the youngest among them (N), and their respective idiosyncratic
productivity in the labor market (v1, v2).
Time allocations I assume time can take on discrete values across three
activities: market work, work in the household (home production), and leisure.
On a daily basis the time put into these activities by each spouse must add up
to 24 hours net of 8 hours that people need for sleep and personal care (Biddle
and Hamermesh, 1990). Table 1.2 summarizes the discrete values market-
and household work can take. Market work can take on three values (for ‘no
work’, ‘part time’, and ‘full time’) whereas work in the household four values
(for ‘low’, ‘low middle’, ‘high middle’, ‘maximum’). The specific numerical
values attached to these labels are not arbitrary; instead they correspond to
the values most frequently reported in the PSID and the distribution implied
by table 1.2 serves as a discrete approximation of the empirical distribution of
time observed in the data.
For computational reasons, not all choices of market and household work
22The model is written with education educj as a state variable. However, current esti-
mation results have education suppressed; results are reported without differentiating indi-
viduals by education.
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are applicable to both men and women. I restrict men’s household work to
‘low’ or ‘low middle’ (consistent with men in the PSID supplying very few hours
to home production); I also restrict women’s household work to ‘high middle’
or ‘maximum’ (consistent with women’s observed household hours after 1980).
Finally, I restrict men’s market work to ‘full time’ only as there are very few
men in my PSID sample not working full-time.23 These restrictions imply that
men’s daily leisure is restricted between 6.4 and 7.6 hours whereas women’s
daily leisure between 2 and 13.
Preferences and home production I parameterize preferences Uj of
spouse j by a non-separable function
Uj
(
Qt, ljt; zjt
)
=
1
1− γ
(
Qt/s(Nt)
)1−γ × exp (gj(ljt; zjt)) (1.8)
where γ > 1 is the common coefficient of relative risk aversion and s(Nt) is an
equivalence scale that depends on the presence and age of the youngest child
Nt.
24 Function gj(·) reflects how the marginal utility of consumption changes
with leisure (and thus with market and household work) and depends on Nt
and j’s education educj. I specify
gj(ljt; zjt) =
 g1(l1t; z1t) =
∑
n κ
n
1 × 1[Nt = n] +
∑
e κ
e
1 × 1[educ1 = e]
g2(l2t; z2t, θ2) =
∑
n κ
n
2 × 1[Nt = n] +
∑
e κ
e
2 × 1[educ2 = e] + θ2
where the first row corresponds to j = 1 and the second row to j = 2. The sum∑
n is over the different values {n} of the age of the youngest child (if any) and
the sum
∑
e is over the different levels {e} of j’s education. For all possible
23Part-time work for men does increase slightly towards the end of the life-cycle (fig-
ure 1.2b). However, I shut down men’s market work choice for reasons pertaining to the
feasibility of the computations herein.
24The role of this equivalence scale is to account for the different needs that families
with children of different ages have. It is not a means of comparison between a multi-
member family and singles. I specify s(Nt) = 1 if the family has no children, s(Nt) = 1.17
if the youngest child is at most 5 years old, s(Nt) = 1.23 if it is between 5 and 10 years,
and s(Nt) = 1.32 if it is between 10 and 18. These numbers come from the McClements
equivalence scale after normalizing the scale to 1 in the case of a childless 2-adult-member
family.
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values {n}, {1[Nt = n]}n constitutes a set of mutually exclusive dummies,
each of which becomes active whenever Nt = n. Similarly, for all possible
values {e}, {1[educj = e]}e constitutes a set of mutually exclusive dummies,
each of which becomes active whenever educj = e. The parameters κ
n
j and κ
e
j
depend on the amount of leisure individual j enjoys and thus on the amount
of market and household work he/she supplies.25 Finally, θ2 is a permanent
individual-specific random cost of work that depends on the amount of work
the female spouse puts into the market and household sectors.26 In practice, θ2
is drawn from a two point discrete distribution whose support and probability
mass depend on the amount of work in the labor market and in the household.
The distribution of θ2 is estimated inside the model. From this specification
it follows that there are two relevant preference shifters affecting Uj, these are
zjt = (Nt, educj)
′.
I parameterize the household production function f by the constant re-
turns to scale specification
f
(
Kt, τ1t, τ2t; Zt
)
= Kφt
(
pi1τ
ϕ
1t + pi2τ
ϕ
2t
) 1−φ
ϕ (1.9)
with the additional restriction that pi1 + pi2 = 1. In the current specification
the vector of production shifters Zt is left empty.
Budget constraint The budget constraint is given by the assets evo-
lution equation (1.3). The borrowing limit At is set at 10% of the family’s
minimum discounted lifetime income at t including pension income (more on
25For a given age n of the family’s youngest child I specify for males (j = 1):
κn1 (l1t) = κ
n
1,0 + κ
n
1,11[τ1t = LM ]
and for females (j = 2):
κn2 (l2t) = κ
n
2,0 + κ
n
2,11[h2t = FT ] + κ
n
2,21[h2t = PT ] + κ
n
2,31[τ2t = MAX].
I specify κej(ljt) similarly. I normalize κ
n
j,0 = 0, ∀j, n, and κej,0 = 0, ∀j, e; these are the
dummies that correspond to j supplying the fewest possible hours in the labor market and
the household. As a result, a positive gj implies that work lowers the utility of consumption
(given that 1− γ < 0) and that consumption and leisure are substitutes.
26I do not model random costs of work for men because these cannot be identified when
men effectively have a binary time use choice only, τ1t = LM or τ1t = L.
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pension income in section 1.3.4). This is not a generous borrowing limit as
lifetime earnings are hindered by the possibility that the female spouse ab-
stains from market. Hourly wages wjt and child care costs CCt
(
h2t, Nt
)
are
described below.
Wages Each household member is fit to work in the market and earn
an hourly wage that evolves according to the following permanent/transitory
process
lnwjt = W jt + vjt + ξjt
vjt = vjt−1 + ζjt.
(1.10)
This process has been shown to fit the PSID data well (Blundell et al., 2016).
The hourly wage is assumed exogenous and the individuals are viewed as price-
takers in the labor market. The process is education specific but those sub-
scripts are removed to simplify the notation. W jt is the mean of j’s log wage
at t which is common across people of the same gender j and education.
The sum vjt+ξjt represents the stochastic idiosyncratic productivity which
consists of a permanent and a transitory component, vjt and ξjt respectively.
The permanent component is the only economically relevant component and
follows a unit root subject to a permanent shock ζjt. I allow shocks to be
correlated across family members; specifically I assume ζ1t and ζ2t are jointly
normally distributed according toζ1t
ζ2t
 ∼ N
 0
0
 ,
 σ2ζ1,t σζ1ζ2,t
σζ1ζ2,t σ
2
ζ2,t
 .
This process is estimated directly from the data and details are provided in
section 1.5.1. The beginning-of-life permanent components, v1t=0 and v2t=0,
are also correlated to reflect initial conditions that arise from the marriage
market (assortative patterns in marriage); this correlation is also estimated
directly in the data.
The transitory shock is viewed as measurement error that does not affect
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choices; a similar approach is taken by French (2005) using PSID data or
Blundell et al. (2013). It follows that the ‘within-household’ gender wage gap
in period t is given by exp(W 1t + v1t)/ exp(W 2t + v2t).
Pareto weight Let mt = {x1,x2, w1t, w2t,d1t,d2t, z1t, z2t} be the set
of variables that enter the intra-family bargaining power (the Pareto weight).
As this must be bounded in the unit interval, I employ the logistic function to
represent it. Let partner 1’s weight be given by
µ1t =
exp
(
η(mt)
)
1 + exp
(
η(mt)
) (1.11)
whereas partner 2’s weight by µ2t = 1− µ1t. For η(mt) I specify
η(mt) = η
(0) +
∑
n
η(n) × w1t
w2t
× 1[Nt = n].
Although not explicitly shown to economize on notation, η(n) is a function
of spouses’ education; I specify η(n) =
∑
e
∑
e′ η
n,e,e′1[educ1 = e, educ2 = e
′]
where the sum is over a set of mutually exclusive education dummies. η(n)
reflects how intra-family bargaining power changes with the gender wage gap
within a particular family and it varies with family composition and spousal
education. As education educj likely affects the initial allocation of bargaining
power in the household, xj = {educj} and there is a partial overlap between
xj and zjt. In this specification d1t and d2t are left empty.
Stochastic fertility The arrival of children is stochastic and exoge-
nously set to reproduce patterns in the PSID over the life-cycle. Children can
affect individual choices in the family through: (i) their needs (they require
more of the public good in the form of an equivalence scale s(Nt)), (ii) their
direct impact on their parents’ time-use preferences κ
(n)
2 , (iii) their direct im-
pact on the budget constraint (children require child care if they are young and
both parents work away from home), and (iv) their effect on the allocation of
bargaining power between parents through η(n). To avoid increasing the state
space beyond what is computationally feasible, I assume that only the age of
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the youngest child (if any) matters for family choices, not the number of chil-
dren in the household. The idea is that the family will always have to cater
for the needs and costs of the youngest child regardless the age or number of
older ones.
I assume there are 4 possible family composition (fertility) states in year
t, summarized by the state variable Nt. State Nt = 1 corresponds to a family
with no children under 18 years, Nt = 2 indicates a family whose youngest
child is between (0, 5) years old, Nt = 3 indicates a family whose youngest
child is between [5, 10) years old, and Nt = 4 is when the youngest child is
between [10, 18] years. At age 18 any child leaves the household with certainty.
The marginal distribution of children, estimated in the PSID, depends on age
and parental education.
The transition between fertility states depends on age, parental education,
as well as the fertility state one period before. For a childless family at age t
the probability that they have a child at age t+ 1 is given by
Probt+1(Nt+1 = 2 | Nt = 1, educ1, educ2).
I restrict the transition matrix to allow smooth transitions only: a family
with Nt = 1 (no children) may next year have Nt+1 = 1 again or progress to
Nt+1 = 2 (a child at the youngest age bracket), but not Nt+1 = 3. Downwards
transitions are not allowed with the exception of the arrival of a new child when
an older one already exists (in this case I reinstate N to 2) or the departure
of an older child from the household. These restrictions accord well with the
patterns seen in the data.
Child care costs The function CCt
(
h2t, Nt
)
= cct
(
h2t, Nt
)×Probt(costs >
0 | Nt) describes child care costs a family must meet as a function of its com-
position and the hours the mother is away from home due to market work
(recall that the father always works full-time). The function depends on time
to reflect changing prices of child care over time as well as on the probability
the family actually faces positive child care costs conditional on the age of
1.3. A Life-Cycle Collective Model without Commitment 53
their child. I assume that pre-school children need child care for so long as
the mother is away from home working. If she is present in the household
for some time, then child care costs are 0 for that time. Young school-age
children require some child care only following the schooldays as education is
publicly provided whereas older school-age children do not require child care.
To account for the fact that some families may have informal child care ar-
rangements in place (such as a grandparent looking after a child) I multiply
the costs function cct
(
h2t, Nt
)
by the probability that the family faces positive
such costs. I allow the probability to depend on calendar time and the fertility
state Nt and I estimate it directly in the PSID data.
Given that the mother can work either ‘full time’ (FT) or ‘part time’
(PT), the costs function cct
(
h2t, Nt
)
can be summarized by
cct
(
h2t, Nt
)
=

FT × cchratet if Nt = 2 and h2t = FT
PT × cchratet if
 Nt = 2 and h2t = PTNt = 3 and h2t = FT
0 in all other cases.
The hourly price of child care is cchratet and varies with calendar time. Section
1.5.1 provides details on the estimation of cchratet and the probability of
positive child care costs.
1.3.4 Retirement
Retirement starts at time T + 1 and ends at time TR for both spouses. During
this period the individuals make no time allocation decisions: they are out of
the labor force retired and do not engage in home production (thus their ‘pro-
ductive’ time is entirely spent on leisure). They face no uncertainty regarding
wages and productivity (as they earn no wages) or fertility (their children, if
any, have grown up and left the household). They receive a pension income
which, along with their savings (if any), they use to purchase market goods or
save further. In the absence of wages or children their outside options remain
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constant throughout retirement; intra-family bargaining power is fixed at its
value in the last period of working life.27,28
Retirement in this model serves as a stylized state towards the end of the
partners’ lifetime. It is not used or needed to infer behavior during the working
period of life (which is the focus of this chapter). In the absence of retirement,
however, individuals would probably need to accumulate fewer assets during
the working period of life and, possibly, work less. In this case, the model would
generate full- or part-time employment profiles less easily without pushing the
disutility of work towards zero (in the context of the parametrization in (1.8)).
Adopting a compact formulation equivalent to expression (1.1’), the house-
hold can be seen during retirement as solving
max
{Qt,At+1}t=TRt=T+1
TR∑
t=T+1
βt
[
µ1TU1
(
Qt, l1t; z1t
)
+ µ2TU2
(
Qt, l2t; z2t
)]
(1.1R)
subject to
At +
2∑
j=1
Ijt = Qt +
At+1
1 + r
At+1 ≥ At+1 (1.12)
ljt = T j = {1, 2} (1.13)
ATR = 0. (1.14)
Most of the notation has been introduced previously. Preferences Uj are given
by (1.8) and the Pareto weight µjT by (1.11); the vector of observable taste
shifters is now zjt = (Nt = 1, educj)
′ as there is no fertility. The budget con-
straint is slightly different from (1.3) in that earnings are replaced by pension
income Ijt, the public good Q directly enters the constraint (as there is no
27Allowing the outside options to depend on distribution factors implies that reallocations
of bargaining power are in principle possible during retirement too. In practice I am making
no use of distribution factors in this chapter, other than the within-household gender wage
gap, and thus I fix the retirees’ intra-family bargaining power to its last value prior to
retirement.
28In the absence of time-use choices during retirement (or, more generally, strictly private
goods), the retirees’ Pareto weights play in reality no role and their problem collapses to a
unitary ‘cake-eating’ problem.
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home production), and there are no child care costs. For each individual, pen-
sion income is set to a deterministic 75% of their average full-time earnings at
the start of their working life. This figure only serves as an approximation to
the actual pension income one would expect to receive; it is not stochastic, it is
history independent (it ignores whether one has worked full-time throughout
their lifetime or not at all), and it is not adjusted for wage growth that has
occurred over time.
Recursive formulation Let SRt = {z1t, z2t,x1,x2, w1T , w2T ,d1T ,d2T}
be the set of exogenous state variables at time t of the retirement stage; current
period assets At is the endogenous state variable.
29 Qt and At+1 are the choice
variables. Program (1.1R) can be written recursively as
V Rt (At,SRt ) = max
Qt,At+1
{ 2∑
j=1
µj
(
x1,x2, w1T , w2T ,d1T ,d2T , z1T , z2T
)
Uj
(
Qt, ljt; zjt
)
+ βV Rt+1(At+1,SRt+1)
}
subject to the budget constraint (1.12), the time budget (1.13), and termi-
nal condition (1.14). This is essentially a modified ‘cake-eating’ problem: in
each period the partners maximize a fixed household welfare function deciding,
without uncertainty, about current-period expenditure and savings.30
Transition from working to retirement period At time T , the last
period of working life, the household’s problem can be written recursively as
VT (AT ,ST ) = maxCT ,AT+1
{U(CT ,ST ) + βV RT+1(AT+1,SRT+1)}
subject to the constraints of the working period.
29The variables x1, x2, w1T , w2T , d1T , and d2T enter the retirement state space through
their effect on the Pareto weight in the last period of working life. These are included here
for theoretical completeness as, in reality, the retirees’ problem is invariant to the Pareto
weight; see footnote 28.
30Ferna´ndez and Wong (2014) also model a ‘cake-eating’ and non-stochastic retirement
period.
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1.4 Model Solution and Simulation
In this section I describe the steps I take to solve and simulate the model devel-
oped in section 2.2. The finite horizon life-cycle model requires computation
of the solution as a function of the entire state space, including age/time, as
described at the start of section 1.3.3. A time period is taken to be 1 year.31
I solve the model starting at the end of the retirement period of life,
assuming that households exhaust their assets and die without debts, and I
move recursively backwards until the beginning of the working period. The
solution in the retirement period is straightforward: this part of the model
is a ‘cake-eating’ problem without uncertainty that involves the continuous
choice of allocating contemporaneous assets and pension income between pub-
lic consumption and future assets. The solution in the working period is more
involved: it entails a mixture of discrete (time allocation) and continuous (con-
sumption/assets) choices under uncertainty which I describe in more detail
below.
I discretize the domain of all continuous state variables to reduce the
dimensionality of the problem: these are assets A (applies to both the working
and retirement periods of life) and idiosyncratic productivity v1 and v2 (applies
to the working period of life only). I use a grid of 12 points in A, the domain
of which depends on age/time, and a grid of 8 points in each of v1 and v2. In
generating the grids in v1 and v2, I assume the spouses expect the gender wage
gap between them to remain flat (mean stationary) over their life-cycle. This
fundamental assumption enables the identification of the household structure
and I discuss it further in section 1.5.2. I use information on the variance
of each spouse’s log wage net of the variance of the economically-irrelevant
transitory shock, the mean of the male’s log wage, and the gender wage gap at
the start of the life-cycle. I trim the support of wages 3.25 standard deviations
31Currently the chapter focuses on one cohort only (those born between 1943 and 1955).
The age of the male spouse is 30 at the start of working life in the model; in the data I
match that to people aged 25-37 (mean age 30) in 1980. The age of the male spouse is 59
at the end of working life; in the data I match that to people who are 55-65 years old (mean
age 59) in 2009.
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above and below their applicable means; the grid points are then the mid-
points of equiprobable adjacent intervals covering the applicable support.
The support of the discrete state variables is fully accounted for in the
solution. Spouses’ education educ1 and educ2 and age/time t are the discrete
states in both working and retirement periods of life. Women’s unobserved
costs of work θ2, and the presence of children and the age of the youngest
among them N , are additional discrete state variables in the working period.
At any given point of the state space, the solution in the working stage
of life proceeds in two steps. In the first step I calculate the optimal con-
sumption/future assets allocation conditional on every possible allocation of
spouses’ discrete time in the market and the household; these time allocations
appear in table 1.2 of section 1.3.3. The second step involves the calculation
of the value of the household objective across all possible allocations of time
(given the corresponding optimal consumption/future assets allocation from
the first step) and the selection of that time allocation that is associated with
the highest value. Note that for any given realization of the state space the
Pareto weight is known as it is mechanical transformation of the gender wage
gap and family composition through (1.11).32 The solution in the retirement
stage of life only involves the unconditional calculation of the optimal con-
sumption/future assets allocation as there are no discrete time choices in this
stage.
The calculation of the optimal consumption/future assets allocation in
the first step requires knowledge of the stream of expected household utilities
(weighted sums of spousal utilities) from the following period onwards. This
expected future value is a function of today’s information, the realization of
the state space in the following period, and future assets (a choice variable
today). Expectations are taken with respect to three stochastic components
in the future period; these are future family composition (presence and age
of youngest child) and the spouses’ future labor market productivity. The
32As a consequence, there is no separate grid for the Pareto weight (unlike, for example,
Mazzocco et al., 2014).
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transition matrices for the random components, i.e. the probabilities of moving
from one point in today’s grid to another grid point tomorrow, are estimated
directly from the data given the parametric assumptions of section 1.3.3.
Once the expected future values are calculated, the conditionally optimal
consumption/future assets allocation in the first step is obtained by maxi-
mizing the weighted sum of the spouses’ utilities today and the discounted
expected future value. The maximization proceeds in a ‘table look-up’ fashion
where I evaluate the objective in proximate points on the applicable domain
of all the relevant choice variables (consumption, future assets). I select the
point that produces the maximum value and, using the immediately adjacent
points, I generate a new finer grid that is concentrated therein. I reevaluate
the objective function and I proceed likewise until I reach the optimal with
an acceptable tolerance. This approach guarantees a global maximum if the
conditional (on a time allocation) objective function is concave. Although the
discrete time use choices in the future can, in principle, induce kinks in the
expected future value, I overcome this thanks to sufficient uncertainty about
the future state (uncertainty about family composition and labor market pro-
ductivity).33 Finally, I use linear interpolations to evaluate the expected future
value function outside the asset grid points for which it is explicitly generated.
I simulate 10 replications of the life-cycle choices of 1279 households (a
total of 12790 simulations). The simulations are based on initial conditions for
spouses’ education and family composition observed in the data. I draw initial
(log) wages for men and women assuming they are normally distributed around
their beginning-of-life means. I replicate the empirical covariance between the
two netting out the covariance of measurement error (transitory shock). I
produce random draws for the entire profile of permanent shocks and I use
(1.10) to generate life-cycle profiles of wages in such a way so as to replicate
the empirical profiles of wages and the gender wage gap. I trim the draws
33I check concavity of the conditional (on a time allocation) objective function by verifying
that the second derivative of the expected future value function is globally non-positive with
respect to assets.
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of such shocks 2.1 times above and below their annual means so as to ensure
that the support of simulated wages falls within the wage grids used in the
solution of the model.34 I also draw profiles of ‘fertility’ shocks given the
initial conditions and the fertility transition matrix estimated in the data. I
use the model’s policy functions to infer the optimal choices associated with
the random profiles of wages and fertility. This involves the interpolation of
the policy functions outside the grid points that are explicitly constructed for.
I interpolate linearly over the asset dimension only after selecting the slice of
the policy functions that is closer to the simulated wage and fertility state at
a given age/time. I start the simulations assuming households hold 0 initial
assets.
The above solution and simulation routines are written in Julia.35 With
currently one education level only active for either spouse, they run in approx-
imately 40 seconds in total on a 12-core Intel Xeon E5-2630 at a 2.3GHz clock
speed.
1.5 Identification and Estimation
In this section I describe the steps I take to estimate the structural model
of section 2.2. I follow a two-step procedure. In the first step I estimate
the external blocks of the model, namely the wage process for each spouse,
the fertility process, and the child care costs. Moreover, using reduced-form
information on divorcees, I approximate the gender-specific value of divorce
and I use it to normalize intra-family bargaining power in the first few years
of the family life-cycle. The role of this approximation and normalization is
further discussed below. In the second step, and conditional on results from
the first step, I estimate the parameters of the structural model using the
method of simulated moments.
34Recall that the wage grids used in the model solution assume a fixed average gender
wage gap over the lifetime.
35Julia is a new high-performance programming language; documentation is available at
http://julialang.org.
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Section 1.5.1 discusses identification and estimation of the external blocks
of the model; section 1.5.2 discusses identification and estimation of the model’s
parameters. This part requires information on the initial intra-family bargain-
ing power, a matter that I discuss in section 1.5.3.
1.5.1 External Processes
Wages To construct the wage grids for the solution of the model, I require
the mean (log) wage over the life-cycle as well as the wage variance net of
the variation in measurement error (transitory shock) for each gender. To
integrate out future uncertainty, I require the transition rule for wages, i.e. the
probability of moving from one point on the wage grid to another, which, in
turn, requires knowledge of the covariance matrix of permanent shocks over the
life-cycle. To obtain simulated wage profiles, I also need the covariance matrix
of spouses’ transitory shocks in the first period (used for initial conditions).
The mean and the variance of wages are calculated directly in the data.
Results are omitted for brevity but a graphical illustration of the mean appears
in figure A.1 in the appendix. Results regarding the transition matrix for wages
are also omitted (but available upon request).
Given the parametrization of the wage process in (1.10) the second mo-
ments of shocks can be readily identified from various second moments of
spouses’ contemporaneous, lagged, and lead wages. Meghir and Pistaferri
(2004) and previous studies show that E[∆ lnwjt
∑1
τ=−1 ∆ lnwjt+τ ] identifies
the variance of individual j’s permanent shock at t and E[∆ lnwjt∆ lnwjt+1]
identifies (minus) the variance of j’s transitory shock. In the first case the
sum of consecutive wage growths removes the transitory elements; the remain-
ing covariation between the sum and contemporaneous wage growth is due to
the variance of the permanent shock. In the second case the covariation be-
tween consecutive wage growths picks up the variance of the mean-reverting
transitory shock. Similar moments between spouses identify the covariance of
spousal shocks.
To obtain estimates of the second moments of shocks I run a minimum
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Figure 1.8: Simulated against actual wages (means)
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Notes: This figure plots the mean of simulated against actual wages over the life-cycle. Simulated
wages are based on wage process (1.10). A 95% confidence interval around the empirical means
appears in gray shade.
Source: Major PSID sample and own simulations.
distance estimation matching the empirical covariance matrix of (log) wages
to its theoretical counterpart; I allow the second moments to vary over the
life-cycle. I use equal weights across all moments (identity weighting matrix).
Appendix A.3 reports the estimation details and a full table of estimates. To
reduce the effect of wage measurement error in the second stage, I input into the
structural model a 5-point two-sided moving average of the covariance matrix
of shocks instead of the original point-estimates; figure A.2 in the appendix
provides a graphical illustration of the moving average for the variances of
men’s and women’s permanent shocks.
After estimating the wage process, I draw 12790 random profiles for men’s
and women’s wages. Figure 1.8 plots the mean of the simulated wages over time
against the empirical ones. This simulation naturally performs well although
there are some small discrepancies due to the use of the smoothed second
moments of shocks rather than the actual ones.
Fertility To integrate out future uncertainty while solving the model I
require the transition rule for fertility, i.e. the probability that a family moves
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Figure 1.9: Proportion of families in various fertility states
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Notes: This figure plots the proportion of families in each fertility state in the actual and the
simulated data over the life-cycle. A 95% confidence interval around the empirical means appears
in gray shade.
Source: Major PSID sample and own simulations.
from one fertility state to another. These probabilities are obtained directly
from the PSID data. I count the number of families reporting a given family
composition at time t conditional on their composition at t− 1. This is done
separately by age t; the calculation only involves families that are observed in
consecutive years and, therefore, uses a subset of the major PSID sample only.
To simulate the model I also require the categorical distribution of family
composition at the beginning of the life-cycle. This is taken directly from the
data. With this in hand and using the aforementioned transition rule I draw
12790 random life-cycle fertility profiles. I use those as input to the structural
model. Figure 1.9 plots the proportion of families in each fertility state in
the actual and the simulated data over the life-cycle. Again, this simulation
performs well.
Child care costs The hourly rate of child care in function CCt
(
h2t, Nt
)
is cchratet and varies with calendar time. It is hard to find direct evidence
on this. The PSID reports child care expenditure by households but any
meaningful analysis of this measure would be incomplete for several reasons.
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First, child care expenditure does not necessarily convey information about
the price of child care; as an example, child care expenditure may increase
for a given household expenditure due to increased demand (say, parents work
longer hours, mothers switch from part to full time work etc.) but the hourly
price may well have stayed constant. Second, only a fraction of households
report positive such costs due to, possibly, one parent being available at home
or some other informal child care arrangements. It is not clear how these
households compare to the general population and standard selectivity issues
arise.
To get around these problems, I exploit the fact that child care is a labor
intensive industry and I assume that its sole cost is the hourly wage child care
workers are paid. A study that provides a systematic analysis of the wages
of such workers is Blau (1992). Based on Current Population Survey data
between 1976 and 1986, the study finds that child care workers are paid ap-
proximately 50% of the mean wage of all other female workers in that period.36
This number is somehow confirmed by Whitebook et al. (1993) who argue that
“child care teaching staff in 1992, as in 1988, continue to earn less than half
as much as comparably educated women”.
Given that the PSID data I use cover the years 1980-2009, I adopt the
above percentage and I fix cchrate in year 1981, the mid-year between 1976
and 1986, at $6.59 (expressed in 2010 dollars).37 A question remains regarding
cchrate prior to and after 1981. There is lack of consistent ‘hard’ evidence
on the compensation of child care workers in the longer period. Blau (1992)
finds a significant negative trend for wages in one child care sector (with trends
in other sectors being insignificant); Whitebook et al. (1993, page 7) report
36Blau (1992) selects a nationally representative sample of around 4, 000 child care givers
(all of whom are women) and divides them in 3 broad child care sectors (private household
care, non-household care, teachers). Table 3 therein reports the average hourly wage in each
of the three sectors alongside the average hourly wage of a random sample of other female
workers. Based on these numbers I calculate the (weighted) average wage across all child
care sectors and divide it by the average wage of other female workers to obtain a ratio of
0.496 ≈ 0.5.
37cchrate1981 = $6.59 is 50% of the average female wage in the PSID over 1976-1986.
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that a growing segment of the child care workforce has seen a decline in their
real wages between 1988 and 1992. O’Neill and O’Connell (2001) report that
real wages of child care have been flat or slightly decreasing over the 1977-
1997 period. In light of this ‘soft’ evidence I calibrate cchrate at a constant
$6.59 (expressed in 2010 dollars) throughout the 1980-2009 period (this period
coincides with the life-cycle of the cohort the chapter focuses on). Whenever
this rate is below the real federal minimum wage, I update cchrate to reflect
this.38 Essentially this pattern implies that the hourly wage of child care
workers declines relative to that of the general population (of both men and
women) reflecting -what seems to be- a consensus that child care has steadily
become less expensive in the last 3 decades.
Finally, I calculate the probability of a family facing positive child care
costs by counting the number of families of a given fertility status that report
non-zero such costs (the PSID collects information on child care expenditure
after 1988). This is done separately by calendar time. In years when child care
expenditures are missing I use the probabilities estimated in the closest period
when data are available. Table A.2 in the appendix reports the estimated
probabilities as well as the calibrated hourly price of child care over calendar
time.
1.5.2 Model Parameters
The model is estimated by the method of simulated moments conditional on
first-stage results for wages, fertility, child care costs, and a normalization of
intra-family bargaining power (the Pareto weight) in the first 10 years of the
family life-cycle. The details of this normalization are presented in section
1.5.3 after I discuss its role in the present section.
There is a number of parameters in the model that are kept fixed based
38I update the hourly child care rate upwards to reflect a binding federal minimum wage
in the following years: 1980-1987, 1992-1993, 1996-1999, and 2008-2009 (average upwards
adjustment of $0.69 and maximum upwards adjustment of $2.27; all amounts are in $2010).
Historical data for the federal minimum wage rate are available by the US Department of
Labor at www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm.
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Table 1.3: Fixed parameters
Parameter Value Reference
r 0.01 Attanasio et al. (2008)
β 0.98 Attanasio et al. (2008)
γ 1.5 Attanasio et al. (2008)
φ 0.8 Lise and Yamada (2014)
pi 0.5 Lise and Yamada (2014)
ϕ 0.5 Lise and Yamada (2014)
on estimates available in the literature; these are summarized in table 1.3.
The interest rate r is set at 1% annually which is very close to the interest
rate in Attanasio et al. (2008) and Blundell et al. (2013). The discount factor
β is set at 0.98 (same as in the aforementioned papers) implying that families
are slightly impatient as the corresponding discount rate is higher than the
interest rate. The coefficient of relative risk aversion γ is set at 1.5 as for
example in Attanasio et al. (2008). In principle γ could be estimated combining
consumption data (from the Consumer Expenditure Survey for example) or
assets data. Finally I fix 3 parameters pertaining to the technology of home
production: the output elasticity of public expenditures φ is set at 0.8, the
share of men’s housework time pi at 0.5, and the technology parameter ϕ at
0.5. These values accord with Lise and Yamada (2014) who estimate a home
production function in a collective setting. The production parameters cannot
be identified in the current setup because the output of household production
is not observed and there are no observable factors that operate exclusively as
production shifters.39
There is a total of 26 remaining parameters40: 4 pertaining to male pref-
39Cherchye et al. (2012) identify the parameters of home production through variation
in exclusive production shifters (number and age of children) that leave individual prefer-
ences unchanged. By contrast, in the present chapter the age and number of children affect
individual tastes and the Pareto weight. Lise and Yamada (2014) identify the production
parameters parametrically using the marginal rates of substitution between leisure, house-
hold work and private consumption (all of which they observe in their data). Such marginal
rates of substitution cannot be used in the current setup as time is a discrete resource.
40There are 26 parameters to be estimated when educj , the education state variable of
each spouse, is suppressed.
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erences (κ
(n)
1 ), 18 pertaining to female preferences (κ
(n)
2 ) including unobserved
work types (θ2), and 4 coefficients on the gender wage gap from the Pareto
weight function (η(n)). The estimation proceeds as follows. Given a set of pa-
rameter values I solve the life-cycle problem and simulate 12790 households. I
compute a number of life-cycle moments pertaining to family time allocations
in the simulated dataset and I do exactly the same using the actual data. Fi-
nally, I calculate a distance metric between the simulated and actual moments
and I repeat the process until the metric is minimized. Formally, the estimated
parameters Θˆ solve the minimization problem
Θˆ = arg min
Θ
(M˜n −Ms(Θ))′Vn(M˜n −Ms(Θ))
where M˜n is a k × 1 vector of moments over n observations from the real
data, Ms(Θ) is a vector of moments over s simulations from the artificial
data, and Vn is the inverse of the diagonal of the covariance matrix of the
data moments.41 For the optimization I use NLopt (Johnson) and a number of
algorithms therein;42 I compute asymptotic standard errors as in Gourieroux
et al. (1993) and Adda and Cooper (2003). In total I fit k = 72 moments; these
are proportions of married men and women engaging in various time allocations
by their family composition and period in their life-cycle. Specifically I fit the
proportion of
• men in:
– ‘low middle’ household work
• women in
– ‘full time’ market work and ‘maximum’ household work
41I use the inverse diagonal of the covariance matrix of the data moments in the light of
evidence about small-sample biases that arise when using the optimal weighting matrix; see
Altonji and Segal (1996).
42I use a local and a global derivative-free algorithm interchangeably. The local is the
Subplex algorithm implemented by Rowan (1990); the global is a fast controlled random
search algorithm described in Kaelo and Ali (2006).
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– ‘full time’ market work and ‘high middle’ household work
– ‘part time’ market work and ‘maximum’ household work
– ‘part time’ market work and ‘high middle’ household work
– no market work and ‘maximum’ household work.
These moments are calculated separately by family composition (fertility) and
over 3 different stages of the working stage of the life-cycle (beginning - first
10 years, middle - subsequent 10 years, end - last 10 years).
Identification works as follows. After normalizing intra-family bargain-
ing power in the first 10 years of the family life-cycle, women’s employment
rates in the same years identify their preferences over full-time and part-time
market work (k
(n)
2 , θ2). Similarly, men’s and women’s rates of household work
in the same years identify their respective preferences over home production
time (k
(n)
1 , k
(n)
2 , θ2). These preferences may differ by family composition and
variation across fertility states identifies such differences.
Keeping preferences and the initial normalized Pareto weight fixed, I use
the model to generate life-cycle profiles of family time allocations. Then, I
allow intra-family bargaining power to shift parametrically with the gender
wage gap in life-cycle years 11-30, so as to minimize the wedge, if any, between
the model-generated and the empirical profiles of time allocations. This iden-
tifies η(n).43 The identifying assumptions are two: (1) preferences conditional
on family composition do not change with time; (2) changes in the gender
wage gap over time are unexpected (i.e. entirely treated as shocks). This im-
plies that individuals do not foresee the narrowing of the gender wage gap in
the future; the extent to which they do foresee it, their choices should reflect
this right from the beginning of their life-cycle and subsequent changes in the
gender gap should not induce further behavioral responses.
These points can be made clearer using the graphical illustration in figure
1.10. Suppose the life-cycle consists of three periods only, period 1, period 2,
43Identification of the structural parameters also obtains if the Pareto weight is fixed,
alternatively, in any other year(s) in the family life-cycle, not necessarily the first 10 ones.
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Figure 1.10: Graphical illustration of identification
(a) Normalize initial Pareto weight (b) Identify preferences in period 1
(c) Generate entire profile of time-use (d) Update Pareto weight
Notes: These four graphs illustrate how I achieve identification of the household structure (indi-
vidual preferences and changes in intra-family bargaining power). The graphs serve as illustration
only and do not correspond to actual profiles from the model or the data.
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and period 3. Suppose also that the solid black line in figure 1.10 depicts the
empirical mean of female full-time market work over the life-cycle. I normalize
the Pareto weight in period 1, shaded gray in graph 1.10a. Conditional on it,
I use the empirical profile in period 1 to identify women’s preferences for full-
time market work. Holding preferences and the initial normalization fixed, I
use the model to generate an entire profile of female full-time market work over
the life-cycle (red dashed and solid line in graphs 1.10b and 1.10c). In period
2 and period 3 I shift the Pareto weight in response to the gender wage gap in
order to minimize the distance between model-generated and empirical profiles
of female full-time market work (graph 1.10d).
How do I normalize the initial intra-family bargaining power? I discuss
this extensively in section 1.5.3. As a brief illustration here, I proxy deci-
sion power of a spouse by the ratio of his/her lifetime earnings over the sum of
the couple’s lifetime earnings should the spouses get divorce. To construct this
ratio I project each spouse’s lifetime earnings in the hypothetical scenario of di-
vorce given their observable characteristics and using information on divorcees
from the PSID.44 This normalization is appealing because it uses information
on divorcees while divorce is the relevant outside option. Alternatively I could
have used an arbitrary normalization as in Ferna´ndez and Wong (2014).
1.5.3 Initialization of the Pareto Weight
The projection of lifetime earnings if spouses get divorced requires informa-
tion on the earnings of divorcees. I obtain this information from the minor
PSID sample of singles whose discussion I postponed previously in data sec-
tion 1.2.1. This sample consists of single men and women and mimics many of
the selection criteria applied to the major PSID sample of married. I restrict
my attention to persons aged 25 to 65 from the core ‘Survey Research Cen-
ter’ sample between years 1980 and 2009 irrespective of their cohort. I select
44Other papers too have used information on divorcees/singles in order to obtain identifi-
cation in the context of the collective model; for example Browning et al. (2013) use singles
to identify a version of equivalence scales and intra-household bargaining power.
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Table 1.4: Minor sample descriptive statistics
Men Women
% some college 0.50 0.48
Annual earnings 49759 31762
Annual work hours 2133 1826
Num. of kids 0.26 0.94
Observations (person-year) 4561 7614
Notes: ‘some college’ is defined as any education above the 12th grade. Annual earnings are
expressed in 2010 dollars.
Source: Minor PSID sample.
individuals who report being divorced, who work in the labor market (as I
require information on their earnings), and whose earnings do not fall below
1% or above 99% of the (gender- and time-specific) distribution.45 The result-
ing dataset consists of 4561 divorced male-year and 7614 divorced female-year
observations. Some key descriptive statistics are presented in table 1.4 and
appendix A.1 discusses this sample at a greater length. A few differences are
apparent between married (table 1.1) and divorced individuals: the latter are
on average less likely to have been to college, divorced men work and earn less
than their married counterparts and divorced women earn roughly the same
but work more than their married counterparts. A stark contrast is the num-
ber of kids each group has with those continuously married having on average
more kids.
My first goal is to form an estimate of the expected flow of lifetime earn-
ings (expected human wealth) of married men and women in the major PSID
sample should they get divorced. Specifically, for each married individual and
each time period I want to calculate
Human Wealthjt if Divorced = Et(Y
d
jt) +
Et(Y
d
jt+1)
1 + ρ
+
Et(Y
d
jt+2)
(1 + ρ)2
+ . . .
where Y djt is j’s earnings as divorcee at time t. The main difficulty is to estimate
45This sample includes those separated alongside those formally divorced.
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expected future earnings and for that I use the minor PSID sample of divorcees.
Following Blundell et al. (2015, 2016) on the estimation of expected life-
time earnings, I pool earnings of divorcees, separately by gender, for all years
and ages. I regress their earnings Y on two types of individual attributes:
attributes that are fixed over time (race and education) and attributes that
change with time in a deterministic way (a quadratic polynomial in age and
its interactions with race and education). Specifically I regress
Ykt = χ
′
kak +ψ
′
ktbk + kt, k = {1, 2} (1.15)
where χk points to the first set of attributes and ψkt to the second; subscript k
reflects the gender of the divorcee. ak and bk are linear regression parameters.
To obtain a time-t estimate of future earnings at t+s should married individual
j get divorce, I use estimates from (1.15) along with information known at t
about the concerned person j. Specifically I construct Ŷjt+s = χ
′
jâj +ψ
′
jt+sb̂j,
j = {1, 2}, and I use it in place of Et(Y djt+s). To generate the sequence of
expected future earnings I assume that individuals work until age 65 and that
(1 + ρ)−1 = β.
My second goal is to generate a proxy for intra-family bargaining power in
the first 10 years of the family life-cycle. The spouses’ projected human wealth
serves as an approximation to the value of their outside option in the event of
divorce. I employ a simple mapping from the approximate value of divorce to
bargaining power. Specifically, I define intra-family bargaining power of the
male spouse at time t (µ1t) as
Human Wealth1t if Divorced/
(
Human Wealth1t if Divorced+Human Wealth2t if Divorced
)
where subscript 1 points to the male spouse and subscript 2 to the female.
This expression is bounded in the unit interval, it is increasing in the value of
men’s human wealth and decreasing in the value of women’s human wealth.46
46The way intra-family bargaining power is constructed favors mechanically the youngest
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Table 1.5: Initialized intra-family bargaining power of men in 1980-1989
mean median std.dev. min max N
Men’s barg. power 0.6358 0.6208 0.0673 0.4022 0.9106 5970
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for the derived intra-family bargaining power of
married men in the major PSID sample in years 1980-1989. ‘N’ refers to the number of married
household-year observations.
The intuition behind these projections is the following. At any given
time, the spouses observe perfectly how divorced people of various ages and
characteristics fare in life and form expectations about how they would fare,
should they get divorced themselves. In other words, the spouses have perfect
knowledge of equation (1.15) at any time t and they use it to form expectations
about themselves, assuming that the distribution of errors kt is the same
among married and divorced persons of the same gender. Obviously such
projections depart from the theoretically-correct value of divorce (i.e. the
utility of the divorcee) but I expect this departure to be innocuous for the
initial normalization.
The results from regressions (1.15) appear in table A.3 in the appendix.
I normalize intra-family bargaining power in the first 10 years of the family
life-cycle so these results use information (earnings, individual attributes) on
divorcees from calendar years 1980-1989 (these years coincide with the first 10
years of the married household’s life-cycle given the restriction of my estimation
sample to one cohort only). Table 1.5 reports basic descriptive statistics for
the derived bargaining power of married males in years 1980-1989; figure 1.11
is a graphical representation of its cross-sectional distribution.
I estimate an average µ1 = 63.58% in years 1980-1989; the median is
slightly lower at 62.08%.47 The maximum value is approximately 91% and
spouse in the household (as for such spouse the sequence of earnings forming human wealth
would be longer). This can be a problem when the age difference between spouses is large.
To remove this undesirable feature I replace human wealth as divorcee by an equivalent
annual annuity; specifically I divide ‘Human Wealthjt if Divorced’ by ρ
−1× (1− (1 +ρ)−Tj )
where ρ is the discount rate and Tj is the remaining years of individual j until age 65.
47Voena (2015) estimates the male Pareto weight at 0.7 using earlier years of the PSID.
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Figure 1.11: Histogram of the initialized intra-family bargaining power of
men in 1980-1989
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of the derived intra-family bargaining power of married
men in the major PSID sample in 1980-1989. A reference line is plotted at 0.5 (equal bargaining
powers between spouses).
there are households in which women are relatively stronger (i.e. for which
men’s bargaining power is less than 50%). The derived bargaining power varies
with education; this is consistent with the structural model that postulates that
xj = {educj} affects the initial allocation of bargaining power in the household.
Appendix table A.4 reports how the derived intra-family bargaining power
correlates with each spouse’s education, race, and age.
In light of this evidence, I normalize men’s intra-family bargaining power
in the first 10 years of the life-cycle at 0.6208 (the median value from table
1.5 across all education states). Naturally, the estimates of the structural
parameters are conditional on this initial bargaining power and it remains an
open question how sensitive they are to a different normalization. One would
expect that an alternative normalization would naturally affect the magnitudes
of the parameters but likely leave unchanged the gradient of each spouse’s
parameters with respect to leisure or the sign of coefficients in the Pareto
weight function.
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1.6 Results
This section presents the estimates of the parameters of the structural model
and displays the model’s overall fit. Table 1.6 reports the estimates for the
parameters of preferences, namely the components of the gj(·) functions in
(1.8). Panel A reports women’s preferences for market work and panel B
reports men’s and women’s preferences for household work.
Reading through table 1.6 note that within a type of time use, for example
within women’s ‘full-time work’ in panel A(I), the parameters corresponding
to different family compositions (rows 1-4) are mutually exclusive inside gj(·).
Notice also that the parameters across types of female market work in panel
A do not increment but they too are mutually exclusive. Finally, note that
positive and larger values of these parameters imply that work, in the market
or in the household (panel B), induces greater disutility as utility in (1.8)
is negative due to γ being set to 1.5. In this case leisure can be seen as a
substitute good to consumption.
The parameters of female full-time market work (panel A(I), rows 1-4)
turn out positive and with a good spread across fertility regimes. Women with
very young kids (up to age 5) suffer the greatest disutility from work whereas
childless women the least. This evidence is in line with Blundell et al. (2013)
who use a similar preference specification for UK women. The parameters
of female part-time market work (panel A(II), rows 1-4) are everywhere lower
than those of full-time work implying that the former causes less disutility than
the latter. Again, women with young kids (up to age 10) suffer the greatest
disutility from part-time work compared to their counterparts with older or
no children. Interestingly, whether childless women work full- or part-time in
the market makes little difference in terms of the disutility these two types of
market work induce.
Rows (5) and (6) report the estimates for women’s unobserved random
costs of work θ2 as they materialize in the case of market work. Recall that
θ2 is drawn from a two-point discrete distribution separately for each type of
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market work (full-time, part-time) and note that these costs increment to the
parameters in rows 1-4. Row (5) refers to the ‘low type’ of market work (i.e.
the type who dislikes work the most) and row (6) refers to the ‘high type’
(i.e. the type who favors work). The probability attached to each type is such
that the average of θ2 per type of market work is zero over the population.
Taken together with rows 1-4 in panel A(I), these estimates suggest that for
approximately 25% of women in the sample function g2(·) is negative rendering
consumption and leisure complements. These are likely to be highly educated
women for whom the costs of not working are significantly higher than the
utility benefits and who are, therefore, highly attached to the labor market.
The parameters of preferences for home production time (panel B, rows
1-4) also turn out positive. For women these estimates are everywhere lower
than the parameters of part-time market work implying that ‘maximum’ house-
hold work is relatively more attractive to them despite the higher amount of
hours it entails (see table 1.2). Comparing men’s and women’s household work
preferences it seems at first that men’s disutility from household work is less
than women’s due to the lower estimates for men’s household work parame-
ters. However, the amount of time each gender devotes to household work is
very different by construction. Women in the model are restricted to devote
more than 3 times as much time as men and this is likely to be driving the big
wedge between their preferences.
Rows (5) and (6) in panel B report the estimates for women’s unobserved
random costs of work θ2 as they materialize in the case of ‘maximum’ household
work. Recall that θ2 increments to the parameters in rows 1-4, panel B(II).
There are no unobserved costs for men’s household work because these cannot
be identified when men have one binary time choice only. The results suggest
that there is not much heterogeneity in women’s household work preferences;
indeed shutting down such heterogeneity does not affect the model fit or the
other estimates too much.
Table 1.7 reports the coefficients η(n) on the gender wage gap from the
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Table 1.7: Estimates of the parameters in the Pareto weight
parameter η(n)
value st.error
(1) No children 0.0490 (0.0033)
(2) Youngest child: up to 5 -0.0171 (0.0069)
(3) Youngest child: 5-10 0.1143 (0.0187)
(4) Youngest child: 10+ -0.0538 (0.0046)
Notes: This table reports estimates of the coefficients on the gender wage gap in the Pareto
weight function (1.11). Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Pareto weight function (1.11). Note again that, as these are parameters cor-
responding to different family compositions (rows 1-4), they are mutually ex-
clusive in (1.11). Positive and larger values of these parameters imply that a
narrower (lower) gender wage gap in a given period reduces the argument of
the logistic function (1.11), lowers men’s bargaining power in the household,
and increases women’s by an equal amount.
It is hard to judge the magnitude of these parameters directly; instead
one can look at the implications of the bargaining effects for family time al-
locations and infer indirectly the importance of those numbers (this is section
1.7). The sign of the parameters is such that the modal with respect to fertility
woman sees her bargaining power improve with the narrowing gender wage gap
over time.48 Two caveats are due here. First, the restriction of the estimation
sample to stable households only (i.e. to those that do not actually divorce)
is likely to push these parameters towards 0 (no effect of gender wage gap on
bargaining power). Stable households are those for whom re-allocation should
take place less frequently as opposed to the general population.49 Second, tar-
48Using the estimates in table 1.7 I find that the modal with respect to fertility woman
sees her Pareto weight improve by up to 1.3% over her lifetime. For this calculation I
use the parametrization of the Pareto weight (1.11) and I assume wages in the household
change intertemporally according to the gender wage gap in figure 1.6. The magnitude of
this change, unlike its direction, is not of practical interest as it is subject to the initial
normalized Pareto weight and the cardinalization of preferences.
49The restriction of the estimation sample to stable households is not uncommon in the
literature of dynamic household decision making. Lise and Yamada (2014) also select a
sample of families that do not experience divorce. This restriction is unavoidable in their
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Table 1.8: Proportions of people in different time allocations
Data Model
A. Men
‘low middle’ household work 0.705 0.703
‘low’ household work 0.295 0.297
B. Women
FT market work and
‘maximum’ household work 0.295 0.318
‘high middle’ household work 0.352 0.370
PT market work and
‘maximum’ household work 0.121 0.098
‘high middle’ household work 0.039 0.037
No market work and
‘maximum’ household work 0.165 0.148
‘high middle’ household work 0.029 0.029
Notes: This table reports the proportion of spouses across different time allocations in the actual
and simulated data. The definitions of ‘maximum’, ‘high middle’, ‘low middle’, and ‘low’ house-
work refer to different amounts of time put into home production; see table 1.2 for details.
Source: Major PSID sample and model simulations.
geting ‘aggregate’ moments of time allocation separately for men and women
may not convey adequate information to uncover shifts in intra-family power.
Possibly, joint moments of time allocation in the household (for example, the
proportion of households in which men supply ‘low middle’ hours to home pro-
duction and women work full-time in the market) may be more appropriate for
uncovering shifts in bargaining power (however, I check similar joint moments
as a means of over-identification; see below).
The overall model fit is good. Table 1.8 reports selected moments of time
allocation in the data alongside their counterparts from the model simulations.
These moments are not targeted directly in the estimation but only indirectly
as they are weighted means of targeted moments. The full set of targeted
moments in the data, alongside their model counterparts, appears in tables
A.5-A.6 in the appendix.
paper as they estimate a dynamic collective model using the first order conditions. In this
chapter this restriction is not unavoidable thanks to the use of a dynamic programming
solution and can be relaxed in future research.
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Figure 1.12: Life-cycle model fit
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(b) Women: full-time market work &
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(d) Women: part-time market work &
‘maximum’ household work
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Notes: This figure plots the life-cycle model fit across time allocations of men and women averaged
over different family compositions. A 95% confidence interval around the data means appears
in gray shade. The definitions of ‘maximum’, ‘high middle’, and ‘low middle’ refer to different
amounts of time put into household work; see table 1.2 for details.
Source: Major PSID sample and model simulations.
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Figure 1.12 illustrates the life-cycle model fit across different time allo-
cations of men and women (averaged over various family compositions). The
most noticeable discrepancy between data and model occurs for women who
work full-time in the market and also supply ‘maximum’ hours to the house-
hold sector (figure 1.12b). The model overestimates the proportion of women
who work full-time in the market during the last few years of their working life.
This discrepancy is mirrored for women who do not work in the market but
supply ‘maximum’ hours to the household (figure 1.12f). There is currently no
mechanism in the model inducing early retirement, such as a compulsory re-
ceipt of social security benefits that crowds out labor earnings (French, 2005),
and allowing for such a mechanism is likely to rectify this.
Finally, I check a big number of non-targeted joint and dynamic moments
of time allocation as a means of over-identification. These are transition prob-
abilities, namely probabilities that an individual engages in a given time allo-
cation conditional on what they or their partner did one or two periods in the
past. These appear in figure A.3 in appendix A.4.
1.7 Implications of Model for Behavior
This section discusses the implications of a narrowing gender wage gap for
married people’s time allocations by illustrating the various effects (income,
substitution, bargaining) the gender wage gap induces on their behavior.
Changes in the gender wage gap (and therefore changes in spousal wages)
induce a number of effects on family behavior:
1. A higher female wage is likely to render female labor supply relatively
more attractive (especially so for women with young children for whom
child care costs may have previously been prohibitive). This is the stan-
dard sum of own income and substitution effects operating on labor sup-
ply with the latter outperforming the former. On the contrary, a higher
male wage may render female labor supply less attractive due to a stan-
dard income or added worker effect (Lundberg, 1985).
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2. Conditional on labor supply, increasing family wages is likely to increase
public expenditure which, depending on the home production technol-
ogy, may crowd out or boost spouses’ household work. Whether this
effect is symmetric across spouses or not depends on the nature of com-
plementarity between τ1 and τ2 in the production function.
50
3. Shifts in relative wages in the household can alter the task specialization
the spouses engage in. For example, a spouse whose wage increases in
relative terms may engage fully in the labor market while her spouse may
increase his involvement in home production.
4. Changes in relative wages can alter spouses’ value of divorce, shift intra-
family bargaining power, and induce bargaining effects across all choices
made by them.
In the data, the average within-family gender wage gap, which I feed
into the model through budget constraint (1.3) and intra-family bargaining
power (1.11), narrows down on average by approximately 10% over the family
lifetime (graph 1.6b). This narrowing induces effects on family time allocations
that can be categorized in two broad groups: income and substitution effects
(corresponding to points 1-3 above) and bargaining effects (corresponding to
point 4).
My aim is to separate and quantify the two groups of effects. I proceed
as follows. Using the preference estimates from section 2.5 and the observed
wage and fertility dynamics over the family life-cycle, I simulate 12790 ran-
dom households prohibiting intra-family bargaining power from shifting with
the gender wage gap. In this case the Pareto weight remains fixed at its ini-
tial normalized level throughout life. I compare the resulting life-cycle family
time allocations to the original ones (the original model fit). Any difference
between the two identifies the bargaining effects of a narrowing gender wage
50An inspection of the production function (1.9) yields
dτjt
dKt
< 0 and dτ2tdτ1t < 0 for φ ∈ (0, 1)
and pij > 0. The inputs to home production are all substitutes.
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gap; alternatively it answers How important are shifts in bargaining power in
response to the gender wage gap?
Subsequently, I simulate a new set of 12790 random households assuming
men’s and women’s wages grow similarly over the entire family life-cycle and,
therefore, relative wages remain unchanged throughout.51 I compare the re-
sulting life-cycle family time allocations to the original ones (the original model
fit); the difference between the two identifies the sum of income/substitution
and bargaining effects of the narrowing gender wage gap. Netting out the bar-
gaining effects (identified above) isolates the income and substitution effects.
The results from the first application suggest that the narrowing gender
gap induces small bargaining effects on women’s labor supply and sizeable
effects on men’s and women’s household work. Figure 1.13 depicts life-cycle
profiles of family time allocations when intra-family bargaining power does not
respond to the gender wage gap (blue dashed lines through the X’s). It super-
imposes them over the original model-generated profiles (red dashed lines) and
the empirical profiles (solid lines). Table 2.8 quantifies the differences: it re-
ports how proportions (averages) of people in various time allocations change
when bargaining effects are prohibited, and it does so over various age bands
in the life-cycle. The original model’s baseline rates (expressed in %) appear
in square brackets on the side.
In the first application, women’s bargaining power is not allowed to im-
prove alongside the narrowing gender wage gap. This induces up to 3.06%
more women into working ‘maximum’ hours in the household and up to 4.98%
fewer men into supplying ‘low middle’. When compared to the baseline rates
in the original model, the first figure corresponds to an increase in women’s
rate by 6.48% and a decrease in men’s by 6.95%.52 Up to 1.03% more women
51Specifically I assume that women’s wages grow according to men’s, relatively slower,
wage growth. The within-family gender wage gap remains on average constant at its begin-
ning of life level.
52The drop in men’s rate of ‘low middle’ household hours is mitigated as time goes
by possibly due to women supplying more household work (spousal hours are substitutes
in home production) or the family affording higher public expenditures (time and public
expenditures are substitute inputs in home production).
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Figure 1.13: Bargaining effects of a narrowing gender wage gap
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Notes: This figure plots life-cycle profiles of family time allocations when intra-family bargaining
power does not respond to the gender wage gap (bargaining effects shut; blue dashed line through
the X’s). The solid line depicts the original data and the red dashed line depicts the original
model fit when bargaining effects are allowed. The definitions of ‘maximum’ or ‘low middle’ refer
to different amounts of time put into home production; see table 1.2 for details.
Source: Major PSID sample and model simulations.
are also induced into full-time market work.
The idea behind these results is the following: keeping intra-family bar-
gaining fixed prevents women from improving their bargaining power as the
gender wage gap narrows down in their favor. In that case women would sup-
ply more time to both the market and the household (compared to what they
actually do), and thus enjoy less leisure. The opposite holds for men.
The results from the second application suggest that keeping the average
gender wage gap constant at its beginning-of-life level has, through its income
and substitution effects, important implications for women’s labor supply and
household work but less so for men’s household work. Figure 1.14 presents life-
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Table 1.9: Bargaining effects: changes in proportions of people in various
time allocations
(1) women (2) women (3) women ‘max’ (4) men ‘LM’
full time work part time work home work home work
ages 40-49 +0.46 [70.3%] -0.58 [13.6%] +2.72 [55.7%] -4.98 [71.7%]
ages 50-59 +1.03 [79.2%] -1.40 [10.5%] +3.06 [47.2%] -0.47 [70.9%]
Notes: The table reports how proportions of people in different time allocations change when
bargaining effects are shut. The original model’s baseline proportions (in %) appear in square
brackets on the side. There are no changes at ages 30-39 (first 10 years of life-cycle) because
bargaining power in those years does not change anyway (see the normalization of the initial
Pareto weight in section 1.5.3). The definitions of ‘maximum’ or ‘low middle’ refer to different
amounts of time put into home production; see table 1.2.
Source: Model simulations.
cycle profiles of family time allocations when women’s wages grow according to
men’s observed wage growth over time and, as a result, the gender wage gap
remains unchanged (orange lines through the triangles). Table 1.10 reports
how the proportions (averages) of people in various time allocations change
when the gender wage gap remains fixed at its beginning-of-life level. The
table reports exclusively the sign and magnitude of the income/substitution
effects should the gender wage gap remain fixed; model rates (in %) factoring
in the bargaining effects appear in square brackets on the side.53
The results suggest that up to 3.39% fewer women would work full-time
in the market when the gender gap does not narrow down. Only some of them
would work part-time and the majority would not participate in the market
at all. ‘Maximum’ household work would attract up to 3.55% more women
whereas men’s housework is less responsive: up to 0.52% fewer men would
supply ‘low-middle’ housework hours.
The narrowing of the gender wage gap appears important for women’s
household work as it accounts for approximately 1/2 of its observed drop
over the life-cycle. Half of its effect is due to the higher monetary reward
53The figures presented in the square brackets are the model’s original baseline rates
adding the bargaining effects of table 2.8. When the gender wage gap narrows down, it
induces income/substitution and bargaining effects. Removing the narrowing of the gender
gap, as this application suggests, removes both types of effects. Table 1.10 reports exclusively
the former as the latter are already reported in table 2.8.
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Figure 1.14: Income/substitution effects of a narrowing gender wage gap
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Notes: This figure depicts life-cycle profiles of family time allocations when women’s wages grow
according to men’s observed wage growth over time and the gender wage gap within the family
remains constant at its initial normalization throughout life (orange lines through the triangles).
The solid line depicts the original data and the red dashed line depicts the original model fit.
The blue dashed line through the X’s depicts life-cycle profiles when the gender wage gap narrows
down but intra-family bargaining power does not respond to it. The definitions of ‘maximum’ or
‘low middle’ refer to different amounts of time put into home production; see table 1.2 for details.
Source: Major PSID sample and model simulations.
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Table 1.10: Income and substitution effects: changes in proportions of
people in various time allocations
(1) women (2) women (3) women ‘max’ (4) men ‘LM’
full time work part time work home work home work
ages 30-39 -0.19 [57.0%] +0.16 [16.3%] +0.19 [66.2%] -0.03 [68.3%]
ages 40-49 -2.30 [70.8%] +0.48 [13.0%] +2.13 [58.4%] -0.52 [66.7%]
ages 50-59 -3.39 [80.2%] +0.78 [9.2%] +3.55 [50.3%] -0.17 [70.4%]
Notes: The table reports how the proportions (averages) of people in various time allocations
change when the average gender wage gap within the family remains fixed at its initial normalized
level. The table reports exclusively the changes due to the income and substitution effects. The
figures presented inside the square brackets are the model’s rates factoring in (adding) the bargain-
ing effects of table 2.8. When the gender wage gap narrows down, it induces income/substitution
and bargaining effects. Removing the narrowing of the gender gap, as this application suggests,
removes both effects. This table reports exclusively the former after netting out the bargain-
ing effects reported in table 2.8. The definitions of ‘maximum’ or ‘low middle’ refer to different
amounts of time put into home production; see table 1.2.
Source: Model simulations.
of women’s market work, thus to women switching to some form of market
work. The other half is due to women becoming relatively stronger in the
household decision process, and therefore able to enjoy more leisure (illus-
trated by the bargaining effects above). The narrowing of the gender gap also
appears important for women’s (full-time) market work contributing to its rise
over the life-cycle. Two opposite forces operate here: the higher monetary
reward pushes women’s market work up (dominating force) whereas women’s
improved bargaining power pushes work down replacing it with leisure. Fi-
nally, as the income women bring in the household rises, the spouses are in
a better financial position to replace household chores, such as child care or
cleaning, with similar services purchased from the market. In principle this
would benefit men too by cutting down their household work (monetary ef-
fect). In reality, however, men keep their household work unchanged as is seen
in the PSID because their weakening bargaining position counterbalances the
monetary effect. As women become more powerful thanks to a narrower gender
wage gap, they shift household work from themselves to their husbands.
Note, finally, that prohibiting the gender wage gap from narrowing does
not alter the overall shape of the life-cycle profiles of family time allocations
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as figure 1.14 illustrates. This suggests that the fertility dynamics and child
care costs spouses face over their lifetime are still jointly quite important even
after accounting for the gender wage gap.
1.8 Implications of Gender Wage Equality
In this section I investigate the likely implications that establishing gender
wage equality (‘equal pay’) would have for married couples’ allocation of time.
This is a realistic counterfactual that policy and business leaders pledge to
implement.
In the United States the gender wage gap has been criticized on grounds
of discrimination against women. During a weekly radio address on April 12,
2014, President Obama called the lack of equal pay between men and women
in the same profession and with the same education “an embarrassment”.54
In the same month, President Obama took executive action requiring federal
contractors to publish data on their employees’ pay by race and gender whereas
earlier, in February 2010, he announced the establishment of a National Equal
Pay Enforcement Task. He has also signed into bill the related Paycheck
Fairness Act.55
Using the model of section 2.2 and the parameter estimates of section
2.5, I investigate the implications of equal pay through three counterfactual
experiments. The experiments have a similar ‘flavor’ in that across all three
of them I shift the mean of the distribution of female wages towards the mean
of men’s wage distribution, leaving the latter unchanged; the timing that this
shift occurs within married people’s lifetime differs across experiments.56
54The full speech of President Obama is available at www.whitehouse.gov/blog
/2014/04/12/weekly-address-ensuring-equal-pay-equal-work.
55Detailed information is available at www.whitehouse.gov/issues/equal-pay. Other
countries too have followed, or led, the campaign for gender wage equality. For ex-
ample, Prime Minister Cameron in the UK declared on July 14, 2015 his inten-
tion to “end the gender pay gap in a generation” (www.gov.uk/government/news/
prime-minister-my-one-nation-government-will-close-the-gender-pay-gap).
56So far I have estimated the model with one only education/schooling level active for each
spouse. In a more detailed estimation across multiple schooling levels, the counterfactual
experiments would involve equalizing the mapping from education to wages between genders.
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In the first counterfactual, I make women earn on average the same wage
as men over their entire life-cycle. Specifically, I shift women’s mean wage up
so that W 2t = W 1t at all times (where W 1t is the mean of men’s wages at t).
In the second counterfactual, men and women start off their working lives with
gender-specific wages at their observed average levels at the start of life, that
is W 1t=0 and W 2t=0 respectively. Subsequently, female wages grow rapidly and
catch up with men’s during the last 1/3 of their life-cycle (i.e. in life-cycle year
21 out of 30). Once they catch up, men’s and women’s wages grow in parallel.
The third experiment is a repetition of the second one but now women catch
up with men just after the first 1/3 of the life-cycle (i.e. in life-cycle year 11
out of 30); thereafter the spouses earn the same on average wage, that is men’s,
until the end of their working lives. Across all counterfactuals the spouses are
faced with the observed fertility dynamics and child care costs, and with their
estimated gender-specific variation in wages. Table 1.11 summarizes the three
counterfactual experiments.
Gender wage equality has important implications for men’s and women’s
time allocations. The results across all experiments are illustrated numerically
in table 1.12 and visually in figure 1.15. Figure 1.15 plots life-cycle profiles of
time allocations; across all graphs therein the black solid lines depict the real
data whereas the red dashed lines depict the original model fit. Counterfactual
#1 is depicted by the blue lines through the crosses, counterfactual #2 by the
orange lines through the triangles, and counterfactual #3 by the purple lines
through the hollow circles.
In a nutshell, equal pay induces women’s entry in the labor market even
during the child bearing years. It increases their rates of full-time market work
by up to 32% in certain years and decreases part-time work, albeit by less. It
lowers women’s likelihood of supplying ‘maximum’ hours to home production
by 22.1% and increases men’s merely by 3.2% in certain years.
The most sizeable effects on married people’s time allocations are seen
in counterfactual #1 where men’s and women’s wages are on average equal
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Table 1.11: Equal pay counterfactuals
When do women
catch up with men?
Bargaining effects
allowed?
#1
equal average wages
throughout life-cycle
no; average wage
gap constant
#2 in year 21 of 30 yes
#3 in year 11 of 30 yes
throughout the entire life-cycle. Equal pay makes women 18.36 percentage
points -or by 32% relative to the baseline- more likely to be in full-time market
work at ages 30-39. Compared to a model baseline rate of 57% at those ages,57
equal pay implies that up to 75.36% of women would work full-time. The
effect is more profound if one looks at specific early ages: at 30, for example,
equal pay renders women 21.3 percentage points more likely to work full-time.
Equal pay makes women aged 30-39 up to 2.28 percentage points less likely
to work part-time; therefore the big increase in full-time work comes from
women entering the labor market when they previously did not participate.
Interestingly, equal pay induces women to enter the market and work full-time
even though they would generally be in their child bearing years. Apparently
they must value their increased earnings more than the higher costs of child
care that their prolonged absence from home would imply.
The proportion of women aged 30-39 supplying ‘maximum’ hours to home
production drops 14.55 percentage points (from a baseline of 66.2% to 51.7%),
whereas the proportion of men supplying ‘low middle’ increases 2.18 points
(from a baseline of 68.2% to 70.4%). The first figure corresponds to a 22%
drop in women’s ‘maximum’ household work rate, whereas the second to a mere
3.2% increase in men’s ‘low middle’ rate. Less time is now devoted jointly to
home production possibly because the couple substitutes household time with
higher public expenditures. The decline in women’s rates of household work
57The ‘model baseline rates’ refer to the proportions observed in the originally simulated
data after fitting the model to the PSID.
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at ages 30-39 is equivalent to up to 7 hours of home work less per week (see
figure 1.15e).58
The effects of equal pay remain important in later periods of life, albeit
less profound; the gender wage gap anyway narrows down in the real data as
time goes by and the effects of equal pay become inevitably less noticeable in
later periods. Nevertheless, equal pay still implies an average increase of 12.29
(8.64) percentage points in women’s likelihood of full-time market work at
ages 40-49 (50-59). The proportion of women supplying ‘maximum’ household
work drops on average 7.27 (3.63) percentage points at ages 40-49 (50-59)
whereas the proportion of men supplying ‘low middle’, perhaps surprisingly,
drops approximately 2 points at 40-49 and remains unchanged afterwards.
Counterfactual #1 generates a higher and flatter female life-cycle profile
of full-time market work compared to the data. If men and women earned on
average the same wages, the model predicts that more than 75% of women
would work full-time right from the beginning of their working life; that would
rise to more than 82% in the middle years as women become less restricted
by young children and to approximately 88% in the later years. With equal
pay women’s profile of full-time market work tends to mimic men’s toward the
end of life. The life-cycle profile of part-time work is lower and also flatter
compared to the data, as also is the profile of women supplying ‘maximum’
hours to the household. Men are the least responsive to the elimination of
the gender wage gap; the life-cycle profile of men supplying ‘low middle’ hours
tends to be lower in the middle years but the changes are a fraction of those
of women.
Counterfactuals #2 and #3 both induce similar eventually effects as coun-
terfactual #1 does: higher female full-time market work, lower female part-
time market work and household work, higher male household work. There
are little differences between all three experiments in the last 10 years of the
58An additional calibration is carried out in order to translate rates of household work
into home work hours because the level of household hours is not targeted in the structural
estimation. The details of this calibration are omitted for brevity but are available upon
request.
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Figure 1.15: Counterfactual life-cycle profiles of time allocations
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Notes: This figure illustrates the life-cycle profiles of family time allocations across three coun-
terfactual experiments. The real data appear in the black solid line and the original model fit
appears in the red dashed line; experiment #1 is depicted by the blue lines through the crosses,
experiment #2 by the orange lines through the triangles, and experiment #3 by the purple lines
through the hollow circles.
Source: Model simulations.
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life-cycle (when for all three average wages are equal between spouses), but
there are some noticeable differences in the earlier years.
Counterfactual #2 generates a steeper profile of female full-time market
work over the first 20 years of the life-cycle. As women’s wages gradually catch
up with men’s, the proportion of women in full-time work increases from 62.7%
at ages 30-39 to 80.4% at 40-49 and reaches eventually 89.2% at 50-59. These
numbers imply an overall 5.7 to 10.1 points increase in full-time market work
rates compared to the baseline model (table 1.12, experiment #2, column 1).
Experiment #3 generates the steepest full-time work profile predicting a jump
from 65.8% at ages 30-39 to 83.3% at 40-49 as women’s wages catch up quickly
in the first 10 years of the life-cycle. These numbers imply an overall 8.8 to 13
percentage points increase in women’s rates of full-time work compared to the
original model (tab.1.12, exp.#3, col.1). During the first 20 years the rates of
full-time work in experiment #3 are everywhere higher than in #2.
Counterfactual #2 generates a downward profile in part-time market work
similar to what we see in the data: the proportion of part-time work decreases
from 16.8% at ages 30-39 to 11.1% at 40-49 and 6.4% in the later years. These
numbers correspond to a drop of up to 4.1 percentage points in women’s rates
of part-time work compared to the original model (tab.1.12, exp.#2, col.2).
Counterfactual #3 generates the steepest downwards profile in part-time work:
the proportion decreases from 15.8% at ages 30-39 to 9.9% at 40-49 and 6.5%
in the later years (tab.1.12, exp.#3, col.2). During the first 20 years women’s
rate of part-time work in experiment #3 is everywhere lower than in #2.
Regarding women’s household work, experiment #3 generates the steepest
downward profile in the early years from a proportion of 60.2% at ages 30-39
to 46.7% at 40-49 and 41.7% afterwards (tab.1.12, exp.#3, col.3). Counterfac-
tual #2 generates a slightly less steep profile over the first 20 years (actually
quite similar to what we see in the data) and the proportion of women sup-
plying ‘maximum’ hours is almost everywhere higher than in experiment #3.
Finally, the proportion of men supplying ‘low middle’ hours is usually higher
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in both experiments than it is in the original model simulations (but with little
differences between them).
Overall, equal pay has important implications for married people’s time
allocations with the most striking changes concentrated around women’s entry
in the labor market and full-time market work during child rearing. The early
effects are greatly mitigated when equal pay is established later on in their
lives. A higher proportion of women working full-time and a higher hourly
wage result in additional income for their households, a boost to their savings,
and a more equal allocation of household work between men and women (even
though women would still work more in the household than men). The time
mothers spend with children is not modeled in this chapter and it remains
an open question how equal pay would impact on this important dimension
(Del Boca et al., 2014).
1.9 Discussion and Conclusions
Over the last three decades the wage gap between men and women in the
United States narrowed down dramatically. This chapter asks how this closing
of the gender wage gap affects family time allocations across market work,
household work, and leisure. I hypothesize that the narrowing has a direct
monetary effect (by increasing women’s monetary reward for market work) as
well as an indirect one through shifting bargaining power in the household.
Currently the chapter investigates this hypothesis on one only cohort whose
working life spans the period 1980-2009 when the closing of the gender gap
had been the most profound. The data (PSID) reveal that both mechanisms
(monetary reward and changes in bargaining power) are important.
I develop a life-cycle collective model of public consumption, savings and
time allocation for spouses who differ in preferences but share a common bud-
get constraint. In the model, spouses’ hourly wages affect choices through
entering (i) the intertemporal budget constraint and (ii) intra-family bargain-
ing power. The latter is so because wages shift the utility spouses can enjoy
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outside their household in the event of divorce. To estimate the model I use
cross-sectional variation in wages and family composition as well as the nar-
rowing of the gender wage gap since 1980 which I treat entirely as shock. I
utilize data on married as well as divorced individuals.
The empirical life-cycle profiles of family time allocations are reproduced
closely. To achieve this, the model assigns women a higher intra-family bar-
gaining power as the gender wage gap narrows down in their favor. The im-
provement in women’s bargaining power affects primarily spousal time into
home production shifting household work from women to their husbands. A
closing of the gap by 10% since 1980 decreased women’s household work by
approximately 14% and increased their rate of full time market work by 4%.
Half of the decrease in women’s household work is due to the higher monetary
reward of market work, thus to women switching to some form of market work.
The other half is due to women becoming relatively stronger in the household
decision process, and therefore able to enjoy more leisure.
I use the model to assess the likely implications that gender wage equality
would have for family time allocations. If women earn on average their hus-
band’s wage, women’s rate of full-time work increases dramatically throughout
the life-cycle. The increase is more striking in the early child bearing years
when the model predicts that 75.36% of women would work full time compared
to 57% in the data. This is primarily due to women entering the labor market
when they previously did not participate. Equal pay makes the allocation of
time into home production more equal between spouses but it also decreases
the overall amount of time invested therein.
This study is subject to a number of limitations. The current focus on a
single cohort is probably the most serious one as it prohibits separating time
and age/life-cycle effects. Economists tend to think of the gender wage gap
as evolving over time; nevertheless, this chapter investigates how the gender
gap affects family time allocations over a particular life-cycle. Extending this
chapter to multiple cohorts will enable to study how the gender gap ultimately
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affects time allocations over time and, therefore, investigate its role for the
sharp increase in female labor supply and decrease in household work over the
last 3 decades. Wages are taken as exogenous and the model abstracts from
human capital; this raises ‘reverse causality’ concerns especially in the present
context of family time allocations: a narrower gender wage gap may be driving
family time allocations but also women’s gradual entry into the labor market
may well be driving the narrowing of the gender wage gap. Allowing for human
capital presents challenges and jeopardizes identification in the current model
where intra-family bargaining power is a function of wages. Solving for the
full dynamic problem of divorced persons is likely to overcome this challenge
but will also result in detaching the Pareto weight from the gender wage gap.
However, an additional advantage of solving for divorcees explicitly is that
it allows the characterization of divorce and removes the restriction of stable
households on the estimation sample.
A number of extensions are desirable and, possibly, feasible. Modeling
fertility as an endogenous choice (in the spirit of Francesconi (2002) in the
unitary model) is likely to be important for the use of the model in assessing
counterfactual policies. Parental time with children is certainly a big compo-
nent of parents’ time use (Knowles, 2013) but is not modeled herein due to
lack of consistent data over time. A better treatment of the price of house-
hold appliances, as in Greenwood et al. (2005), or services, beyond the price
of child care, is likely to be important for the patterns of household work.
Finally, use of consumption data can help identify a number of parameters
currently imposed onto the model from the literature and possibly character-
ize consumption allocations between spouses.
Chapter 2
Consumption Dynamics and
Allocation in the Family
2.1 Introduction
The transmission of idiosyncratic wage/income changes into household con-
sumption, or the link between wage/income and consumption inequality, has
been the focus of a large body of ongoing research (eg. Blundell and Preston,
1998; Krueger and Perri, 2006; Blundell et al., 2008). A consistent empiri-
cal finding is that household consumption is considerably smoothed with re-
spect to wage/income shocks, even with respect to shocks to after-tax income.1
Recent economic research attempts to understand theoretically and quantify
empirically the mechanisms behind household consumption smoothing (eg.
Heathcote et al., 2014; Blundell et al., 2016). But, although these studies ex-
plore a rich set of possible consumption smoothing mechanisms, such as fam-
ily labor supply or external insurance, there is little work on intra-household
consumption inequality or, more generally, on the internal workings of the
household.2 The goal of the present chapter is precisely this: investigate the
mechanisms of consumption smoothing within a collectivity of potentially dif-
ferent individuals that act together under common constraints (that is, within
1Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and Heathcote et al. (2010) study the empirical patterns
of inequality in consumption and various measures of income since the 1980s.
2Lise and Seitz (2011) is an exception; I discuss below how this chapter relates to it.
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a household) and thus respect the fundamental principle of methodological in-
dividualism (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Chiappori,
1988). Treating the household as a collectivity of individuals opens up the dis-
cussion to new issues, such as how resources are shared within the household
or how intra-household bargaining power influences consumption smoothing.
This chapter develops a collective life-cycle model for consumption, sav-
ings, and labor supply of a household of two decision-making spouses.3 The
model takes into account a number of mechanisms that potentially come into
play at the intersection of wages, earnings, and consumption. First, it allows
for self-insurance through borrowing or saving in the credit markets. Second,
it gives each spouse an endogenous labor supply choice at the intensive margin.
Third, it gives each spouse an endogenous consumption choice over multiple
consumption goods, namely over a private (or rival) good and a public (or
non-rival) good. Fourth, it assigns intra-family bargaining (or decision) pow-
ers to the decision-making spouses conditional on which all other choices are
made. Such bargaining powers reflect individual and household characteris-
tics, as well as market conditions, and can change with them across as well as
within households.
The life-cycle model has four important features. First, the model is col-
lective in the spirit of the static implementations of Chiappori (1988, 1992) and,
given the presence of a public good, of Blundell et al. (2005). The decision-
making spouses have their own, egoistic, gender-specific preferences over their
leisure and private consumption, and the household public good; and they
devise a mechanism, summarized by their intra-family bargaining powers, to
reach agreements between them. Second, each spouse’s preferences are po-
tentially nonseparable across the three goods they draw utility from. Such
non-separability permits a rich pattern of complementarities among goods at
the individual and household level. Third, each spouse/earner receives an
3Throughout this chapter, I use the terms ‘household’ and ‘family’ interchangeably to
refer to a two-member collectivity of financially dependent individuals. Whenever I need to
make reference to single-member households, I clearly state so. I also use interchangeably
the terms ‘spouses’, ‘partners’, ‘individuals’.
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idiosyncratic hourly market wage, the stochastic component of which is de-
composed into a spouse-specific permanent and transitory shock (Abowd and
Card, 1989; MaCurdy, 1982; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004). These shocks are
correlated between spouses reflecting positive or negative assortative mating
(Blundell et al., 2016). Market wages are assumed exogenous to individual
choices (albeit functions of age, gender, and other observables) and serve as
the primitive source of uncertainty conditional on which the spouses make
joint decisions. Fourth, the model features lack of spousal commitment to
future allocations of resources in the spirit of Mazzocco (2007) and Lise and
Yamada (2014). Formally, in each period the spouses stay together as mem-
bers of a common household, they do so because they satisfy, separately, their
participation constraints in the household. Such participation constraints take
the form of lower bounds, often micro-founded as the value of the outside op-
tion/divorce (Voena, 2015), that the utility each spouse enjoys from within
their joint household must respect.4 These lower bounds may move with ob-
servable characteristics or market conditions triggering shifts in intra-family
bargaining power. In this model, market wages enter the outside options and,
therefore, affect intra-family bargaining power. Intra-family bargaining power
may increase reflecting an improvement in one’s market wage, although the di-
rection of this effect is a priori unrestricted. Lack of commitment nests the full
commitment benchmark, where intra-family bargaining power remains fixed
over a given family’s life-cycle, and allows tests of one setup against the other.
I derive closed-form analytical expressions for spousal earnings (labor sup-
ply) and consumption as functions of wage shocks, relying on Taylor approxi-
mations to the problem’s first order conditions and the intertemporal budget
constraint. Similar approximations within the unitary context appear in Blun-
dell and Preston (1998) and a sequence of papers thereafter (Attanasio et al.,
2002; Blundell et al., 2008, 2015, 2016). These expressions are convenient be-
4Non-cooperation in the household may be seen as an alternative outside option available
to spouses. Lechene and Preston (2011) and Cherchye et al. (2015) are recent studies of
static noncooperative household models.
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cause they provide a neat picture for the contribution of various components
(preferences, intra-family bargaining power, consumption sharing, etc.) to the
transmission of wage shocks into earnings and consumption without resorting
to any specific parametrization of individual preferences. To the best of my
knowledge the present chapter is the first one to implement such approxima-
tions in the context of the collective model.
Identification of the household structure is challenging for a number of
reasons that are either inherent to the household model or relate to the avail-
ability of appropriate data. The first reason pertains to the non-observability
of two outcome variables, namely of individual private consumption of each
spouse. Unlike Cherchye et al. (2012) for the Netherlands and Lise and Yamada
(2014) for Japan, there is no household survey in the US with comprehensive
information on assignable or exclusive expenditure within the household. This
is why, throughout this study, I assume one observes total private consump-
tion in the household, but not its sharing between spouses. A second reason
pertains to the rich complementarities allowed for by the non-separabilities in
spousal preferences. The demand for any given good is a function of the quan-
tity demanded for every other good separately, and, in the analog of a demand
analysis, the demand system out of this household problem exhibits no ex-
clusion restrictions. A third reason, inherent to the collective model, pertains
to the indistinguishability of preferences from intra-family bargaining power.
The literature has often resorted to distribution factors, that is variables that
affect bargaining power but not preferences, to overcome this problem (Chi-
appori et al., 2002; Voena, 2015). This problem is only aggravated here due
to wages entering the budget set and intra-family bargaining powers. A final
reason, not uncommon across applied consumer economics, is the lack of ob-
servable cross-sectional variation in the price of consumption (in here, in the
prices of two consumption goods).5
With the aim to identify the household structure, that is preferences and
5A general overview of identification in the static collective model is given in Chiappori
and Ekeland (2009).
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the parameters of consumption sharing and intra-family bargaining power,
I use information on single individuals of either gender before they form a
joint household or after they separate from it. This approach has been used in
Barmby and Smith (2001), Vermeulen (2006), Vermeulen et al. (2006), or, more
recently, Browning et al. (2013). Assuming that each spouse’s preferences are
the same as their single counterparts’, the full set of gender-specific preferences,
the parameters of consumption sharing, and the effects of wages on household
outcomes through their impact on intra-family bargaining power are identified.
The rationale is the following: observability of singles suffices for recovering
individual preferences over leisure and all types of consumption. When a given
wage shock hits, and conditional on those preferences, the unobserved response
of each spouse’s private and public consumption should they be single becomes
known. The observed response of consumption at the household level is then
a weighted sum of the two individual responses; the weight is nothing but the
consumption sharing between spouses in the case of private consumption or
(a transformation of) their intra-family bargaining power in the case of public
consumption.
The empirical implementation requires panel data on individual earnings
and hours of work, household-level consumption, and household-level assets of
single- and multi-member households. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) is suitable as it collects such data biennially since 1999. I utilize 7
waves in total (1999-2011).
The results suggest sizeable Frisch own-elasticities of labor supply for both
men and women, with women’s labor supply being considerably more elastic
than men’s. I also find sizeable Frisch consumption substitution elasticities,
with, perhaps surprisingly, the public good (comprising items such as housing
services for renters and owners, household utilities, and children’s expendi-
ture) exhibiting a much higher elasticity than the private good. This may in
part reflect higher variability in public expenditure due to house prices. The
evidence from the cross-elasticities suggests that market hours are Frisch sub-
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stitutes with all types of consumption and statistically significantly so far as
public consumption is concerned. Note that this Frisch substitutability con-
cerns the intensive margin of labor supply only. Overall, men seem to differ
from women in their labor supply preferences but not in their consumption
preferences. Finally, the bargaining effects of wages, that is the effects on
household outcomes through the impact of wages on bargaining powers, are
economically significant but not statistically so. At first sight, this suggests
one cannot reject full commitment between spouses, but the result may mask,
among other factors, unobserved heterogeneity across households.
This chapter is related to two distinct strands of literature. A large lit-
erature in consumer analysis and labor economics is devoted to understand-
ing household decisions respecting methodological individualism. The most
prominent approach, imposing efficiency of household decisions, has been the
collective model introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and Rees
(1988). These first static implementations triggered a series of follow-up stud-
ies extending the basic model into home production (Chiappori, 1997), income
taxation and discrete labor supply (Donni, 2003; Blundell et al., 2007), public
goods (Blundell et al., 2005), multiple consumption items (Chiappori, 2011),
and numerous other features. Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori and
Ekeland (2006, 2009), and Bourguignon et al. (2009) provide a theoretical
overview of the collective model’s features and implications for household be-
haviour.
Early empirical implementations of the static model include Bourguignon
et al. (1993), Browning et al. (1994), or Chiappori et al. (2002). These studies
were mostly concerned with testing the collective model or showcasing the rel-
evance of distribution factors for household behaviour. More recently, Lise and
Seitz (2011) use the collective model to infer the evolution of intra-household
inequality in Britain. This chapter differs from Lise and Seitz (2011) in that
I develop a life-cycle collective model (theirs is static) with the aim to inves-
tigate the mechanisms of consumption smoothing and inequality transmission
2.1. Introduction 103
in the household. In a somehow related study, Browning et al. (2013) estimate
the allocation of consumption and bargaining power in the household, as well
as concepts of economies of scale due to living with a partner (as opposed to
staying single) or equivalence scales for comparing the same individual across
the two states of life (i.e. in a couple and as single).6 Cherchye et al. (2012)
estimate a collective model with home production while relying on variation
in observed production shifters to achieve identification. Lewbel and Pen-
dakur (2008) and Dunbar et al. (2013) estimate the household sharing rule,
namely each spouse’s share of household expenditure, using restrictions on
Engel curves. Finally, Cherchye et al. (2009, 2011, 2015) apply a somehow dis-
tinct empirical methodology to the collective model, namely they set-identify
the sharing rules from alternative versions of the model relying on revealed
preferences principles.
The extension to the dynamics of the collective model opens up the dis-
cussion to new issues such as issues pertaining to inter-temporal commitment
between spouses. Mazzocco (2007), the first implementation of the dynamic
collective model, rejects full commitment on data from the US post 1980. Ever
since, the dynamic collective model has been used to study a number of issues,
such as household behaviour post the liberalization of divorce and property
division laws in the US in the 1970s (Voena, 2015) and education investments
of women (Bronson, 2014; Chiappori et al., 2015). Lise and Yamada (2014),
who also provide evidence against full commitment, and Mazzocco et al. (2014)
extend the dynamic collective model to home production and general prefer-
ences.7
Another literature, at the intersection of macro- and microeconomics,
studies the relation between wage/income and household consumption growth.
Recent papers include Blundell and Preston (1998), Attanasio et al. (2002),
Krueger and Perri (2006), Blundell et al. (2008), Kaplan and Violante (2010),
6Chiappori and Meghir (2014) provide an overview of these concepts.
7Browning et al. (2014) and Chiappori and Mazzocco (2014) provide an overview of the
static and intertemporal collective models.
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Heathcote et al. (2014), and, more recently, Blundell et al. (2016). Most
of these papers have a life-cycle focus and investigate the transmission of
wage/income changes, expected and unexpected, into household consumption
in a variety of alternative environments (stretching from exogenous income and
no insurance against permanent shocks to endogenous labor supply and partial
insurance). What they all have in common, however, is their modeling of the
household as a single economic agent, and therefore, their abstracting from
issues pertaining to the internal workings of the household or intertemporal
commitment.8
The present chapter advances this literature into the realm of the col-
lective model. It contributes by studying the transmission of idiosyncratic
wage/income changes into household consumption, or the link between wage/income
and consumption inequality, when household members have their own prefer-
ences and an efficient decision mechanism, which reflects in part their outside
options, is put in place among them.
The chapter proceeds as follows: section 2.2 presents the life-cycle collec-
tive model and discusses identification. Section 2.3 presents a parallel model
for singles and discusses how the two models can be of use together. Section
2.4 is concerned with the empirical implementation of the model(s) whereas
section 2.5 presents the results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 A Life-Cycle Collective Model without Com-
mitment
This section presents the life-cycle collective model without commitment for
the family of two decision-making partners. Specifically, section 2.2.1 devel-
ops the model, section 2.2.2 overviews the solution to the household problem,
section 2.2.3 illustrates the family response to wage shocks, and section 2.2.4
is dedicated to the identification of the household structure.
8Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) provide an overview of
this literature.
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The model of this section describes the household after the spouses have
decided to form one and before they possibly decide to dissolve it. Specifically,
the model is conditional on the spouses meeting, say, in the marriage market,
and deciding to live together in one household. Assortative mating is taken
care by conditioning observables and unrestricted correlations between spousal
wage shocks. Divorce or, more generally, household dissolution exists as threat,
but I do not model spousal choices in case those events actually materialize.
Instead I model spousal choices for so long as the spouses find their joint
arrangement (their joint household) superior to their outside options, i.e. for
so long as they do not exercise the threat of divorce or household dissolution.
2.2.1 The Model
Formally, let Hjit be the continuous hours of market work of spouse j in family
i at time t; to fix ideas suppose a male-female couple where j = 1 denotes
the male spouse (‘the husband’) and j = 2 the female spouse (‘the wife’). I
normalize the total time endowment available to each spouse to 1 so that Hjit ∈
(0, 1] (time can only be allocated between market work and leisure). I abstract
from modeling labor supply at the extensive margin too, as in Blundell et al.
(2007), because this would render the preferred model solution method, namely
the Taylor approximations to the first-order conditions and the intertemporal
budget constraint, inapplicable.
Let Cit be total private consumption of the household at t and Kit be its
public consumption; both Cit and Kit are composite Hicksian goods. Cit is the
sum of C1it and C2it where Cjit is spouse j’s individual private consumption.
A good is private if consumption of one unit by one spouse deprives the
other spouse from that particular unit. Consider a meal at the local coffee
shop or a subway ticket; both goods are private in that their consumption (or
use) by one spouse renders the goods unavailable to the other spouse.
On the contrary, a good is public if consumption by one spouse does not
reduce the amount available to the other spouse. Consider a car journey to the
countryside, or the gas required to heat the house in the winter; if a spouse
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consumes (purchases) a unit of these goods, the exact same unit is always
available for the other spouse to enjoy. In a seminal paper, Blundell et al.
(2005) consider children’s expenditure in the household as a public good for
their parents.9 The existence of public goods generates economies of scale in
the family as the spouses share the expenditure on them, an expenditure which
they would otherwise have to bear by themselves alone.
Throughout this study I assume the econometrician observes Cit sepa-
rately from Kit given the itemized household expenditure data available nowa-
days. However, the econometrician does not observe the partition of Cit into
C1it and C2it as consumption information is usually collected at the household
rather than the individual level.10
Spouse j’s within-period and gender-specific preferences are given by
Uj(Kit, Cjit, 1−Hjit; zjit)
where 1 − Hjit denotes leisure and zjit an mj × 1 vector of observable taste
shifters such as race, age, or education.11 I do not parameterize Uj but I
assume it has continuous second-order derivatives in K, Cj, Hj, and Uj,K > 0,
Uj,Cj > 0, Uj,Hj < 0 (first derivatives), Uj,KK < 0, Uj,CjCj < 0, Uj,HjHj > 0
(second derivatives).
The household solves over the life-cycle
max
{Kit,Cjit,Hjit,Ait+1}∀t,j
E0
T∑
t=0
βtU1
(
Kit, C1it, 1−H1it; z1it
)
(2.1)
9Even though the couple may have children in this model, children themselves are not
decision makers.
10There exists a limited only number of household surveys with individual consumption
information; Cherchye et al. (2012) gather detailed assignable expenditure through the Lon-
gitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences whereas Lise and Yamada (2014) use the
Japanese Panel Survey of Consumption with detailed information on individual expendi-
tures in the household. To the best of my knowledge there is no household survey in the US
that provides such information comprehensively.
11I treat leisure as private good. Allowing for publicness in spousal leisure, as in Fong
and Zhang (2001), together with publicness of K, will likely jeopardize the model’s empirical
tractability.
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subject to constraints
E0
T∑
t=0
βtU2
(
Kit, C2it, 1−H2it; z2it
) ≥ U2(Xi0) (2.2)
U1
(
Kit, C1it, 1−H1it; z1it
) ≥ U¯1t(W1it,dit) ∀t (2.3)
U2
(
Kit, C2it, 1−H2it; z2it
) ≥ U¯2t(W2it,dit) ∀t (2.4)
Ait +W1itH1it +W2itH2it = Kit + PtCit +
Ait+1
1 + r
, AiT+1 = 0, ∀t.
(2.5)
Constraint (2.2) is a promise keeping constraint, set out at time t = 0,
that spouse 2’s lifetime utility will not fall below a threshold U2
(
Xi0
)
. Xi0 is
a set of covariates known at t = 0 (or expected at time t = 0) that determine
the promise keeping threshold; possible examples are spousal education, their
age difference, their occupation or expected lifetime earnings.
Constraints (2.3) and (2.4), repeated over time, are the partners’ partic-
ipation constraints in the family; they ensure that each spouse is always at
least as well off in their joint household as they could possibly be if they ‘fall
back’ on their outside option at t, U¯jt. I do not have to specify the context
of the outside option explicitly although one can think of U¯jt as the value of
divorce (for example see Voena, 2015). I assume that spousal hourly market
wages W1it and W2it, as well as distribution factors dit, affect the value of the
outside option.12
Constraint (2.5) is the sequential budget constraint; Ait is common house-
hold assets at t, Pt is the relative price of the private good when the price of
the public good is normalized to 1 (I assume Pt exhibits no cross-sectional
variation), and r is the non-stochastic and known real interest rate.13 For
12By distribution factors I refer to any variable that affects the spouses’ outside options
but not their preferences or the budget set (Bourguignon et al., 2009). Chiappori et al.
(2002) and Voena (2015) use the sex ratio in the local marriage market or laws governing
divorce and property sharing as distribution factors.
13If P kt is the price of the public good at t, and P
c
t is the price of the private good, then
the relative price of private consumption is defined as Pt = P
c
t/Pkt . In other words, P
k
t is the
deflator of all other monetary figures in the model, including assets and wages.
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tractability, discounting βt is common between spouses. The household prob-
lem can be decentralized using personal (Lindahl) prices for the public good
(Chiappori and Meghir, 2014).
Let ϑ2it=0 be the Lagrange multiplier on (2.2), ϑ˜1it be the Lagrange mul-
tiplier on (2.3), and ϑ˜2it on (2.4). Then the above household problem is equiv-
alent to
max
{Kit,Cjit,Hjit,Ait+1}∀t,j
E0
T∑
t=0
βt
[
µ1itU1(Kit, C1it, 1−H1it; z1it)+µ2itU2(Kit, C2it, 1−H2it; z2it)
]
(2.1’)
subject to the budget constraint (2.5) only. Here, µ1it = 1 + ϑ˜1itβ
−1
t denotes
spouse 1’s intra-family bargaining power at t and µ2it = ϑ2it=0 + ϑ˜2itβ
−1
t spouse
2’s intra-family bargaining power. I normalize the sum of the powers to 1 so
that µ2it = 1 − µ1it. Therefore, µ1it and µ2it can also be seen as the Pareto
weights a social planner attaches to each partner’s preferences in the social
planning problem (2.1’) subject to (2.5).14
The two formulations of the household problem, (2.1) and (2.1’), are equiv-
alent so long as reservation utilities U¯1t and U¯2t do not depend on endogenous
choices (Chiappori and Mazzocco, 2014). Formulation (2.1’) is more convenient
for empirical purposes as it subsumes a number of constraints into intra-family
bargaining powers µ1it and µ2it.
2.2.1.1 Intra-Family Bargaining Powers
Intra-family bargaining powers µjit are functions of the factors entering the
constraints to which their components, ϑ2it=0 and ϑ˜jit, serve as Lagrange mul-
tipliers. As a result I model µ1it as
µ1it = µ (W1it,W2it,dit;µ1it−1,Xi0) (2.6)
where the dependence on µ1it−1 and Xi0 will become clearer below. Starting
from a generic µjit =
1
2
, spouse j becomes relatively more (less) powerful when
14This normalization is possible if βt is appropriately redefined in each period to avoid
distorting the intertemporal incentives when µ1it + µ2it 6= µ1is + µ2is for t 6= s.
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µjit′ >
1
2
(µjit′ <
1
2
) for a future period t′.
With full commitment between spouses, the partners stick to their initial
intra-family bargaining powers throughout their life-cycle. In this case
µ1it = µ1it−1 = · · · = µ1i0(Xi0)
and revelation of new information about wages or distribution factors does
not affect the intra-family bargaining powers. Notice that the beginning-of-
life bargaining power µ1i0 still depends on Xi0 and is household-specific.
If full commitment is not possible, two possibilities open up. Limited
commitment, on one hand, implies that the spouses update their bargaining
powers whenever any of the participation constraints (2.3) or (2.4) bind as a
result of changing wages or distribution factors. In this case
µ1it =
 µ (W1it,W2it,dit;µ1it−1,Xi0) if (2.3) or (2.4) bindµ1it−1 otherwise.
The partners reallocate power between them to reward the spouse who receives
favorable news, say a sudden promotion and a higher permanent wage. As
one’s outside option gets more attractive due to the favorable news, meaning
an increase in U¯jt in (2.3)-(2.4), one must be rewarded with a higher intra-
family bargaining power so as to keep satisfying one’s participation constraint
and remain in the family. This case is introduced in Kocherlakota (1996) and
Ligon et al. (2002) and explored empirically in Mazzocco et al. (2014).
Lack of commitment, on the other hand, implies that the spouses up-
date their bargaining powers at any time their wages or distribution factors
shift. This case, originally explored in Mazzocco (2007), is equivalent to a
series of static interactions between spouses if other dynamic features in the
family, such as savings, are assumed away. Full commitment is nested within
lack of commitment and limited commitment; however lack of commitment is
not nested within limited commitment or vice versa. In this chapter, strictly
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speaking, I model lack of commitment because I allow intra-family bargaining
powers to respond to wages (and distribution factors) at all times; however I
cannot distinguish empirically lack of- from limited commitment.
As Browning et al. (2014, section 6.2.2) point out, the outcome of problem
(2.1’) is ex-post (second-best) efficient under lack or limited commitment; once
news regarding wages and distribution factors are revealed and bargaining
powers determined, no other allocation of resources, other than the chosen
one, can induce Pareto improvements without violating the prevailing budget
constraint.
2.2.1.2 Prices
There are two types of prices in the model: one is hourly wages W1it and W2it
the spouses earn in the labor market, the other is the relative price of private
consumption Pt and the interest rate r. As I cannot exploit cross-sectional
variation in the latter prices, a feature that would help considerably in the
identification of the household structure and the estimation of the model, the
rest of this subsection is devoted exclusively to spousal wages.15
The primitive source of uncertainty the partners face is the hourly wages
they earn. Other things remaining fixed, the partners are hit by unexpected
changes in Wjit and respond by shifting their choices appropriately.
I adopt a permanent-transitory process for each earner’s wage in the
household. The log of spouse j’s real hourly wage at t is given by
lnWjit = x
W
jit
′
ζWjt + lnw
P
jit + ujit
lnwPjit = lnw
P
jit−1 + vjit.
The vector xWjit contains observable characteristics known at t such as race, age,
or education; ζWjt is the vector of time-varying parameters. The permanent
15There is variation in Pt over time but this is absorbed by conditioning private consump-
tion on time dummies (see section 2.4.3). Cross-sectional variation in Pt could be obtained
by exploiting regional (state or county) variation in prices or by constructing family-specific
prices given the basket of goods a household consumes (as in Kiefer, 1984).
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component lnwPjit follows a unit-root and vjit is the (permanent) shock to this
process. Transitory deviations from one’s wage profile are captured by the
transitory shock ujit. Rewriting I get
∆wjit = vjit + ∆ujit (2.7)
where ∆wjit = ∆ lnWjit −∆(xWjit′ζWjt ) captures wage growth net of growth in
observable characteristics and ∆ is the first difference operator.
Deviations from the deterministic path for wages (xWjit
′
ζWjt ) occur because
permanent and transitory shocks hit the partners. A permanent shock shifts
the value of one’s skills in the market permanently (for example, a promotion
shifting wages permanently up); a transitory shock is mean reverting (for ex-
ample, a short illness affecting productivity). When shocks hit, I assume the
spouses can perfectly observe and distinguish between them; moreover they
hold no advance information on them.
All shocks have zero cross-sectional means and second moments given by
E (vjitvkit+s) =

σ2vj ,t if j = k, s = 0
σvjvk,t if j 6= k, s = 0
0 otherwise
E (ujitukit+s) =

σ2uj ,t if j = k, s = 0
σujuk,t if j 6= k, s = 0
0 otherwise
for j, k ∈ {1, 2}. Permanent shocks are independent of transitory, vjit ⊥ ukit+s
∀j, k, i, t, s. The second moments are time-varying to reflect, for instance, the
possibility that some periods of time are more turbulent than others. Shocks
of the same type are correlated between spouses reflecting assortative mating
(positive correlation) or risk sharing agreements (negative correlation). Finally,
shocks are serially uncorrelated.
Although the permanent-transitory process for wages may seem restric-
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tive, it fits the PSID data well (for example Blundell et al., 2016). Recent gen-
eralizations of this process or alternative formulations include Blundell et al.
(2015), Guvenen (2007), and Browning et al. (2010).
2.2.2 The Solution to the Family Problem
Without parameterizing or restricting spousal preferences in (2.1’), I obtain
analytical closed-form expressions linking the growth rates of earnings (labor
supply) and consumption to wage shocks that hit the household. To achieve
this, I apply first- and second-order Taylor approximations to the problem’s
first order conditions and the intertemporal budget constraint following Blun-
dell and Preston (1998) and a sequence of papers thereafter (Attanasio et al.,
2002; Blundell et al., 2008, 2015, 2016).
Specifically, I derive the necessary first order conditions of the household
problem (2.1’), subject to (2.5), assuming an interior solution. These are given
by
[Kit] : µ1itU1,K + µ2itU2,K = λit
[C1it] : µ1itU1,C1 = λitPt
[C2it] : µ2itU2,C2 = λitPt
[H1it] : µ1it(−U1,H1) = λitW1it
[H2it] : µ2it(−U2,H2) = λitW2it
[Ait+1] : λit = β(1 + r)Etλit+1
(2.8)
where λit is the Lagrange multiplier on the sequential budget constraint at t
(the marginal utility of wealth) and µjit, j = {1, 2}, is given by (2.6). Uj,xj , the
first order partial derivative of Uj with respect to xj = {K,Cj, Hj}, j = {1, 2},
is i- and t-specific but I omit these subscripts to ease the notation.
There are five intra-temporal and one inter -temporal optimality condi-
tions in each period t. With unrestricted spousal preferences the first order
conditions for Cjit and Hjit are functions of Kit, Cjit, and Hjit, whereas the
first-order condition for Kit is a function of Kit, C1it, C2it, H1it, and H2it. The
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latter is so because Kit bridges partners’ preferences and is therefore interre-
lated with all other choice variables.
Applying Taylor approximations to the first order conditions (more on this
below) enables me to relate the growth rates of labor supply and consumption
to wage shocks and an innovation to the marginal utility of wealth. As the
latter is not appealing empirically, I apply a Taylor approximation to the
intertemporal budget constraint (more on this below), which enables me to
replace the aforementioned innovation to λit by a function of wage shocks. I
combine these approximations into a single set of equations for the growth
rates of household outcomes as functions of permanent and transitory wage
shocks only.
To render such equations empirically useful, 1.) I add up individual private
consumption, which is not observed in the data, to total private consumption
in the household, and 2.) I replace market hours with earnings using the
identity Yjit = WjitHjit, j = {1, 2}. The final set of equations is
∆kit
∆cit
∆y1it
∆y2it
 ≈ Tit

v1it
v2it
∆u1it
∆u2it
 (2.9)
where lower case variables denote logged outcomes net of observable charac-
teristics (i.e. ∆kit = ∆ lnKit net of the change in covariates).
16
Tit is a 4 × 4 matrix of ‘transmission parameters’ (loading factors) of
shocks into outcomes. Such transmission parameters are nonlinear functions
of a large set of gender-specific Frisch (λ-constant) elasticities of each spouse
plus additional parameters pertaining to financial and human wealth in the
family, as well as bargaining power and the allocation of private consumption
between spouses. I report the transmission parameters in Tit analytically in
appendix B.4 after I present the details of the approximations to the first
16I assume that changes in observable covariates are anticipated by partners (and ex ante
contracted upon) and therefore already accounted for in their optimal choices.
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Table 2.1: Frisch elasticities of spouse j
j’s labor supply elasticities...
ηj,h,w : with respect to own wage Wj
ηj,h,pc : with respect to the price of private consumption P
c
ηj,h,pk : with respect to the price of public consumption P
k
j’s private consumption elasticities...
ηj,c,w : with respect to own wage Wj
ηj,c,pc : with respect to the price of private consumption P
c
ηj,c,pk : with respect to the price of public consumption P
k
j’s public consumption elasticities...
ηj,k,w : with respect to own wage Wj
ηj,k,pc : with respect to the price of private consumption P
c
ηj,k,pk : with respect to the price of public consumption P
k
Notes: This table presents the full set of Frisch (λ-constant) elasticities of spouse j. These
elasticities constitute an ordinal representation of j’s preferences Uj . There are 9 elasticities
per gender in total, 3 own-price and 6 cross-price elasticities. The rule governing the notation
of Frisch elasticities in this chapter: ηj,x,χ is individual j’s elasticity of own outcome variable
x = {hj , cj , k} with respect to price χ = {wj , pc, pk}.
order conditions in appendix B.2 and the intertemporal budget constraint in
appendix B.3.
The gender-specific Frisch elasticities ordinally describe spousal prefer-
ences over public & private consumption, and leisure. Table 2.1 introduces the
full set of such elasticities and appendix B.1 defines them analytically.
The advantage of the aforementioned approximations over, for example, a
full numerical solution to the household problem, is summarized in (2.9). Such
analytical equations provide a neat picture for the contribution of wage shocks,
preferences, bargaining power, consumption sharing etc. to consumption and
earnings growth and, therefore, a straightforward way to identify the household
structure through, for example, the covariance matrix of (2.9).
The rest of this section is devoted to a more detailed description of the
steps I take to reach equations (2.9):
1. I approximate the intra-temporal first order conditions in (2.8) around
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t− 1’s prices, choices, and intra-family bargaining power. These approx-
imations appear in detail in appendix B.2. The approximated equations
constitute a 5×5 system in (the t−1→ t growth in) K, C1, C2, H1, and
H2. Solving for the choice variables results in approximate closed-form
expressions for each one of them as functions of (the growth in) wages,
intra-family bargaining power, and the marginal utility of wealth. This
is equation (B.8) in the appendix.
2. As the growth in intra-family bargaining power in (B.8) is unobserved, I
exploit (2.6), which relates bargaining power to wages and distribution
factors, and log-linearize µ1it to get
∆ lnµ1it ≈ ηµ,w1∆ lnW1it + ηµ,w2∆ lnW2it +
∑
n
ηµ,dn∆ ln d
n
it. (2.10)
Here the ‘surplus extraction’ elasticity ηµ,wj , j = {1, 2}, captures the
sensitivity of function µ(·) to each spouse’s wage and ηµ,dn captures the
sensitivity to distribution factor dn. If µ(·) in (2.6) remains unrestricted,
then ηµ,wj and ηµ,dn vary with µ1it−1 and last period’s wages and distri-
bution factors.
I assume that only permanent wage shocks shift intra-family bargaining
power in (2.10). As transitory shocks are rapidly mean-reverting, one
can expect that they do not reflect serious enough events that can alter
the allocation of bargaining power between spouses.17
3. As the growth in the marginal utility of wealth in (B.8) is unobserved, I
apply a second order Taylor approximation to the Euler equation in (2.8)
and decompose ∆ lnλit into two additive terms (see appendix B.2 and
equation (B.9) for details). The first term, ωit, reflects spousal motives
17Lise and Yamada (2014) find that unpredicted deviations in the spouses’ relative wages
during marriage impact on intra-family bargaining powers but not for all households. They
report that the mode of revisions (to the Pareto weight) is one, indicating no revisions at
all. This evidence motivates the exclusion of transitory shocks, namely the least important
shocks over the family life-cycle, from the revisions to µ1it.
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for precautionary savings over their life-cycle. The second component
it is a 0-mean innovation term which captures idiosyncratic revisions
to λit in response to wage shocks. Blundell et al. (2013, appendix A.1)
show that ωit converges to a constant as the variance of it tends to 0. To
achieve tractability I assume that ωit ≡ ωt does not vary cross-sectionally
(Blundell et al., 2016, appendix).
4. Combining results from points 2-3 above, namely equations (2.10) and
(B.9), I update equation (B.8) and write (the t − 1 → t growth in) K,
C1, C2, H1, and H2 as functions of wage shocks and the components of
λit only. This is equation (B.10) in the appendix; to obtain it I have
assumed away any variation in distribution factors.18
5. I use the intertemporal budget constraint (the sequential version of which
appears in (2.5) above) to link it to the wage shocks that hit the spouses.
My aim is to replace the innovation to the marginal utility of wealth it
by an expression involving wage shocks only so as to render equation
(B.10) empirically useful.
Specifically, I apply a first order Taylor approximation to each side of the
intertemporal budget constraint around the path that would be followed
if wage shocks were zero. The approximation draws on Campbell (1993);
Blundell et al. (2013, 2016) are recent applications of such approxima-
tion to budget constraints that are similar to (2.5). If either spouse’s
current earnings are negligible compared to their expected lifetime earn-
ings, the approximation enables me to map permanent wage shocks vjit,
j = {1, 2}, into it. The details appear in appendix B.3.
The mapping from permanent wage shocks to it, given by (B.11) in
the appendix, involves spousal preferences (the full set of gender-specific
Frisch elasticities in table 2.1), parameters pertaining to the allocation
of private consumption (more on this below) and bargaining power in
18Lise and Yamada (2014) find no effect of distribution factors other than the spouses’
relative wages on the allocation of resources in the household.
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the household, as well as three ‘quasi-reduced-form’ parameters pertain-
ing to expectations about the allocation of future household resources.
These are: ξit ≈ Lifetime Spending on KitLifetime Spending on Kit+Cit is the share of public in total ex-
pected lifetime expenditure, sit ≈ Lifetime Earnings1itLifetime Earningsit is the share of the male
spouse’s expected lifetime earnings (his human wealth) in total lifetime
earnings in the family, and piit ≈ AssetsitAssetsit+Lifetime Earningsit is the ‘partial
insurance’ parameter (term due to Blundell et al., 2008) that reflects
the share of assets (financial wealth) in the family’s total financial and
human wealth combined.
6. A final step is needed to obtain equations (2.9); this involves replacing
individual private consumption C1 and C2, which is not observed in the
data, by total private consumption using the approximation
∆ lnCit ≈ ϕit−1∆ lnC1it + (1− ϕit−1)∆ lnC2it. (2.11)
Here ϕit =
C1it
Cit
is the male spouse’s share of private consumption; ϕit
will serve as a parameter to be identified in the data.
2.2.3 The Family Response to Wage Shocks
Wage shocks induce three types of effects on household outcomes, namely on
public and private consumption, and spousal earnings (or labor supply). Per-
manent shocks induce static, bargaining, and wealth effects whereas transitory
shocks induce static effects only.
The static effects summarize the impact a price change, in this case a
wage change, has on outcomes in the exact same period when the price change
occurs. Such effects are, by definition, identical across a dynamic model, like
the present one, and a static one-period model. They reflect the standard
substitution effect the price change induces by tilting the contemporaneous
budget constraint and altering the marginal rate of substitution among the
different goods the spouses enjoy. Permanent and transitory shocks (for a
given spouse) induce identical static effects as there is no distinction between
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such shocks in an one-period environment.
On top of their static effects, permanent shocks induce bargaining effects
through shifting intra-family bargaining power in (2.10). Changes in intra-
family bargaining power further alter the marginal rate of substitution among
goods promoting those goods that the relatively powerful spouse prefers more.
Finally, permanent shocks induce wealth/income effects through shifting
the intertemporal budget constraint as a result of a permanent change in house-
hold earnings. As household earnings are an endogenous household outcome,
and therefore depend on the spouses’ response to shocks through the aforemen-
tioned static and bargaining channels, the wealth effects themselves depend on
(are a function of) the static and bargaining effects.
With reference to the transmission matrix Tit in (2.9), its first two columns
are the transmission parameters of permanent wage shocks comprising the
sums of the static, bargaining, and wealth effects by each spouse’s perma-
nent wage shock. The last two columns are the transmission parameters of
transitory wage shocks, therefore comprising the static effects only.
Bargaining effects do not operate in the unitary model. Static and wealth
effects do (Blundell et al., 2016). However, in contrast to the unitary model,
static effect in the collective model are explicit functions of both spouses’
preferences (Frisch elasticities), the prevailing intra-family bargaining power,
as well as the prevailing allocation of private consumption (the latter matters
for the transmission of shocks into private consumption only). Wealth effects,
being a function of static and bargaining effects, are themselves structurally
richer in the collective as opposed to the unitary model.
To help build intuition, I illustrate how a transitory wage shock transmits
into selected household outcomes. Without loss of generality, consider the
ceteris-paribus19 transmission of ∆u1it > 0, a positive transitory shock to the
male wage at t, into public consumption Kit and his leisure L1it. I study the
response of leisure to the transitory shock, instead of earnings or labor supply,
19Ceteris-paribus implies v1it = v2it = ∆u2it = 0.
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because leisure facilitates the present illustration; recall that there is 1-to-1
mapping between leisure and earnings/labor supply in the absence of home
production.
From appendix B.4 the response of those outcomes to ∆u1it is given ana-
lytically by
∆kit ≈ η1,k,w × νit−1 × η2,k,pk
η¯k,pk
×∆u1it
∆l1it ≈ −κ×
(
η1,h,w − η1,k,w × (1− νit−1)× η1,h,pk
η¯k,pk
)
×∆u1it
(2.12)
where η1,k,w is the male elasticity of the public good with respect to his wage,
η1,h,w is his own-wage labor supply elasticity, and η1,h,pk is his labor supply
elasticity with respect to the price of the public good (see table 2.1). νit−1
is a mixture of preferences and the prevailing (i.e. last period’s) intra-family
bargaining power; η¯k,pk = (1−νit−1)η1,k,pk +νit−1η2,k,pk is a weighted average of
the spouses’ elasticities ηj,k,pk of the public good with respect to its price.
20,21
In figure 2.1 I draw the male spouse’s hypothetical preferences for leisure
and the public good assuming that these goods are imperfect substitutes (this
assumption is used for the purposes of this illustration only). The bold down-
ward sloping curve (‘Indifference curve 1’) depicts his preferences across
the two goods at the beginning of t, that is before the realization of the tran-
sitory shock. The straight line passing through A represents the original con-
temporaneous budget constraint at the same time. The scale of the axes is
irrelevant. The spouse consumes initially at A (LA and KA respectively).
The positive transitory wage shock does not shift the contemporaneous
budget constraint outwards. Section 2.2.2 and appendix B.3 show that, under
weak assumptions, transitory shocks do not induce wealth/income effects and,
therefore, leave the total available budget at t unchanged. However, such
20νit−1 = µ1it−1U1,K(µ1it−1U1,K + µ2it−1U2,K)−1 where Uj,K is j’s marginal utility of
the public good at t. Expect that ν ∈ [0, 1].
21In the absence of home production ∆l1it is obtained from (2.9) as ∆l1it = −κ∆h1it =
−κ(∆y1it −∆w1it) where κ > 0 reflects Jensen’s inequality when translating logged market
hours to logged leisure. As a result, κ in expression (2.12) reflects that leisure elasticities
are a scaled translation of labor supply elasticities.
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Figure 2.1: The transmission of ∆u1it > 0 into public consumption and
leisure
Plot 1 x, 1 x  1.5, 1 x  0.9, 6.25  x  5, 1  x  2 , x, 0, 1.7 , AxesOrigin  0, 0 , PlotRange  0, 5
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shock, once it realizes, tilts the budget constraint around the initial indifference
curve rendering leisure relatively more expensive (because ∆u1it > 0 and the
wage is the price of leisure) and the public good relatively cheaper. The new
budget constraint is the straight line passing through B.
If the male spouse can adjust his leisure and the public good freely, he
will move consumption to bundle B on the plane (LB and KB respectively) in
response to the tilting of the budget constraint. In this case the change in his
leisure is proportional to his own-wage labor supply elasticity, namely ∆l1it =
−κ×η1,h,w×∆u1it, and he cuts down leisure from LA to LB (assuming η1,h,w > 0).
The change in the public good is given by his elasticity of the public good
with respect to his wage, namely ∆kit = η1,k,w×∆u1it, and he increases public
consumption from KA to KB (assuming η1,k,w > 0 in this case). These responses
stem from (2.12) after setting νit−1 = 1 and observing that, as a result,
η
2,k,pk
η¯
k,pk
=
1; νit−1 = 1 corresponds to the extreme case where µ1it−1 = 1 and the male
spouse acts as a ‘dictator’, i.e. he completely imposes his preferences onto
household outcomes. Consumption bundle B is one extreme possible outcome
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in response to the positive transitory shock.
In the opposite extreme case, the male spouse holds no power in the
household and his partner becomes the ‘dictator’. This case can be obtained
when µ2it−1 = 1 implying νit−1 = 0. From (2.12), ∆l1it = −κ × (η1,h,w −
η1,k,w × η1,h,pkη
1,k,pk
) × ∆u1it whereas ∆kit = 0. The (lack of) response of public
consumption is straightforward: a shock to his wage does not alter the female
spouse’s tradeoffs (marginal rates of substitution) among the goods she enjoys
and, as a result, she does not change her (the household) demand for the public
good. The response of his leisure is less straightforward. As µ2it−1 tends to
1 and the public good tends to remain at KA, it is suboptimal for the male
spouse to shift his leisure like he would if he was the ‘dictator’: in such case
he would consume at C (LB and KA respectively) which is below the applicable
budget frontier and a profound deterioration in his welfare. Instead he adjusts
his leisure so that he ends up on the budget frontier given kit = KA: that is
consumption bundle D. This adjustment differs from the first best response
−κ × η1,h,w × ∆u1it by κ × η1,k,w × η1,h,pkη
1,k,pk
× ∆u1it, that is by the product of
his optimal response of K had he been able to adjust it freely (η1,k,w) and his
sensitivity of leisure relative to the public good (κ× η1,h,pk
η
1,k,pk
).
In more realistic cases, neither partner would act as ‘dictator’ and spouse
1 should land somewhere between the extreme bundles B and D. The final re-
sponse of the public good, given by (2.12), is a fraction νit−1 of his unrestricted
response η1,k,w×∆u1it weighed by a term η2,k,pkη¯
k,pk
that reflects the female spouse’s
relative sensitivity for the public good. The last term appears because, as the
public good enters both spouses’ preferences, changes in its demand have to be
agreed by both. The final response of his leisure, given by (2.12), is equal to
his unrestricted response −κ× η1,h,w×∆u1it plus an additional feedback term
in response to the household-wide shift in the public good; such adjustment
is captured by κ × η1,k,w × (1 − νit−1) × η1,h,pkη¯
k,pk
×∆u1it and exists because 1.)
leisure and public consumption are nonseparable in spousal preferences, 2.)
the response of public consumption, whatever that may be, reflects not just
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his but both spouses’ preferences.
Extending the discussion to all outcome variables is straightforward. The
difference between the impact of ∆u1it on kit, l1it (or y1it), c1it on one hand and
l2it (or y2it), c2it on the other is that there are direct and indirect static effects
induced on the former set, whereas there are only indirect ones induced on
the latter. The direct effects capture the direct response to a transitory wage
shock which, in all cases except leisure, exists because of non-separabilities in
spousal preferences. The indirect effects capture adjustments in the demand
of a good in response to household-wide shifts in public consumption.
The response to a permanent shock follows a similar discussion. In addi-
tion to their static effects, permanent shocks induce bargaining effects, which,
in the analog of figure 2.1, restrict or expand the admissible range of outcomes
between points B and D, and wealth/income effects that move the budget con-
straint inwards or outwards.
2.2.4 Identification of the Family Structure
In this section I discuss the identification of the household structure from
panel data on consumption (household-level public and private consumption),
spousal earnings, and spousal wages only. In each period t there are 6 wage
variances and covariances (σ2v1,t, σ
2
v2,t
, σv1v2,t, σ
2
u1,t
, σ2u2,t, σu1u2,t), 18 Frisch elas-
ticities (2 spouses × 9 elasticities each; see table 2.1), a parameter reflecting
the allocation of private consumption between spouses (ϕit), the Pareto weight
on male preferences (µ1it), 2 ‘surplus extraction’ elasticities (ηµ,wj), and a pa-
rameter reflecting a mixture of preferences and intra-family bargaining power
(νit). These amount to 29 parameters in total. Three additional parameters,
ξit, sit, and piit, enter the wealth effects but, as they are obtainable directly
from the data (section 2.4.2), I treat them as known in this discussion.
Several parameters vary cross-sectionally with observables; for example
the allocation of private consumption ϕit varies with the level of consumption
Cit, the Pareto weight µ1it varies with initial conditions or last period’s Pareto
weight µ1it−1, the ‘surplus extraction’ elasticities ηµ,wj vary with last period’s
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wage levels Wjit−1 and the Pareto weight µ1it−1. I discuss identification of such
parameters assuming they do not vary with observables; once identification is
established in such case, the extension to when they vary with observables is
straightforward. Identification does not require any parameter to be stationary
over time.
The parameters of the wage process are identified by wage moments only
(i.e. independently of preferences). Specifically
σ2vj ,t = E[∆wjit(∆wjit−1 + ∆wjit + ∆wjit+1)]
σv1v2,t = E[∆w1it(∆w2it−1 + ∆w2it + ∆w2it+1)]
σ2uj ,t = E[∆wjit∆wjit+1]
σu1u2,t = E[∆w1it∆w2it+1]
(2.13)
where ∆wjit is given by (2.7), j = {1, 2}, and E[·] denotes the first moment.
Identification follows the logic in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and earlier stud-
ies.
∑t+1
t−1 ∆wjit strips ∆wjit of its transitory component and, as a result, the
covariance E[∆wjit
∑t+1
t−1 ∆wjit] identifies the variance of the permanent shock.
Similarly, the covariance of ∆wjit and
∑t+1
t−1 ∆wkit, j 6= k, identifies the co-
variance between the partners’ permanent shocks. The covariance of ∆wjit
and ∆wjit+1 identifies the variance of the transitory shock because consecu-
tive transitory shocks are autocorrelated due to mean reversion. Similarly,
the covariance of ∆wjit and ∆wkit+1, j 6= k, identifies the covariance between
transitory shocks. Overidentifying restrictions are available.
The average transmission parameters of shocks into consumption and
earnings, namely the components of matrix Tit in (2.9), are identified by sec-
ond moments of the joint distribution of wages, earnings, and consumption.
Consider, as an example, the transmission of shocks into the public good and
define the following moments
mk1t = E[∆kit(∆w1it−1 + ∆w1it + ∆w1it+1)]
mk2t = E[∆kit(∆w2it−1 + ∆w2it + ∆w2it+1)]
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mk3t = E[∆kit∆w1it+1]
mk4t = E[∆kit∆w2it+1]
where ∆kit is given by (2.9). The average transmission parameters into the
public good are identified as
E[τ 11it ] =
mk1t σ
2
v2,t
−mk2t σv1v2,t
σ2v1,tσ
2
v2,t − σ2v1v2,t
E[τ 12it ] =
mk1t σv1v2,t −mk2t σ2v1,t
σ2v1v2,t − σ2v1,tσ2v2,t
E[τ 13it ] = −
mk3t σ
2
u2,t
−mk4t σu1u2,t
σ2u1,tσ
2
u2,t − σ2u1u2,t
E[τ 14it ] = −
mk3t σu1u2,t −mk4t σ2u1,t
σ2u1u2,t − σ2u1,tσ2u2,t
where (τ 11it , τ
12
it , τ
13
it , τ
14
it ) is the first row of the transmission matrix Tit in (2.9).
Identification rests on the following idea: if permanent wage shocks trans-
mit into public consumption, the contemporaneous covariance between spouse
j’s wage growth (striped of its transitory components) and public consump-
tion growth picks up the variance of spouse j’s permanent shock scaled by
its transmission parameter into public consumption. Similarly, the covariance
between contemporaneous growth in public consumption and next period’s
wage growth picks up (minus) the variance of the mean reverting transitory
shock weighed by its loading factor onto public consumption. In both cases
adjustments are made to account for the correlation of wages in the family.
Identification of the remaining transmission parameters (into total pri-
vate consumption and individual earnings) follows the same logic and requires
analogous moment conditions. A total of 16 transmission parameters are iden-
tified.
The question that emerges is whether such transmission parameters con-
vey sufficient information for the identification of the underlying household
structure. The answer is negative; there are only 16 transmission parameters
comprising a total of 29 structural parameters and most one can identify is
a few uninformative ratios of Frisch elasticities. Reasons behind the lack of
identification include 1.) the lack of variation in the price of the consumption
goods, 2.) the non-observability of individual private consumption, 3.) the ex-
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istence of a public good bridging spousal preferences and the interdependence
of goods allowed for by non-separabilities in spousal preferences, and 4.) the
indistinguishability between preferences and intra-family bargaining power.
I explore two possibilities in order to overcome the lack of identification.
In section 2.2.4.1 I impose restrictions on spousal preferences, rendering the
public good additively separable from private consumption and leisure, and
enforce full commitment. In section 2.2.4.2 I maintain nonseparable spousal
preferences and lack of commitment but I bring additional information into
(2.9), namely information on single individuals of each gender. In both cases
I obtain partial identification of the household structure.
2.2.4.1 Separable Public Good and Full Commitment
Additive separability of the public good implies that, conditional on household
income, public consumption does not change with wages or the price of private
consumption, leading to ηj,k,w = ηj,k,pc = ηj,h,pk = ηj,c,pk = 0 for j = {1, 2}.
Changes in wages still trigger shifts in the public good through the budget
constraint only. Full commitment implies that bargaining power in a given
household remains fixed over time (µ1it = µ1it=0, ∀t) leading to ηµ,wj = 0 and
0 bargaining effects.
The transmission parameters of wage shocks into household outcomes are
obtained from the expressions in appendix B.4 plugging in the aforementioned
restrictions. Note that private consumption and leisure remain nonseparable.
It is straightforward to see that the response of spousal earnings to own
transitory shocks identifies the own-wage labor supply elasticities ηj,h,w, j =
{1, 2}. Such response reflects the direct static effect on earnings (the indirect
static effect, which would feed back should public consumption also shift, is 0)
which is proportional to one’s labor supply elasticity.
The response of private consumption to transitory shocks identifies the
private consumption elasticities ηj,c,w up to scale where the scale is given
by a spouse’s share of private consumption in the household. Specifically,
the response of private consumption to the male transitory shock identifies
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E[ϕit]η1,c,w whereas the response to the female shock identifies E[1−ϕit]η1,c,w.
Again, such responses reflect the direct static effect on private consumption,
which is proportional to one’s own-wage private consumption elasticity and
their share of private consumption. It is not possible to separate the two.
To identify the hours elasticities with respect to the price of private
consumption (ηj,h,pc) I exploit a natural set of theoretical restrictions, that
is symmetry of each spouse’s matrix of substitution effects. After a con-
stant marginal-utility-of-wealth price change (essentially a transitory shock),
the matrix of substitution effects, that is (B.1) in the appendix, is equal to
the (scaled) inverse Hessian of the individual utility function. Symmetry
of this matrix follows from symmetry of the Hessian. In the present con-
text, this symmetry implies one linear restriction per spouse involving their
non-zero cross-price elasticities, namely η1,h,pc = −η1,c,w × ϕit × P
c
t Cit
W1itH1it
and
η2,h,pc = −η2,c,w × (1− ϕit)× P
c
t Cit
W2itH2it
.22
The response of consumption to permanent shocks identifies two quasi-
reduced-form consumption substitution elasticities at the household level. Specif-
ically, the response of public consumption identifies
η˜k,pk = E
[
η1,k,pkη2,k,pk/
(
(1− νit−1)η1,k,pk + νit−1η2,k,pk
)]
whereas the response of private consumption identifies
η˜c,pc = E [ϕit−1η1,c,pc + (1− ϕit−1)η2,c,pc ] .
The former parameter coincides with the household-level public consumption
substitution elasticity, i.e. the substitution elasticity of public consumption
when the household acts as a single economic agent (the case of the uni-
tary model). The latter parameter coincides with the household-level private
22See appendix B.1 for details. Frisch symmetry is not the only way to identify ηj,h,pc ,
j = {1, 2}. In principle, those elasticities can also be identified from the transmission of
permanent shocks into household outcomes. In practice the transmission of permanent
shocks alone could not pin down ηj,h,pc precisely.
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consumption substitution elasticity, i.e. the substitution elasticity of private
consumption in a unitary household. The response of earnings to permanent
shocks provides overidentifying restrictions for η˜k,pk and η˜c,pc .
A note of caution is due here: even though additive separability of public
consumption delivers identification of a number of structural parameters, the
demand for ‘public’ items, such as water or electricity, is likely to co-move
with hours of work (see, for example, Browning and Meghir, 1991). Casual
arguments suggest that water or electricity consumption may increase if in-
dividuals work less and spend more time at home. In the present model,
additive separability of K also implies that one partner’s earnings do not vary
with their spouse’s wage, thus stripping earnings of the ‘added worker’ effect
(Lundberg, 1985). This is because such effect operates here through the inter-
dependence of preferences due to a nonseparable public good and it vanishes
otherwise. Finally, in the absence of bargaining effects, full commitment ren-
ders the model indistinguishable from a unitary one unless η˜k,pk varies with
past wages through its dependence on νit−1 and last period’s Pareto weight.23
2.2.4.2 Nonseparable Public Good and Lack of Commitment
Suppose single and married individuals of gender j = {1, 2} have the same
preferences across the two states of life (as singles, in couples). Suppose, also,
that the entire set of Frisch elasticities per gender ηj = {ηj,h,w, ηj,h,pc , ηj,h,pk ;
ηj,c,w, ηj,c,pc , ηj,c,pk ; ηj,k,w, ηj,k,pc , ηj,k,pk} is available through, say, observing
singles. Then the second moments of the joint distribution of wages, earnings,
and consumption in the family, whose theoretical counterpart is the covariance
matrix of (2.9), suffice for the (over)-identification of the remaining household
structure.
Once spousal preferences (the Frisch elasticities) are known, the response
of public consumption to either spouse’s transitory shock identifies E[νit−1].
23One cannot distinguish this model from the unitary if ϕit alone and, therefore η˜c,pc or
the response of private consumption to transitory shocks, varies with wages or other observ-
ables. The non-separability of leisure and private consumption implies that the allocation
of private consumption will vary with wages even when the unitary model is the ‘correct’
representation of the household.
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νit−1 is a ‘preference aggregator’; it determines the extent to which shifts in
the household demand for the public good reflect one or another spouse’s
preferences. Similarly, the response of private consumption to either spouse’s
transitory shock identifies the average consumption allocation between them
E[ϕit−1]. The response of earnings provides over-identifying restrictions.
In both cases the rationale behind identification is the following: knowl-
edge of spousal preferences implies knowledge of how each spouse would, hy-
pothetically, change their consumption as single. The actual consumption
response at the family level is a weighted sum/product of the two individual
responses; the weight is given by ν in the case of public consumption and by ϕ
in the case of private consumption. An equivalent interpretation is the follow-
ing: the extent to which the response of family consumption to wage shocks
resembles the way one or another partner would have responded had they been
single is informative about the decision process for the public good as well as
the allocation of the private good.
The response of household outcomes to permanent shocks identifies 8 bar-
gaining effects (4 bargaining effects -on public consumption, private consump-
tion, and earnings- by each spouse’s permanent shock). Permanent shocks
induce bargaining and wealth effects; as the latter are functions of the former
and the static effects that are identified from transitory shocks and singles,
the response to permanent shocks just identifies the bargaining effects.24 It
24Without loss of generality consider the bargaining effects βk,w1 , βc,w1 , βy1,w1 , βy2,w1
and the wealth effects γk,w1 , γc,w1 , γy1,w1 , γy2,w1 induced by men’s permanent shock. I write
βk,w1 + γk,w1
βc,w1 + γc,w1
βy1,w1 + γy1,w1
βy2,w1 + γy2,w1
 =

$k,w1
$c,w1
$y1,w1
$y2,w1

where ($k,w1 , $c,w1 , $y1,w1 , $y2,w1)
′ 6= 0 is the difference between the transmission param-
eters of permanent and transitory shocks to men’s wage. Conditional on the static effects,
the wealth effects γ are linear functions of the bargaining effects (see appendix B.4). Ma-
nipulating this system appropriately, I write
Mit (βk,w1 , βc,w1 , βy1,w1 , βy2,w1)
′
= mit.
Mit is a data-dependent matrix that is unlikely to be singular. mit is unlikely to be the
zero vector. There is a unique solution for (βk,w1 , βc,w1 , βy1,w1 , βy2,w1)
′
given by M−1it mit.
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is not possible to delve deeper and identify components of the bargaining ef-
fects, namely ηµ,wj or µ1it−1. The ‘surplus extraction’ elasticities ηµ,wj cannot
be separately identified from the (prevailing) Pareto weight µ1it−1. Indeed, in-
specting the bargaining effects in appendix B.4, these elasticities appear always
together with and multiplicatively to the Pareto weight.
But how can one obtain ηj? The following section (section 2.3) develops
a life-cycle model for consumption and leisure of singles. Based on such model
I show how the entire set of Frisch elasticities per gender ηj can be identified
and used as input to the model for couples.
2.3 A Life-Cycle Model for Singles
Single individuals of gender j = {1, 2} live alone and consume the same set of
goods as their non-single counterparts, namely ‘public’ consumption K, ‘pri-
vate’ consumption C, and leisure 1 − H. Public consumption is no longer
‘public’ in the sense that it is enjoyed together with a spouse because such
spouse does not exist; however, it still comprises the same goods that spouses
would generally consume together (such as last section’s car journey to the
countryside or the gas to heat the house). Private consumption C also com-
prises the same goods as in section 2.2 (e.g. a meal at the local coffee shop
or a subway ticket). Although a distinction between K and C is now less
meaningful, I do not collapse them to a single commodity because I want to
maintain consistency with the family problem of section 2.2.
I illustrate the main points of the model focusing on single j. Using a
time index s, the single individual’s problem is given by
max
{Kjis,Cjis,Hjis,Ajis+1}∀s
E0
S∑
s=0
βsUj(Kjis, Cjis, 1−Hjis; zjis) (2.14)
subject to the sequential budget constraint
Ajis +WjisHjis = Kjis + PtCjis +
Ajis+1
1 + r
, AjiS+1 = A˜, ∀t. (2.15)
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Here S indicates the horizon of the single’s lifetime and deserves some atten-
tion. In the case of a young single individual who may get married in the
future, S reflects the uncertain future time when he/she gets married; A˜ re-
flects assets, positive or negative, the single transfers to his/her future family.
In the case of an older single who was married in the past but is now divorced
or widowed, S reflects the end of lifetime (assuming no remarriage) and A˜ = 0
is the usual no-Ponzi terminal condition. (2.14)-(2.15) could also reflect the
problem of a person who remains single for their entire lifetime, in which case
S and A˜ are like for the older single above.
The public good is now subscripted by j to indicate its assignability to
single j; assets are also assignable and thus also subscripted by j. Private
consumption Cjis is observed and fully assignable to individual j. The wage
process is given by (2.7). The rest of the notation, as well as the properties of
Uj, remain exactly the same as in section 2.2.1.
I solve the problem following the same procedure like before (section
2.2.2): I obtain the problem’s first order conditions, I apply first and second
order Taylor approximations to them, I log-linearize the singles’ intertemporal
budget constraint. I obtain a set of closed-form equations for (growth in) sin-
gles’ consumption and earnings as functions of their permanent and transitory
wage shocks. These equations are given by
∆kjis
∆cjis
∆yjis
 ≈

ηj,k,w + (ηj,k,w + ηj,k,pc + ηj,k,pk)`
s
jit ηj,k,w
ηj,c,w + (ηj,c,w + ηj,c,pc + ηj,c,pk)`
s
jit ηj,c,w
ηj,h,w + (ηj,h,w + ηj,h,pc + ηj,h,pk)`
s
jit + 1 ηj,h,w + 1

 vjis
∆ujis

(2.16)
and they are the singles’ analog of equations (2.9) in the family problem. The
transmission of the permanent shock differs from that of the transitory shock
solely by the wealth/income effect it induces as there are no bargaining ef-
fects in a single-member household. The wealth/income effect is captured by
`sjit,which stems from the log-linearization of the intertemporal budget con-
straint and is defined analytically in appendix B.3, and the terms multiplying
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it.25
The response of public consumption to the transitory wage shock identi-
fies the public consumption wage elasticity ηj,k,w. Specifically, E[∆kjis∆wjis+1]
identifies (minus) this elasticity scaled by the variance of the transitory shock;
the latter is identified by (2.13). Similarly, the response of private consump-
tion (earnings) identifies the private consumption wage elasticity ηj,c,w (the
own-wage labor supply elasticity ηj,h,w). Identification of ηj,k,w and ηj,c,w, and
symmetry of the matrix of substitution effects (illustrated in section 2.2.4.1
and appendix B.1), brings about identification of the ‘reciprocal’ labor supply
elasticities ηj,h,pk = −ηj,k,w P
k
s Kjis
WjisHjis
and ηj,h,pc = −ηj,c,w P
c
sCjis
WjisHjis
.
The response of consumption to permanent shocks identifies two sums of
consumption substitution elasticities, namely ηj,k,pc + ηj,k,pk and ηj,c,pc + ηj,c,pk .
Importantly, identification of the sums is robust to misspecification in the single
person’s intertemporal budget constraint due to over- or under-estimating the
true horizon S of the single.26
It is not possible to separate the components of those sums, namely ηj,k,pc
from ηj,k,pk or ηj,c,pc from ηj,c,pk , even if one restricts the ‘reciprocal’ elasticities
ηj,k,pc and ηj,c,pk by exploiting the symmetry in the matrix of substitution
effects. Lack of variation in the prices of the two consumption goods is the
fundamental reason. But even if such variation was obtainable in the data, it
would be even harder to obtain independent variation in price P c from price
P k. This observation motivates the restriction P c = P k = P which implies
ηj,k,pc = ηj,k,pk and ηj,c,pc = ηj,c,pk .
27 These additional restrictions complete the
25Transitory shocks do not induce wealth/income effects provided that the lifetime hori-
zon as single is sufficiently long and earnings within a given period are negligible compared
to lifetime earnings as single.
26The response of earnings to permanent shocks identifies E[`sjit] conditional on ηj,h,w,
ηj,h,pc , and ηj,h,pk . Even though `
s
jit depends on the singles’s horizon S through (B.12) in
the appendix, identification of E[`sjit] does not. Indeed one could replace `sjit by a flexible
variable bjit (which, unlike `
s
jit, has an unknown analytical representation), so that the
response of earnings to permanent shocks identifies E[bjit]. Conditional on this, the response
of consumption to permanent shocks identifies the aforementioned sums ηj,k,pc + ηj,k,pk and
ηj,c,pc + ηj,c,pk . Of course, if the true horizon of the single is known, then the analytical
representation of `sjit has the advantage of providing overidentifying restrictions.
27It also implies ηj,h,pc = ηj,h,pk .
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identification of the entire set of Frisch elasticities per gender.
Conditional on these elasticities and as illustrated in section 2.2.4.2, the
response of consumption to transitory shocks in a two-member household iden-
tifies, among other things, the sharing of private consumption between spouses;
the response of consumption to permanent shocks identifies the bargaining
effects on household outcomes. In practice, one would estimate the gender-
specific preferences (Frisch elasticities) and the parameters of the collective
household jointly across married couples, single males, and single females;
therefore the Frisch elasticities would need to satisfy a big number of overi-
dentifying restrictions across singles and couples.
The critical assumption that makes this identification strategy work is
that spousal, gender-specific, preferences do not change across the two states
of life, namely across single and married individuals, or change only through
their dependence on taste shifters and observables. A number of studies have
employed this assumption to identify the structure of the collective household,
such as Barmby and Smith (2001), Vermeulen (2006), Vermeulen et al. (2006),
or, more recently, Browning et al. (2013).
There are a few different ways to weaken such assumption empirically.
For example, one may restrict the estimation sample to singles who have pref-
erences for marriage, or otherwise for forming a household, by only admitting
those who were married in the past or will get married in the future. Alterna-
tively, one may admit singles in a short window of time around the ‘marriage
cutoff’, that is for a few only periods before one gets married or after one
divorces. I impose the first restriction in the subsequent empirical application
(section 2.4).
Note that a class of preferences are excluded from Uj upon assuming pref-
erences are state-of-life invariant. Spouse j in the family cannot be altruistic,
therefore caring for his/her partner, as that would imply a change of prefer-
ences across the two states of life. As single, one cannot care for another person
because there is no one else in the household to care for. When partnered, one
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will still have to not care for their partner’s utility, other than caring through
the common public good, because, otherwise, preferences would change violat-
ing the aforementioned assumption.
2.4 Empirical Implementation
The model is estimated on seven waves of the PSID between 1999 and 2011; the
1997 wave is used for initial conditions.28 The PSID started in 1968 interview-
ing a -then- nationally representative core sample of roughly 3,000 households;
repeated annually until 1997 the survey collected information on employment,
income, health, education and other demographics of the adult household
members and their linear descendants should they split off and establish their
own households. A second smaller sample of low income households, consisting
roughly of 2,000 units in 1968, was also interviewed consistently. I estimate
the model on the core sample only.
The survey becomes biennial after 1997 but, starting in 1999, it collects
richer information including information on expenditure, wealth, philanthropy,
and numerous other topics. The sample size has grown consistently over the
years reaching 5,495 core sample households in 2011 (this reflects tracking of
an increasing number of the original families’ first and subsequent generations
split-offs).
The PSID is suitable for the model in this chapter due to a number of
desirable features: (i) detailed data on household assets and spending are avail-
able after 1999, along with data on earnings, hours of work, and demographics
for the main earners, (ii) consecutive information on the same households is
available, and (iii) multi-member, as well as single-member households are
interviewed.
28More information on the PSID, as well as access to all the data, is available online at
psidonline.isr.umich.edu.
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2.4.1 Sample Selection and Definition of Variables
I consider opposite-sex married couples; I exclude those cohabiting (a tiny
fraction in the data). I assign the model spouse j = 1 to the male spouse in
the data and the model spouse j = 2 to the female. Their single counterparts
in the data are single men and single women respectively.
I select a baseline sample of stable29 couples such that both partners are
between 25 and 65 years old and have no missing demographics such as race,
education, employment status, or state of residence. Both spouses must par-
ticipate in the labor market and earn an hourly wage at least equal to half the
applicable state minimum wage. The family must consume non-zero amounts
of both the public and the private goods and report usable information on
their wealth (precise definitions of the variables follow). I remove observa-
tions with extreme values for wages, earnings, or family consumption; these
variables must also not experience extreme jumps from one period to another
(jumps that probably signal measurement error).
Singles are selected according to the same exactly criteria like couples;
their only difference is that they live in single-member households. I restrict
my attention to single men and women who were married in the past or will
get married in the future. In other words, I drop singles who may have tastes
against marriage, something which would go against the assumption that pref-
erences are state-of-life invariant.
In total there are 10,232 married couple-year observations satisfying the
above selection criteria, 853 single male-year, and 1,109 single female-year (the
totals include calendar year 1996).30 There are more single women than men
because of more widowed or divorced women in all years of the data.
Table 2.2 presents information on demographics and labor market out-
29By stable households I refer to households whose lead couple (husband-wife) remains
intact. If a new spouse enters a household, because, say, of divorce and remarriage, I drop the
household the period this occurs and reinstate it in the following period as a new household.
I also drop intermittent households, i.e. households that appear in the survey only once or
in waves too far apart.
30The PSID data are retrospective, i.e. information in the 1997 survey wave refers to
calendar year 1996. I report descriptive statistics respecting this feature.
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comes by year (1996-2010), gender (male-female), and marital status (married,
single). Mean age of individuals in couples is in the early 40s (with women
approximately two years younger than their husbands). Mean age of singles
trends upwards over time reflecting that the majority of young singles in the
later survey waves are not included in the sample because I cannot observe
them getting married in the future. Approximately 90% of couples comprise
white individuals; this figure is slightly lower among single men (-4pct) and
considerably lower among single women (-12pct). Average years of education,
as well as the likelihood of having been to college, increases over time for mar-
ried men and women; the latter almost always outperform the former. There
is mixed evidence on the educational attainment of singles: single men have
progressively fewer years of schooling, possibly reflecting changes in the age
composition of single men, whereas single women maintain stable schooling
levels despite that.
Earnings are defined on an annual basis and include labor income (includ-
ing tips and overtime) and the labor part of business income from unincorpo-
rated businesses. Hourly wages are defined as annual earnings over annual
hours of market work. Women earn consistently less than men across both
marital states but they also work fewer hours. Single men work approximately
the same hours as men in couples but they earn less; single women work more
than their married counterparts but earn slightly less.
The PSID collects information on numerous elementary expenditure items
(see Blundell et al., 2016, for how the PSID compares in that respect to the Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts). To meet the requirements of the model
I categorize and aggregate the elementary items into a private and a public
good considering which items may be rival among family members and which
may not. There is no easy way to draw a line between private and public and I
treat the following categorization as baseline – private consumption comprises
food at home, food out, transport on public means, medical services exclud-
ing health insurance, and prescriptions; public consumption comprises housing
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services, home insurance, health insurance, utilities including gas, electricity,
water and sewer, children’s schooling and child care, and vehicle utilization
costs including motor fuel.31
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present summary statistics for private and public con-
sumption respectively. Across the two tables, the first row presents by year
average real expenditure on goods by couples (expressed in $2010). The second
and third rows present average real expenditure by single males and females
respectively as a percentage of the expenditure of couples in the same year.
In the subsequent rows I break down expenditure of couples to its elementary
components. I do not repeat for single men or women as their small sample
sizes along with the infrequency of purchases of disaggregated items prohibits
such illustration.
The average private expenditure of couples, expressed in $2010, is approx-
imately $11,500 over the period from 1998 to 2010; interestingly this average
does not fluctuate over time. The average private expenditure of single men is
approximately 65% of the couples’ average; single women’s is slightly less but
still above 60% of the couples’ average.
The average public expenditure of couples, expressed in $2010, is $26,244
in 1998; this increases steadily to $38,057 in 2006 but drops sharply in the
years of the financial crisis. The average public expenditure of single men is
approximately 60%-65% of the couples’ average; this fluctuates considerably
over time reflecting, possibly, the compositional changes in the age of singles in
the sample. The average public expenditure of single women is again slightly
lower than single men’s and also fluctuates with time.
Expenditure on public goods is consistently the largest part of household
expenditure across marital states; it amounts approximately to 72.1% of a mar-
ried couple’s total expenditure, 70.3% of a single male’s, and 71.8% of a single
female’s. Interestingly, for all marital states the share of public expenditure in
total expenditure increases, slowly but steadily, over time.
31This categorization excludes goods that were added in the PSID after wave 2005 such
as clothing and recreational goods.
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Information on assets is needed for the construction of the ‘partial in-
surance’ parameter piit. The PSID collects data on home equity (house value
net of mortgages), value of other real estate, vehicles, farms and businesses,
shares, stocks and other investments, savings accounts and bond holdings, in-
dividual retirement accounts and annuities, and miscellaneous assets. Data
on household debt are also collected including credit card debt, student loans,
medical and legal bills, and loans to relatives. I am interested in the house-
hold net worth, therefore I aggregate the various asset components into one
figure (‘wealth’) that captures total household assets and home equity net of
outstanding debts (excluding vehicle loans).
Table 2.5 mimics the style of the consumption tables and presents sum-
mary statistics for assets and their components (expressed in $2010). The
average net worth of couples is positive at $330,470 in 1998; this increases
steadily until 2006 but drops sharply afterwards. The averages for singles are
less reliable as, due to the small sample sizes, they are often impacted by ex-
treme values. Nevertheless, net worth of singles appears to trend upwards with
time possibly reflecting the shifting age composition of their samples.
2.4.2 Pre-Estimated Parameters
Three parameters pertaining to the log-linearization of the intertemporal bud-
get constraint (appendix B.3) are estimated outside the structural model.
These are
ξit ≈ Et [Lifetime Expenditure on Kit]Et [Lifetime Total Expenditureit]
sit ≈ Et [Lifetime Earnings1it]Et [Lifetime Earningsit]
piit ≈ Assetsit
Assetsit + Et [Lifetime Earningsit]
where ‘Lifetime’ here spans the period between t = 0 and t = T . Similar pa-
rameters are also defined for singles. Identification of the household structure
does not, however, require a log-linearization of the singles’ budget constraint
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(section 2.3) and, as a result, I do not estimate the singles’ counterparts of
those parameters.
To deal with the expectations, first notice that
Et [Lifetime Expenditure on Kit] = Kit +
T∑
ς=1
EtKit+ς
(1 + r)ς
.
I estimate EtKit+ς by pooling Kit across all periods of time and regressing it
on a set of predictable characteristics including each spouse’s race, education,
year of birth, a quartic polynomial in age, and a rich set of interactions. This
regression can be written as Kit = Q
k′
itβ
k+εkit where the notation is obvious. To
obtain the time t-expected household public consumption, say, at t+2 (ς = 2),
I use EtKit+2 = Qk′it+2βˆk. I set the interest r at 2%. I repeat the same for
private consumption Cit. It follows that Et [Lifetime Total Expenditureit] =
Et [Lifetime Expenditure on Kit] + Et [Lifetime Expenditure on Cit].
As for sit, notice that
Et
[
Lifetime Earningsjit
]
= Yjit +
T∑
ς=1
EtYjit+ς
(1 + r)ς
.
I pool spouse j’s earnings over the years and I regress them on his/her race,
education, year of birth, a quartic in age, and their interactions. This re-
gression is given by Yjit = Q
y′
jitβ
y
j + ε
y
jit. Like before, I obtain j’s expected
earnings, say, at t + 2 (ς = 2) setting EtYjit+2 = Qy′jit+2βˆ
y
j . I repeat the same
steps for each spouse’s earnings separately; then Et [Lifetime Earningsit] =∑2
j Et
[
Lifetime Earningsjit
]
.
Constructing piit requires knowledge of beginning-of-period assets (section
2.4.1) and expected human wealth Et [Lifetime Earningsit]. I assume assets at
t are prior to any consumption-leisure choices in the same period.
Figure 2.2 plots average values of the (pre-estimated) parameters ξit, sit,
and piit against the age of the male spouse. The grey dashed lines plot the
average values; a 95% confidence interval around them appears in a grey shade.
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Figure 2.2: Pre-estimated parameters
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Notes: These figures plot the average ξit, sit, and piit against the age of the household head. The
red line depicts a 5-point moving average over the series (averages by age of household head),
the grey dashed line depicts the actual means, and the grey shade is the 95% confidence interval
around the actual mean.
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The red solid lines plot a 5-point moving average around the average values in
order to ease legibility of the graphs.
According to graph 2.2a, the share of expected lifetime public in total
expenditure drops slightly over the life-cycle, from around .82 at age 25 to .72
by age 65. Graph 2.2b informs that men’s share of expected lifetime earn-
ings is around .6 of combined lifetime earnings in the family over the first 2/3
of the life-cycle. Post age 50, however, this share drops, initially slowly but
subsequently faster, to less less than .5, reflecting the presence of a relatively
younger spouse and, therefore, different retirement ages. Graph 2.2c illustrates
that young households hold very little assets at the beginning of their life-cycle
but piit steadily increases in a convex way. By age 60, assets constitute approx-
imately half of their financial and (remaining) human wealth combined. Note
that graphs 2.2b-2.2c are very similar quantitatively to the ‘partial insurance’
graphs in Blundell et al. (2016).
2.4.3 Estimation Procedure
In this section I describe the steps I take to estimate the structural parameters
and I discuss issues pertaining to measurement error in the data and infer-
ence. The ‘chronology’ of the model estimation is as follows. First, I clear
wages, earnings, and consumption from the effect of observable characteris-
tics. Subsequently, I estimate the parameters of the wage process. Finally, I
estimate the parameters of the structural model conditional on the estimated
wage parameters.
I regress lnWjit, j = {1, 2}, on a set of observable characteristics that
include dummies for calendar year, age, education, race, state of residence,
and education-year and race-year interactions, and I obtain the residual. I
carry out such regression separately for men and women, married and singles.
If wages suffer from measurement error, and if such error is classical (which
implies, among others, that it is independent of the covariates), the wage
residual is
w˜jit = wjit + e
w
jit
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where wjit is the error-free (economically relevant) residual and e
w
jit is the
measurement error.
I stack together growth in residual wages w˜jit from one period to another,
that is ∆w˜ji = (∆w˜ji1999; ∆w˜ji2001; . . .∆w˜ji2011)
′. Motivated by the theoretical
representation (2.7), I use the second moments of ∆w˜ji to estimate the pa-
rameters of the gender-specific wage process, i.e. the second moments of wage
shocks. I estimate those separately for married and singles. I use the GMM
estimator and I weigh the moments by the identity matrix.
The measurement error presents a challenge as it is not possible to esti-
mate the variance of the transitory shock separately from the variance of the
error. To get around this, I remove a priori the variability in wages that is
attributed to error using a well-known validation study for the PSID. Bound
et al. (1994) compare interview responses and official records for a sample of
workers in a single large manufacturing firm; they extrapolate their findings
appropriately to representative samples and argue that measurement error is
responsible for 7.2% to 16.2% of the variability in log hourly wages. I adopt an
estimate in the middle of that range (13%; Blundell et al., 2016, use the same
number too) and I assume that measurement error is serially uncorrelated as
well as uncorrelated across partners.32
I regress lnYjit on the same set of observables like above, as well as dum-
mies for the number of children, number of household members, employment
status at the time of the interview, for additional earners in the household
other than the main two (main one for single-member households) and for
outside recipients of financial support. I also include the first difference of
those variables and employment status-year interactions. I carry out the re-
gressions separately for married and singles; for married I also control for the
characteristics of the spouse.
32The major caveat using Bound et al. (1994)’s validation study is that their sample of
workers comes from years 1982 and 1986, i.e. almost two decades before the bulk of the
data I am using in this chapter. It is unclear how the importance of measurement error has
changed over time or after the restructuring of the PSID in 1997. Another caveat comes
from using the same estimates to correct female wages too even though the validation study
sampled male workers only.
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If earnings suffer from (classical) measurement error, the earnings residual
is
y˜jit = yjit + e
y
jit
where yjit is the error-free residual and e
y
jit is the measurement error. I stack
together growth in residual earnings y˜jit from one period to another and I ob-
tain ∆y˜ji. Bound et al. (1994) report that roughly 4% of the variability in log
earnings is attributed to measurement error; I use this estimate to correct the
second moments of ∆y˜ji. I also remove the error variance from E[∆w˜ji∆y˜ji].
Given that log hourly wages are calculated as log annual earnings minus log
annual hours
E[ewjite
y
jit] = E[(e
y
jit − ehjit)eyjit] = E[eyjit2]− E[ehjiteyjit]
and
E[ehjite
y
jit] = 1/2
(
E[eyjit
2] + E[ehjit
2
]− E[ewjit2]
)
where ehjit is the measurement error in spouse j’s log annual working hours at t.
Bound et al. (1994) report that between 17.9% and 26.6% of the variability in
log annual hours is due to measurement error; I adopt an estimate in the middle
of that range (23%). Again, I assume that the errors are serially uncorrelated
and uncorrelated across partners.
Finally, I remove the effect of observables from private and public con-
sumption regressing lnCit and lnKit respectively on the same set of covariates
that I used in the earnings regressions above. If consumption suffers from
(classical) measurement error, the estimated residuals are respectively
c˜it = cit + e
c
it
k˜it = kit + e
k
it
where cit and kit are the error-free residuals and e
c
it and e
k
it are measurement
errors. I stack together growth in residual consumption from one period to
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another to obtain ∆c˜i and ∆k˜i (with ∆ci1999 and ∆ki1999 both missing as
consumption information was first collected in 1999). For singles these vari-
ables are all subscripted by j = {1, 2} to indicate assignability of consump-
tion. I identify the variance of the measurement error by the first-order auto-
covariance of consumption given that the transmission of transitory shocks into
consumption is identified by the covariance between consumption and wages.33
I estimate the parameters of the structural model by assigning the empir-
ical second moments of wages, earnings and consumption of couples to their
theoretical counterparts, i.e. to the covariance of (2.9). For estimating the
full version of the structural model (with nonseparable preferences and lack of
commitment) I also use the empirical second moments of wages, earnings and
consumption of singles.34 I use GMM and the identity matrix as weights. For
inference I adopt the block bootstrap (see for example Section 4 in Horowitz,
2001). I draw 1,000 random samples from the original samples (by marital sta-
tus) and repeat all stages of the estimation for each bootstrap resample (i.e.
first stage regressions for wages, earnings, consumption; GMM estimation of
the parameters of the wage process; GMM estimation of the remaining param-
eters). I account in this way for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity across
and serial correlation within blocks as well as the fact that I use pre-estimated
residuals in the main GMM estimation.
2.5 Results
This section presents the main estimation results, namely the GMM estimates
of the parameters of the wage process and of the household structure, including
the gender-specific Frisch elasticities, the allocation of private consumption,
and the bargaining effects due to lack of commitment.
I estimate the wage process of male and female earners imposing station-
33I allow the variance of the measurement error in consumption to differ across couples,
single men, and single women. See table B.1 in appendix B.5 for estimates of the variance.
34I use the empirical variances and first order auto-covariances of the joint distribution
of wages, earnings, and consumption over time. Higher-order auto-covariances are almost
always insignificantly different from 0.
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arity of the parameters over time. I present two sets of results: panel A of table
2.6 presents the estimates for married individuals whereas panel B presents the
estimates for singles.
The variance of female shocks is effectively unchanged across states of
life (across panels A and B); the variance of male shocks is, however, slightly
lower among single men as opposed to men who are married. Men exhibit
higher transitory variability/instability than women across both states of life
possibly reflecting higher job mobility (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 2009). Overall,
the relatively higher variance of women’s permanent shocks may reflect wider
dispersion of returns to skills and labor market experience compared to men.
The covariance of shocks between spouses is always positive, although
this is estimated less precisely than the variance; it implies a correlation of
ρv1v2 = 0.15 for permanent shocks and ρu1u2 = 0.17 for transitory shocks.
These correlations suggest that, possibly due to positive assortative mating,
the spouses work in similar industries or sectors, or their skills are similar,
implying that they are hit by shocks that co-move.
Stationarity is not a restrictive assumption in practice. Although relaxing
it renders the model more flexible, in practice the results change very little.
The standard errors, however, are inflated due to the smaller sample sizes
that are applicable per estimable parameter. These results are available upon
request.
Subsequently, I present the estimates for the main set of model parame-
ters. Following the illustration of identification in section 2.2.4, I present two
sets of results. In section 2.5.1 the public good is additively separable in in-
dividual preferences; moreover spouses fully commit to each other for life. To
estimate the (applicable) model parameters in this case I rely on wage esti-
mates from panel A in table 2.6. In section 2.5.2 preferences are nonseparable
and full commitment relaxed; but spousal preferences are assumed common
among married and singles. To estimate the model parameters in this case I
rely on wage estimates from both panels A and B in table 2.6.
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2.5.1 Results with Separable Public Good and Full Com-
mitment
The results appear in columns 1 across blocks I-III of table 2.7. The own-
wage labor supply elasticity, at η1,h,w = 0.349 for men and η2,h,w = 0.992
for women, is within the range of other studies (and consistent with them,
women’s elasticity is higher than men’s; for a review see Keane, 2011).
The cross-elasticity of labor supply with respect to the price of the private
good, at η1,h,pc = 0.016 for men and η2,h,pc = 0.039 for women, is statistically
insignificant but positive, implying that market hours and private consumption
are Frisch substitutes at the intensive margin of labor supply (leisure and pri-
vate consumption are Frisch complements).35 The ‘reciprocal’ cross-elasticities,
of private consumption with respect to wages, weighed by the average private
consumption share of each spouse, are effectively the same between men and
women. Note that Frisch symmetry cannot be used to infer the consump-
tion share given η1,h,pc and η2,h,pc , because Frisch symmetry is already used to
identify η1,h,pc and η2,h,pc in the first place.
The household-level private consumption substitution elasticity η˜c,pc =
E [ϕit−1] η1,c,pc+E [1− ϕit−1] η2,c,pc is estimated at−0.331 whereas the household-
level public consumption substitution elasticity
η˜k,pk = E
[
η1,k,pkη2,k,pk/
(
(1− νit−1)η1,k,pk + νit−1η2,k,pk
)]
at −0.645. Given the average shares of public and private consumption over
the period 1999-2011, these numbers imply a total consumption substitution
elasticity, i.e. a parameter estimated in standard unitary models, approxi-
mately equal to −0.55 (similar estimate found in Blundell et al., 2016).
35Blundell et al. (2016) also find evidence of Frisch complementarity between spousal
leisure and consumption. Theirs is a study using the unitary model though.
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Table 2.7: Estimates of Frisch elasticities
I. Men II. Women
(1) (2) (1) (2)
separable nonseparable separable nonseparable
η1,h,w 0.3493 0.3390 η2,h,w 0.9923 0.7340
(0.0629) (0.1158) (0.1791) (0.2963)
η1,h,pc 0.0162 0.0004 η2,h,pc 0.0391 0.0134
(0.0141) (0.0128) (0.0394) (0.0402)
η1,h,pk 0.2822 η2,h,pk 0.3804
(0.1139) (0.4697)
η1,c,w -0.0027 η2,c,w -0.0390
(0.0874) (0.1164)
E[ϕ1] -0.0550 E[ϕ2] -0.0568
× η1,c,w (0.0481) × η2,c,w (0.0572)
η1,c,pc -0.4209 η2,c,pc -0.4209
(0.2045) (0.2045)
η1,c,pk 0 η2,c,pk 0
(n/a) (n/a)
η1,k,w -0.3633 η2,k,w -0.2329
(0.1461) (0.2885)
η1,k,pc 0 η2,k,pc 0
(n/a) (n/a)
η1,k,pk -1.5386 η2,k,pk -1.5386
(0.8064) (0.8064)
III. Family
(1) (2)
separable nonseparable
η˜k,pk -0.6454 -1.5386
(0.1098) (n/a)
η¯c,pc -0.3306 -0.4209
(0.0763) (n/a)
Notes: The table presents the GMM estimates of gender-specific Frisch elasticities when the public good is
additively separable from private consumption and leisure (columns 1) and when it is nonseparable (columns 2).
Block bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses based on 1,000 bootstrap replications. The full set of Frisch
elasticities are defined in table 2.1. ϕ1 is men’s share of private consumption in the household and ϕ2 = 1 − ϕ1
is women’s.
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2.5.2 Results with Nonseparable Public Good and Lack
of Commitment
The results appear in columns 2 across blocks I-III of table 2.7. A number
of restrictions are imposed on the model parameters that deviate from (and
are stronger than) the set of restrictions, described in section 2.2.4.2, that
suffice for identification of the household structure. Specifically, i) I enforce a
separability between the public and the private good, meaning that ηj,c,pk =
ηj,k,pc , j = {1, 2}; ii) I impose equal intra-family bargaining power µ1it =
µ2it = 1/2, ∀i, t, and νit = 1/2 (∀i, t; recall that ν ∈ [0, 1] reflects a mixture
of preferences and bargaining power); iii) I impose equal sharing of private
consumption between spouses, that is ϕit = 1/2, ∀i, t; and iv) I restrict the
consumption substitution elasticities to be the same across spouses, that is
η1,c,pc = η2,c,pc and η1,k,pk = η2,k,pk . These restrictions serve the purpose of
obtaining a robust but meaningful first set of estimates and will be relaxed in
further versions of this work.36
The own-wage labor supply elasticity, at η1,h,w = 0.339 for men and
η2,h,w = 0.734 for women, is again within the range of other studies (Keane,
2011). Note that men’s elasticity changes very little from when preferences are
separable (however, the standard error is almost doubled). The cross-elasticity
of hours with respect to the price of the private good, at η1,h,pc = 0.0004 for
men and η2,h,pc = 0.013 for women, is statistically insignificant but, albeit
marginally, positive. The cross-elasticity of hours with respect to the price
of the public good, at η1,h,pk = 0.282 for men and η2,h,pk = 0.380 for women,
is positive, implying that market hours and public consumption are Frisch
substitutes at the intensive margin of labor supply, and, at least for men, sta-
tistically significant. Across all prices, and consistent with previous evidence,
women’s labor supply is more elastic than men’s.
The cross-elasticity of private consumption with respect to the wage is
36The results presented in this section reflect the specific restrictions currently imposed
on the parameters. These results will likely change while I implement the full estimation in
future versions of this work.
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negative and statistically insignificant as expected by being a function of the
hours elasticity with respect to the price of the private good. I estimate the
private consumption substitution elasticity, that is the elasticity of private con-
sumption with respect to its price ηj,c,pc , j = {1, 2}, at −0.421 (and statistically
significant).
The cross-elasticity of public consumption with respect to the wage is
negative and, at least for men, statistically significant as expected by being a
function of the hours elasticity with respect to the price of the public good.
The public consumption substitution elasticity, that is the elasticity of public
consumption with respect to its price ηj,k,pk , j = {1, 2}, is estimated at −1.539
(and marginally significant).
As a means to compare the results with the estimated parameters when
the public good is separable and full commitment imposed (section 2.5.1),
I construct the implied household-level consumption substitution elasticities;
η˜c,pc = −0.421 is close to its counterpart in the former case; however η˜k,pk =
−1.539 is nearly 2.5 times larger (in absolute value) than its counterpart in the
former case. The presence of bargaining effects, or a poor choice of restrictions
(see beginning of this section), may explain this discrepancy.
Overall, men’s Frisch elasticities seem to be estimated more precisely than
women’s. This is an interesting finding that is also confirmed by the main
estimation results (again on Frisch elasticities) of Blundell et al. (2016).
Table 2.8 presents the estimates of the (average) bargaining effects induced
by permanent shocks on household outcomes through the dependence of intra-
family bargaining power (2.6) on wages. Column 1 presents the bargaining
effects from men’s permanent shock v1 whereas column 2 presents the effects
from women’s permanent shock v2.
Two things are worth noting. First, all bargaining effects, as well as
the ‘surplus extraction’ elasticities, are insignificant from a statistical point of
view. This suggests that the spouses do not engage in reallocation of intra-
family power when permanent shocks hit. This contradicts Mazzocco (2007)
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Table 2.8: Bargaining effects
(1) (2)
from v1 from v2
on y1 0.0681 -0.0939
(0.0692) (0.0843)
on y2 -0.1611 0.2223
(0.1632) (0.1731)
on c 0.0043 -0.0060
(0.0173) (0.0252)
on k -0.0156 0.0215
(0.0800) (0.1098)
Notes: The table presents the GMM estimates
of the bargaining effects induced by permanent
shocks. Block bootstrap standard errors are in
parentheses based on 1,000 bootstrap replications.
Column 1 presents the effects from men’s perma-
nent shocks; column 2 presents the effects from
women’s permanent shocks.
and serves as evidence against lack of commitment.
Second, the bargaining effects on earnings have the opposite signs than
one would expect. One would expect a negative bargaining effect from one’s
own wage on one’s own earnings and a positive on their partner’s earnings. The
idea is the following: as one’s wage increases permanently (vj > 0), one should,
if anything, gain in bargaining power. Ceteris paribus, this should result in
reducing one’s market hours in order to enjoy more leisure and, therefore, it
would also result in a reduction in one’s earnings. The opposite would hold
for their partner’s market hours and earnings. As one becomes relatively more
powerful due to a positive wage shock, their partner becomes relatively less
powerful and, therefore, increases their market hours and reduces their leisure.
In practice, however, a positive male permanent shock of 0.1 (10% permanent
wage increase) increases his earnings by 0.068× 0.1 (0.68% increase) whereas
it reduces his wife’s earnings by −0.161 × 0.1 (1.61% decrease). A positive
female permanent shock of 0.1 increases her earnings by 0.222 × 0.1 (2.22%
increase) whereas it reduces her husband’s earnings by −0.094 × 0.1 (0.94%
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decrease).
The bargaining effects on consumption are harder to sign. The estimates
suggest that the empowerment of women in the household results in a reduction
in private consumption and a boost in public consumption. The opposite holds
for men.
The reason why the earnings bargaining effects have opposite signs is
attributed to the signs of the ‘surplus extraction’ elasticities ηµ,wj . These are
estimated at ηµ,w1 = −0.239 (s.e. = 0.290) and ηµ,w2 = 0.330 (s.e. = 0.345).
Note that the reason why I identify these parameters is because I set the Pareto
weight to 1/2. Their signs are opposite than one would expect (they imply that a
positive permanent shock makes its recipient less powerful in their household);
flipping their signs would mechanically reverse the signs of the bargaining
effects. A possible reason why these elasticities end up having the ‘wrong’
signs is the definition I employ for the consumption substitution elasticities. I
define ηj,c,pc and ηj,k,pk , j = {1, 2}, as negative whereas Blundell et al. (2016)
define them as positive; flipping their sign would likely result in flipped signs
for ηµ,wj and the bargaining effects too. Another reason may pertain to the
presence of cross-sectional heterogeneity in the bargaining effects that may
imply that their unconditional first moment is a poor choice of parameter to
estimate.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter presents and estimates a life-cycle collective household model with
the aim of understanding how shocks to spousal wages transmit into earnings
and household consumption. The model allows for a number of important
features such as intra-family correlation of wages, wage shocks of various per-
sistence, the distinction of consumption to public and private, asset accumu-
lation, endogenous labor supply, and lack of spousal commitment to future
allocations. Specifically, permanent wage shocks enter the spouses’ outside
options and, therefore, also affect their intra-family bargaining powers.
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I obtain analytical expressions for earnings and household consumption
applying Taylor approximations to the problem’s first order conditions and
the lifetime budget constraint. I show how, using those expressions and infor-
mation on singles of either gender, one can identify the household structure,
namely a rich set of spouse-specific Frisch elasticities for labor supply and con-
sumption, the unobserved sharing of private consumption between spouse, as
well as the bargaining effects of wages. Importantly, information on assignable
or exclusive consumption is not required.
Using PSID data post 1999 I find sizeable Frisch labor supply as well as
consumption substitution elasticities. Consistent with the bulk of previous
empirical evidence, women’s labor supply is considerably more elastic than
men’s. The public consumption elasticities are up to two and a half times as
large as the private consumption ones. The evidence on the cross-elasticities
points to market hours being Frisch substitutes to all types of consumption at
the intensive margin of labor supply. The bargaining effects are economically,
but not statistically, significant although they appear to have the opposite sign
than one would expect.
The chapter, at its current state, is subject to a number of limitations.
The signs of the bargaining effects remain a puzzle that must be better under-
stood. At the same time, the current estimation results reflect a much stricter
set of restrictions than what suffices for identification and an important pa-
rameter, the sharing of private consumption between spouses, remains fixed at
an arbitrary 1/2 in the cross-section and over time. Subsequently, robustness
checks are missing such as checks involving alternative categorizations within
private and public consumption, or checks involving a proper treatment of the
selection into market work (which, at least for women, may be important). All
these are issues that deserve further investigation.
Chapter 3
Consumption Inequality across
Heterogeneous Families
3.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the transmission of income shocks into consumption across
households that exhibit unobserved preference heterogeneity. The chapter de-
velops a tractable life-cycle model for household consumption, savings, and
labor supply, and presents theoretical conditions with straightforward empir-
ical counterparts that deliver identification of the cross-sectional distribution
of household preferences if panel data on consumption, hours, and earnings
are available. Importantly, identification does not depend on any specific
parametrization of household preferences or their distribution.
A consistent empirical finding is that consumption inequality across house-
holds appears significantly lower than income inequality (Blundell and Preston,
1998; Blundell and Etheridge, 2010; Heathcote et al., 2010). This finding holds
across different definitions of income and earnings, even for earnings post ben-
efits and transfers. This discrepancy is usually attributed to consumption
insurance or consumption smoothing in the household.
A large literature in macroeconomics and labor economics focuses on the
mechanisms transmitting idiosyncratic income or wage changes into consump-
tion within the household. Krueger and Perri (2006), Blundell et al. (2008),
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Kaplan and Violante (2010) are recent contributions investigating the link be-
tween exogenous household income and consumption. Attanasio et al. (2002)
model a two-earner household where the participation of the second earner
in the labor market follows a Markov stochastic process. Hyslop (2001) in-
vestigates the link between wage and earnings inequality; he abstracts from
consumption but focuses explicitly on endogenous family labor supply that is
a potentially crucial insurance mechanism against shocks. This point is also
made by Blundell et al. (2016) who study the transmission of wage shocks into
consumption through a model of endogenous family labor supply, savings, and
external insurance.
In a general equilibrium framework, Heathcote et al. (2014) model the
labor supply of one earner in the household and implement an ‘insurance di-
chotomy’ whereby some income shocks are perfectly insurable whereas other
are uninsured. Attanasio and Pavoni (2011) model labor supply (effort of one
earner) jointly with consumption and allow households to possess private in-
formation about their effort and savings. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) and
Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) provide an overview of the extensive literature.
With the exception of Heathcote et al. (2014), a consistent feature of
this literature is that households are assumed ex ante identical. Conditional
on their observable characteristics and idiosyncratic incomes/wages, any two
households are modeled to behave the same when a given shock hits them.
This is a poor feature especially in the light of extensive evidence of het-
erogeneity across individuals or households in consumer demand analysis and
labor supply studies.1 Heathcote et al. (2014) admit that part of the dispersion
in consumption and hours in the cross-section is unrelated to income or price
variation and allow for unobserved preference heterogeneity. Their treatment
of heterogeneity is, however, restrictive as heterogeneity is, in effect, addi-
tively separable and specific to the parametrization of household preferences
1For example, Abowd and Card (1989) find sizeable cross-sectional dispersion in working
hours even at fixed wage rates. Blundell et al. (2007) and Blundell and Stoker (2007) provide
reviews of the treatment of heterogeneity in labor supply or consumer demand studies.
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that they employ.
The present chapter studies the transmission of idiosyncratic earnings/wage
shocks into consumption across two-member unitary households that exhibit
unobserved preference heterogeneity. The treatment of heterogeneity is gen-
eral for: (i) within-period household preferences are nonseparable from such
heterogeneity; (ii) household preferences are semi-nonparametric (nonparamet-
ric up to a separability between consumption and leisure; the separability is
not needed for any of the results in this chapter but simplifies the illustra-
tion); (iii) heterogeneity is not restricted to a single dimension (to a single
preference parameter in the analog of parametric preferences); instead it is
multi-dimensional meaning that any within-period preference parameter in the
analog of parametric preferences might exhibit unobserved heterogeneity; (iv)
the multi-variate distribution of preferences is nonparametric and unrestricted
(up to the requirement of finite first and higher moments).
The specific workings of the household environment are the following:
I model life-cycle choices over consumption and female labor supply for a
household of two adult members (for example, two spouses). The household
can borrow and save at a deterministic interest rate. The primary earner
(suppose the male spouse) works fixed hours in the labor market and receives
full-time earnings that are subject to productivity shocks. The secondary
earner (suppose the female spouse) has an endogenous choice over working
hours (in the intensive margin) and, for each one hour of work, receives a wage
that is subject to productivity shocks. Each spouse’s productivity shocks are
decomposed into permanent and transitory components. Such shocks are the
only source of uncertainty for the household members.
How do I solve the model? Is a model with such general heterogeneity
empirically useful? I follow Blundell and Preston (1998) and a sequence of
papers thereafter (Attanasio et al., 2002; Blundell et al., 2008, 2016) and I
apply first- and second-order Taylor approximations to the lifetime budget
constraint and the problem’s first-order conditions. Such approximations en-
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able me to obtain analytical expressions for consumption and labor supply
as functions of the productivity shocks, household idiosyncratic preferences
(namely marginal-utility-constant or Frisch elasticities), and a number of ‘par-
tial insurance’ parameters (term due to Blundell et al., 2008). The analytical
expressions are convenient because they provide a neat picture for the contri-
bution of different components of the model to consumption and hours growth,
and, therefore, a straightforward way to identify the household structure.
The second and higher moments of the empirical joint distribution of
consumption, earnings, and hours growth have, thanks to the aforementioned
analytical expressions, a clear theoretical counterpart. This mapping between
data and theory provides restrictions that can be used to identify second and
higher moments of the cross-sectional distribution of household preferences.
I show how, effectively, any moment of the distribution of female (Frisch,
own-wage) labor supply elasticities can be identified from panel data on hours
and wages.2 Recovering the said moments provides a straightforward and
empirically-feasible test for unobserved preference heterogeneity in labor sup-
ply. In the general case with preferences nonseparable between consumption
and leisure, any moment of the distribution of consumption (Frisch) elasticities
with respect to female wages can also be identified. However, lack of varia-
tion in the real price of consumption prohibits identification of the distribution
of (consumption, hours) elasticities with respect to the price of consumption,
including the consumption substitution elasticity.
The chapter contributes to the literature that studies the link between
idiosyncratic income changes and consumption (see above). Given the precise
method I follow for solving the household problem, this chapter can be seen
as complementary to Blundell and Preston (1998), Attanasio et al. (2002),
Blundell et al. (2008), and Blundell et al. (2016). None of these papers allow
for unobserved preference heterogeneity, thus they effectively enforce a rep-
2The Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics is a widely used panel dataset with
detailed information on wages, incomes, employment and labor supply of household heads
and their spouses. Since 1999 it also provides detailed information on household expenditure
and assets, albeit on a biennial basis.
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resentative agent assumption (conditional on observables). By contrast, the
present chapter: (i) embeds a general form of unobserved preference hetero-
geneity across households, and (ii) provides moment restrictions that identify
the distribution of and test for such heterogeneity. However, unlike Blundell
et al. (2016), I impose an exogenous labor supply for the primary earner and
separable preferences between consumption and leisure. This is so as to fa-
cilitate the illustration herein and both restrictions can be relaxed without
jeopardizing the results of the chapter.
Finally, although this chapter is not a demand analysis study, it does share
a common goal with the extensive literature on consumer demand, namely the
identification of preferences from observed behavior. Lewbel (2001) studies
various forms of random preferences, with and without nonseparable hetero-
geneity, and argues that restricting heterogeneity to additive errors comes close
to imposing a representative agent assumption. In light of this, a number of re-
cent consumer demand studies present identification results when preferences
exhibit nonseparable unobserved heterogeneity (like in this chapter); exam-
ples are Matzkin (2003, 2008), Blundell et al. (2013, 2014), and Cosaert and
Demuynck (2014).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the life-cycle
household model and presents analytical expressions for household consump-
tion, hours, and earnings, as well as expressions for cross-sectional inequality
in such outcomes. Section 3.3 discusses the identification of the parameters
of the income process and the household structure, namely the distribution
of preferences. Section 3.4 presents simple tests for unobserved preference
heterogeneity and the model specifications. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 A Life-Cycle Household Model for Con-
sumption and Labor Supply
This section has two parts. In the first part I develop a life-cycle model for
household consumption, savings, and female labor supply, which exhibits unob-
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served preference heterogeneity. In addition, I overview the method I employ
to solve the model, namely the Taylor approximations to the intertemporal
budget constraint and the problem’s first order conditions. In the second part
I present a closed-form system of equations for household consumption, earn-
ings, and female labor supply as well as closed-form equations for the dynamics
of consumption and earnings inequality in the cross-section.
3.2.1 The Model
A household consists of two earners, each one subscripted by j. To fix ideas
suppose the two earners are a male (j = 1) and a female (j = 2) spouse,
although the model applies equally to any modern or traditional form of co-
habitation. In any period t, the spouses make choices regarding total household
consumption Ct, their future assets At+1, and female hours of work in the labor
market H2t (intensive margin labor supply only). The male spouse is assumed
to work always full-time, thus he has no labor supply choice.
I assume the spouses stay together and commit to one another for life
(the length of which is T ). I model the household problem as unitary, that
is as the problem of a single economic agent. This facilitates the discussion
of cross-sectional preference heterogeneity without confounding it with issues
pertaining to intra-household heterogeneity, commitment, or intra-household
inequality.
A household i in the cross-section chooses {Cit, Ait+1, H2it} over its life-
cycle to maximize its expected discounted lifetime utility
max
{Cit,Ait+1H2it}Tt=0
E0
T∑
t=0
βt
[
Ui(Cit,Zit)− Vi(H2it,Zit)
]
(3.1)
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint, the sequential version of which
at time t is
Ait + Y1it +W2itH2it = Cit +
Ait+1
1 + r
.
In the budget constraint, Ait is beginning-of-period household assets, Y1it
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is the male spouse’s full-time earnings, W2it is the female’s hourly wage rate,
and r is the deterministic market interest rate.
In the objective function, Ui is the household utility from consumption
and Vi is the household disutility from female market work.
3 β is the geo-
metric discount factor and, for simplicity, is assumed the same across house-
holds. Vector Zit includes observable taste shifters such as education or age
(thus, it captures observed preference heterogeneity). Household preferences
Ui and Vi are all subscripted by i to indicate unobserved preference hetero-
geneity across households, strictly speaking household-specific preferences not
captured by the conditioning observed taste shifters. This is a general way to
model such heterogeneity and is consistent with various different sources that
preference heterogeneity may stem from, such as cross-household differences in
unobserved costs of work, in consumption substitution elasticities, or in intra-
family bargaining powers (for example, in the context of a full commitment
life-cycle collective model). I do not parameterize Ui or Vi but I do require
they have continuous first- and second-order derivatives.
Male earnings Y1 and female wages W2 are the primitive sources of labor
market uncertainly for the household and are assumed exogenous to house-
hold choices. I model them using a permanent-transitory process which is a
prominent representation in the income dynamics literature (see, for example,
Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004).4 For men, I decompose residual log earnings into
3If male labor supply was an endogenous choice, then the household (static) objective
would be Ui(Cit,Zit)−V1i(H1it,Zit)−V2i(H2it,Zit), where H1it would be the male spouse’s
hours of market work and Vj the corresponding disutility from work, j = {1, 2}.
4The permanent-transitory process for income, wages or earnings, has been used exten-
sively in the literature, for example in MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989), Attanasio
et al. (2002), Attanasio et al. (2008), Blundell et al. (2008), or Blundell et al. (2016). The
permanent-transitory process results in, so-called, ‘restricted income profiles’, meaning that
different economic subjects have the same income profiles conditional on observables but
differ with respect to the idiosyncratic shocks they are hit by. An alternative family of in-
come processes in the literature supports individual-specific life-cycle income profiles, even
conditional on observables, and results in, so-called, ‘heterogeneous income profiles’ (see, for
example, Browning et al., 2010; Guvenen, 2007).
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the sum of a permanent and a transitory earnings shock
lnY1it = X
′
Y1,it
αY1 + lnY
p
1it + u1it
lnY p1it = lnY
p
1it−1 + v1it
where lnY p1it is the permanent component of (log) earnings, X
′
Y1,it
is a vector of
covariates (such as age or education) and αY1 is the corresponding coefficient,
u1it is the transitory shock, and v1it is the permanent shock.
Similarly, I decompose residual log wages of women
lnW2it = X
′
W2,it
αW2 + lnW
p
2it + u2it
lnW p2it = lnW
p
2it−1 + v2it.
The notation is similar; note that shocks subscripted by 1 indicate shocks to
earnings (permanent or transitory) whereas shocks subscripted by 2 indicate
wage shocks. The latter induce income and substitution effects on female labor
supply whereas the former only induce income effects.
The income processes can be written more compactly
∆Fjit = vjit + ∆ujit (3.2)
where ∆Fjit = ∆ lnY1it − ∆X ′Y1,itαY1 ≡ ∆y1it for men (j = 1) and ∆Fjit =
∆ lnW2it −∆X ′W2,itαW2 ≡ ∆w2it for women (j = 2).
The permanent shock reflects a permanent change in the returns to one’s
skills in the labor market whereas the transitory shock indicates short-lived
mean reverting fluctuations in productivity such as fluctuations in effort when
effort is observed and tied to one’s wage. I refrain from labeling the permanent
shock as technical change as that would be aggregate in nature and the model
does not account for aggregate shocks.
Assumption (Properties of shocks). Earnings and wage shocks are idiosyn-
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cratic in nature with zero cross-sectional means, second moments given by
E(vjitvkit+s) =
σ
2
vj ,t
if j = k and s = 0
0 otherwise
E(ujitukit+s) =
σ
2
uj ,t
if j = k and s = 0
0 otherwise
E(vjitukit+s) = 0 ∀j, k, s
and third moments by
E(v2jitvkit+s) =
γvj ,t if j = k and s = 00 otherwise
E(u2jitukit+s) =
γuj ,t if j = k and s = 00 otherwise
E(v2jitukit+s) = 0 ∀j, k, s
E(vjitu2kit+s) = 0 ∀j, k, s
where j = {1, 2}, k = {1, 2}, s = {0, . . . , T}, and E(·) denotes the mean over
i. The spouses hold no advance information about future shocks.
I allow the second and third moments of shocks to vary with time as differ-
ent time periods can be associated with different amounts of income volatility
or skewness. As life-cycle effects are captured by the conditioning observables
(age), the time dependence of moments indicates calendar-time effects such
as a financial crisis leading to bigger amounts of income variability in certain
years. I assume shocks between spouses are independent. This is a strong as-
sumption and implies no assortative mating, positive or negative, between the
two. Relaxing it will not alter the chapter’s conclusions regarding the impli-
cations of unobserved preference heterogeneity; it would, however, complicate
the solution of the model and the derivation of the closed-form expressions of
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section 3.2.2.
I solve the model by obtaining the first-order conditions of (3.1) and by
applying first- and second-order Taylor approximations to them. These ap-
proximations produce closed-form expressions for household consumption, fe-
male hours of work, and the marginal utility of wealth given by
∆cit ≈ φi∆ lnλit
∆h2it ≈ ψi (∆ lnλit + ∆w2it)
∆ lnλit ≈ εit + ωit.
(3.3)
The notation is as follows: ∆cit = ∆ lnCit net of observables such as age or
education; ∆h2it = ∆ lnH2it net of the same observables; λit is the Lagrange
multiplier on the household budget constraint (the marginal utility of wealth).
εit is an innovation term that captures idiosyncratic revisions to the marginal
utility of wealth when income shocks hit. ωit is a function of the discount
factor, the interest rate and the variance of ∆ lnλit and captures household
precautionary motives over time. Appendix C.1 provides the details of these
approximations.
Parameters φi and ψi load income shocks (or innovations to the marginal
utility of wealth) onto household consumption and female labor supply. Specif-
ically, φi =
U ′i(Cit)
CitU ′′i (Cit)
is household i’s consumption substitution elasticity (the
Frisch elasticity of consumption with respect to its price); ψi = − V
′
i (H2it)
H2itV ′′i (H2it)
is household i’s labour supply elasticity (the Frisch elasticity of hours with
respect to own wage).5 It is easy to see why φi and ψi serve as loading factors
of income shocks. For instance, female hours of work respond to a transitory
wage shock so long as female labor supply is elastic and ψi > 0. In this case
the response of female labor supply is a proportion ψi of the wage shock. If
women’s labor supply is perfectly inelastic, i.e. if ψi = 0, then ∆h2it = 0 and
a wage shock will leave female labor supply unchanged.
There is a distribution of consumption substitution and labor supply elas-
5U ′i and V
′
i denote first-order derivatives; U
′′
i and V
′′
i denote second-order derivatives.
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ticities in the cross-section as preferences in this model are household-specific
due to unobserved heterogeneity. I am interested in recovering moments of the
cross-sectional distribution of preferences, such as the mean E(·) and the vari-
ance Var(·) of both φi and ψi. For simplicity, I assume that the distribution
of preferences does not change with time but note that this assumption is not
actually needed for the identification of such distributions.
Although ∆cit, ∆h2it and spousal incomes ∆y1it and ∆w2it are all di-
rectly observed in standard household panel surveys, such as the PSID after
1999, ∆ lnλit is not. That renders the system of equations (3.3) empirically
unattractive. Following Blundell and Preston (1998), Attanasio et al. (2002)
and a sequence of papers thereafter, I apply a first-order Taylor approxima-
tion to the intertemporal budget constraint around the path the household
would follow if income shocks were absent and I take expectations before and
after the income shocks are realized. This way I relate the innovation εit to
spousal earnings and wage shocks. This approach draws on Campbell (1993)’s
log-linear approximation to the intertemporal budget constraint.6
The details of this derivation appear in appendix C.2. There I show how
I approximate the innovation to the marginal utility of wealth by a linear
function of permanent earnings and wage shocks, namely by
εit ≈ 1
φi − (1− sit)ψi (sitv1it + (1− sit)(1 + ψi)v2it) . (3.4)
Here sit is approximately equal to the average expected share of male earnings
in family total earnings over the period between t and T (end of lifetime). It
follows that 1 − sit is the average expected share of female earnings over the
same horizon. Standard panel surveys usually provide adequate information
to infer sit; for example, Blundell et al. (2016) use the PSID to construct
measures of sit per household and time period.
Two important assumptions help get expression (3.4). These are:
6Also see Blundell et al. (2013) for a detailed illustration of this approach.
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Assumption (No wealth effects from transitory shocks). Transitory income
(earnings, wage) shocks are mean-reverting and do not shift the intertemporal
budget constraint. As a result, transitory income shocks do not affect the inno-
vation εit to the marginal utility of wealth and, therefore, do not induce wealth
effects on consumption or female labor supply.
Assumption (Negligible assets). Household assets at any time t are negligi-
ble compared to household expected lifetime resources (lifetime financial and
human wealth).
The first assumption implies that transitory income shocks induce stan-
dard income and substitution effects on choices, but not wealth effects through
the intertemporal budget constraint. Although this is not an unreasonable as-
sumption, at least for the most common transitory income shocks, relaxing it
would likely complicate, if not jeopardize, identification of the cross-sectional
distribution of preferences. The second assumption is likely to be true if house-
holds are sufficiently young and have not accumulated significant assets yet.
Relaxing it does not jeopardize identification or tractability of the approxima-
tion; instead it introduces a ‘partial insurance parameter’ piit in (3.4) (term
due to Blundell et al. (2008); more on this in appendix C.2) which can be
inferred directly from the data (as in Blundell et al., 2016).
Relation (3.4) is informative about how permanent shocks impact the revi-
sions to the marginal utility of wealth. A permanent shock v1it to male earnings
is transmitted into εit weighed by sit because male earnings are only a fraction
sit of total family earnings. In the extreme when sit ≈ 0 an earnings shock v1it
has no effect. Similarly, a permanent shock v2it to female wages is transmitted
into εit weighed by 1− sit. This wage shock, however, is further mitigated by
1 + ψi as the female spouse can adjust her labour supply in response to such
a shock. For example, in the case of a positive permanent wage shock, she
can take advantage of the higher wage by increasing her working hours and
thus raise her permanent earnings by even more than just the magnitude of
the shock.
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The transmission of shocks is further mitigated by 1/φi−(1−sit)ψi; the larger
the absolute value of φi or ψi is, the smaller the effect of shocks on the revi-
sions to the marginal utility of wealth. Ceteris paribus, a high absolute value
for φi (high consumption substitution elasticity) implies the household can
substitute future for current consumption less reluctantly and thus attenuate
the impact of shocks on current consumption; a high ψi (high labor supply
elasticity) implies the female can adjust her labour supply flexibly enough to
smooth fluctuations in contemporaneous labor supply or consumption induced,
otherwise, by shifts in the intertemporal budget constraint.7
3.2.2 Closed-Form Expressions for Inequality
Combining the spousal income processes in (3.2) with the approximated first-
order conditions of the household problem in (3.3) and the approximate ex-
pression for the marginal utility of wealth in (3.4), one can write compact,
closed-form, analytical expressions for the evolution of (growth in) earnings,
labor supply, and consumption in the household given by8
∆y1it
∆w2it
∆h2it
∆y2it
∆yit
∆cit

≈

1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
kh2,v1 kh2,v2 0 kh2,u2
ky2,v1 ky2,v2 0 ky2,u2
ky,v1 ky,v2 ky,u1 ky,u2
kc,v1 kc,v2 0 0


v1it
v2it
∆u1it
∆u2it
+

0
0
kh2,ω
ky2,ω
ky,ω
kc,ω

ωit.
(3.5)
Here ∆y2it = ∆w2it+∆h2it is growth in female (log) earnings net of observables
and ∆yit ≈ ρit−1∆y1it + (1− ρit−1)∆y2it is growth in total (log) earnings of the
family net of observables (with ρit the ratio of male over family earnings at t).
The k’s are transmission parameters of shocks (and of ωit) into endogenous
7This is the indirect effect of wage shocks on labor supply; whereas the direct effect
works towards increasing female hours of work after a positive shock, the indirect one works
oppositely: it attenuates fluctuations in εit and, therefore, further fluctuations in labor
supply to which εit feeds back.
8The first two equations in the system are exact, not approximate, equalities.
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household outcomes. They all vary in the cross-section (with i) and over
time (with t) but such subscripts are removed to ease the notation. Defining
ζit = 1/φi−(1−sit)ψi, the transmission parameters are
kh2,v1 = ψiζitsit
kh2,v2 = ψiζit(1− sit)(1 + ψi) + ψi
kh2,u2 = ψi
kh2,ω = ψi
ky2,v1 = ψiζitsit
ky2,v2 = ψiζit(1− sit)(1 + ψi) + ψi + 1
ky2,u2 = ψi + 1
ky2,ω = ψi
ky,v1 = ρit−1 + (1− ρit−1)ψiζitsit
ky,v2 = (1− ρit−1) (ψiζit(1− sit)(1 + ψi) + ψi + 1)
ky,u1 = ρit−1
ky,u2 = (1− ρit−1)(ψi + 1)
ky,ω = (1− ρit−1)ψi
kc,v1 = φiζitsit
kc,v2 = φiζit(1− sit)(1 + ψi)
kc,ω = φi
Note that the expressions for ∆y2it and ∆yit in (3.5) are, in practice, transfor-
mations of ∆y1it, ∆w2it and ∆h2it.
System (3.5) is appealing because it is empirically tractable and provides
a neat picture for how shocks, preferences, and other factors contribute to
earnings and consumption growth. It also offers a theoretical interpretation to
the dynamics of earnings and consumption inequality. Blundell and Preston
(1998) use the covariance matrix of (a simplified) system (3.5) to study the
3.2. A Life-Cycle Household Model for Consumption and Labor Supply 172
transmission of income uncertainty to consumption inequality. In a follow-up
paper, Blundell et al. (2008) use the covariance matrix of (a simplified) system
(3.5) to motivate and empirically estimate the degree of insurance against in-
come shocks that is available to households. Finally, Blundell et al. (2016) use
a more sophisticated system (3.5), one that stems from a household problem
where they relax many of the structural simplifications imposed herein, in or-
der to identify household preferences when there is no unobserved preference
heterogeneity.
Inspecting (3.5), there are two distinct parts contributing to earnings or
consumption growth. One is due to shocks to the primitive incomes, namely to
male earnings and female wages. The other is due to household precautionary
motives over the life, namely due to ωit (for details see appendix C.1). Blun-
dell et al. (2008, p. 1897) note that factors other than shocks also contribute
to earnings and consumption growth and they refer to factors pertaining to
“measurement error in consumption, preference shocks, innovations to higher
moments of the income process, etc”. As ωit in the present model is a func-
tion of the variance of (the growth in) the marginal utility of wealth, it comes
closer to reflecting preference shocks and innovations to higher moments of the
income process.
The transmission parameters k, which load the income shocks onto labor
supply, earnings, and consumption, vary in the cross-section through their de-
pendence on preferences φi and ψi, and the shares sit and ρit. Thus when a
given same shock hits two different households, the households will not neces-
sarily respond similarly to it. Crucially, even if the two households share the
same initial conditions (i.e. same sit and ρit), their heterogeneous preferences
will likely lead them to divergent labor supply, earnings, and consumption
paths. As a consequence, the variability of (inequality in) earnings or con-
sumption growth in the cross-section is partly due to the variance of shocks
and partly due to preference heterogeneity.
Before I present closed-form expressions for cross-sectional inequality, it
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is useful to model the second moments of ωit. Moreover, the presence of cross-
sectional preference heterogeneity and precautionary motives ωit, necessitates
a discussion of how income shocks relate to preferences and ωit.
Assumption (Second moments of ωit).
E(ωitωit+s) =
σ
2
ω,t if s = 0
0 otherwise
where s = {0, . . . , T}.
I allow the variance of ωit to differ with time but I assume ωit is not serially
correlated. Note that if households have heterogenous discount factors β then
ωit is serially correlated. In that case, identification of the distribution of
household preferences (section 3.3) would still be possible but more involved.
Assumption (Independence of income shocks and preferences). Income shocks
are independent of household preferences, namely
vjit ⊥ φi or ψi
ujit ⊥ φi or ψi
for all j = {1, 2}, i, t. Income shocks are mean independent of ωit, namely
E(vjitωit) = E(vjit)E(ωit) = 0
E(ujitωit) = E(ujit)E(ωit) = 0
for all j = {1, 2}, i, t and, consequently, Cov(vjit, ωit) = Cov(ujit, ωit) = 0.
Preferences are mean independent of ωit, namely
E(φiωit) = E(φi)E(ωit) = 0
E(ψiωit) = E(ψi)E(ωit) = 0
for all i, t and, consequently, Cov(φi, ωit) = Cov(ψi, ωit) = 0.
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This assumption postulates the independence of income shocks and pref-
erences; this is a standard assumption in the literature as, for example, in
Cosaert and Demuynck (2014). It implies that, conditional on observables,
unobserved preference heterogeneity is independent of primitive incomes. The
assumption also postulates the mean independence between income shocks
and precautionary motives ωit as well as between preferences and ωit. I cannot
impose strong stochastic independence between shocks and ωit as higher mo-
ments of income may affect the variance of the growth in the marginal utility
of wealth (of which ωit is a function).
I rely on (3.5) to obtain closed-form expressions for the variance of female
earnings and consumption. These are:
Vart(∆y2it) = E
(
(ψiζitsit)
2
)
σ2v1,t + E
(
(ψiζit(1− sit)(1 + ψi) + ψi + 1)2
)
σ2v2,t
+ 2E
(
(ψi + 1)
2
)
σ2u2,t + E
(
ψ2i
)
σ2ω,t
Vart(∆cit) = E
(
(φiζitsit)
2
)
σ2v1,t + E
(
(φiζit(1− sit)(1 + ψi))2
)
σ2v2,t
+ E
(
φ2i
)
σ2ω,t
where Vart(·) indicates the cross-sectional variance at time t. Goodman (1960)
and Bohrnstedt and Goldberger (1969) provide tools for the second moments
of products of random variables that are not necessarily mutually independent.
It is straightforward to obtain similar closed-form expressions for the variance
of labor supply, household earnings, as well as all possible covariances among
them. Such expressions describe fully the dynamics of consumption, earnings,
and hours inequality across households.
3.3 Identification
This section has three parts. First, I show which conditions in the data can
identify the parameters of the primitive income processes, namely the second
or higher moments of income shocks. Second, I present the moments that
identify the transmission parameters of income shocks (the k’s) into labor
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supply, earnings, and consumption. Third, I discuss what can be learned about
the distribution of preferences in the cross section, namely the distribution
of the consumption substitution elasticity φi and the labor supply elasticity
ψi. I will show that, although the mean and the variance of the latter are
identifiable, there is very little to be learned about the distribution of the
former without variation in the real price of consumption. Throughout this
section I assume that panel data for incomes, hours of work, and consumption
are available (for example the Panel Study of Income Dynamics after 1999).
3.3.1 Income Shocks
Identification of the parameters of the income processes follows Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004) and earlier studies. Specifically,
Cov (∆y1it,∆y1it−1 + ∆y1it + ∆y1it+1)
identifies σ2v1,t and
Cov (∆w2it,∆w2it−1 + ∆w2it + ∆w2it+1)
identifies σ2v2,t with Cov(·, ·) indicating the covariance. The intuition is as
follows:
∑s=1
s=−1 ∆y1it+s (or
∑s=1
s=−1 ∆w2it+s) strips ∆y1it (∆w2it) of its mean-
reverting transitory shock at t and, therefore, the covariance between the sum
and ∆y1it (∆w2it) identifies the variance of the permanent shock.
The covariance of immediately consecutive income / wage growths identi-
fies (minus) the variance of the transitory shock because the transitory shock
is the only mean-reverting component in (3.2). Specifically
−Cov (∆y1it,∆y1it+1)
identifies σ2u1,t and
−Cov (∆w2it,∆w2it+1)
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identifies σ2u2,t.
Higher moments of the distribution of shocks can be identified by similar
arguments. As an illustration for the third moments,
Cov
(
(∆y1it)
2,∆y1it−1 + ∆y1it + ∆y1it+1
)
identifies γv1,t and
Cov
(
(∆w2it)
2,∆w2it−1 + ∆w2it + ∆w2it+1
)
identifies γv2,t. Moreover
−Cov ((∆y1it)2,∆y1it+1)
identifies γu1,t and
−Cov ((∆w2it)2,∆w2it+1)
identifies γu2,t.
3.3.2 Transmission Parameters of Income Shocks
Identification of the transmission parameters k relies on the logic of Blundell
et al. (2016). For x = {y1, w2, h2, y2, y, c} the following conditions identify the
average transmission parameter k of shocks into x
E(kx,v1) =
Cov
(
∆xit,
∑s=1
s=−1 ∆y1it+s
)
Cov
(
∆y1it,
∑s=1
s=−1 ∆y1it+s
)
E(kx,v2) =
Cov
(
∆xit,
∑s=1
s=−1 ∆w2it+s
)
Cov
(
∆w2it,
∑s=1
s=−1 ∆w2it+s
)
E(kx,u1) =
Cov (∆xit,∆y1it+1)
Cov (∆y1it,∆y1it+1)
E(kx,u2) =
Cov (∆xit,∆w2it+1)
Cov (∆w2it,∆w2it+1)
.
(3.6)
As there are 6 elements in x’s set and 4 identifying conditions above, in total
24 transmission parameters are identified. Note that these may vary with time
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through their dependence on sit or ρit−1 and (3.6) permits a period-by-period
identification.
The intuition behind the identification result is the following. The covari-
ance between ∆xit and
∑s=1
s=−1 ∆y1it+s in the numerator of the first condition
in (3.6) identifies the variance of men’s permanent income shock weighed by its
average loading factor (transmission parameter) onto ∆xit. The denominator
adjusts for the variance of the permanent shock, thus the ratio identifies the
average loading factor. Identification of the remaining transmission parameters
follows a similar logic.
3.3.3 Distribution of Preferences
Now I turn to the first two moments of the cross-sectional distribution of pref-
erences, namely of ψi and φi. Household-specific parameter ψi is the female
labor supply elasticity with respect to wage w2it. Note that ψi is 1.) an inten-
sive margin elasticity, as the decision variable h2it is hours of work conditional
on working; 2.) a Frisch elasticity, as the marginal utility of wealth λ is held
constant in expected terms. Household-specific parameter φi is the elasticity
of consumption with respect to its own price p. Again, this is a Frisch elas-
ticity, as the marginal utility of wealth λ is held constant in expected terms
(Browning et al., 1999, section 3.2).
3.3.3.1 Labor Supply Elasticity
The average ψi in the cross-section is identified through the transmission pa-
rameter of transitory wage shocks to female labor supply, namely
E(ψi) = E(kh2,u2).
Alternative conditions also identify E(ψi) or serve as overidentifying restric-
tions. For example, E(ky2,u2) identifies E(ψi) + 1 whereas E(ky,u2) identifies
(E(ψi) + 1)(1− E(ρit−1)) while E(ρit−1) is obtainable directly from the data.9
9I assume preferences are independent of incomes, therefore E(ψiρit−1) = E(ψi)E(ρit−1).
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Identification of the cross-sectional variance of ψi hinges on the idea that
the covariance between consecutive growths in labor supply must be due to
the variance of the mean-reverting transitory shock as well as the variability
in the labor supply response, i.e. the variance of the labor supply elasticity.
Specifically
Cov (∆h2it,∆h2it+1) = Cov (ψiu2it,−ψiu2it) = −E(ψ2i )σ2u2,t
(see appendix C.3 for details) and, consequently, E(ψ2i ) is identified as
E(ψ2i ) =
Cov (∆h2it,∆h2it+1)
Cov (∆w2it,∆w2it+1)
.
Then it is straightforward to identify the cross-sectional variance of the labor
supply elasticity as
Var(ψi) = E(ψ2i )− (E(ψi))2 .
Again, a number of alternative moments can be implicated in the identifi-
cation of E(ψ2i ) such as the covariance between consecutive growths in female
earnings.
Finally, identification of higher moments of the cross-sectional distribution
of ψi is possible following the same logic illustrated above. In all cases, a
starting point for the identification is the covariance between (∆h2it)
m and
∆h2it (or between (∆y2it)
m and ∆y2it) where m is the order of the moment of
ψi minus 1.
3.3.3.2 Consumption Substitution Elasticity
The mean and the variance of the consumption substitution elasticity are not
separately identified when there is unobserved preference heterogeneity. The
fundamental underlying reason is the lack of cross-sectional variation in the
real price of consumption.
To see this point take the transmission parameter of men’s permanent
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shocks kc,v1 into consumption. This identifies
E(kc,v1) = E(φiζitsit) = E(φi)E(ζitsit) + Cov(φi, ζitsit) (3.7)
with the covariance being due to the variance of φi or the likely covariance
between φi and ψi (ζit = 1/φi−(1−sit)ψi is a function of both φi and ψi). I cannot
separate the moments of ζit and sit in (3.7) as the former is a function of the
latter.
Expression (3.7) illustrates that the transmission of shocks into consump-
tion involves both the first and second moments of φi. Unlike ψi, this is true
across all transmission parameters of permanent shocks in (3.5). φi always
appears multiplying ζit; in turn, ζit, which is a transformation of φi and ψi,
always appears multiplying either φi or ψi. It is this multiplicity that prohibits
recovering distinct moments of φi.
Finally, even without unobserved heterogeneity in φi or ψi, the transmis-
sion parameter kc,v1 (or any transmission parameter of a permanent shock)
fails to identify φ. Notice that the second term in (3.7), the covariance, drops
out when φ does not vary, whereas the first term, the product of expectations,
becomes φE
(
1
φ−(1−sit)ψsit
)
. As φ is weighed by the expectation of a nonlinear
function of φ, ψ, and sit, Jensen’s inequality prohibits the identification of φ
itself. This result applies more generally to all papers that rely on approxima-
tions to the intertemporal budget constraint and the first order conditions of
a household model (for example Blundell et al., 2015, 2016). Without varia-
tion in the price of consumption these papers rely on the approximated budget
constraint to identify the consumption substitution elasticity. In practice, how-
ever, they only identify the said elasticity up to scale, where the scale depends
on the specificities of the household problem in each case, as is shown above.
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3.4 Tests
In this section I present a number of restrictions that must be satisfied in
the data for the model of section 3.2 to be consistent with observed household
behavior (specification tests) and I discuss two particular specification features.
I also present a test for unobserved preference heterogeneity across households.
3.4.1 Specification Test and Further Discussion
The model presented in section 3.2, with preferences additively separable be-
tween consumption and labor supply and with the assumption that transitory
shocks do not induce wealth effects, implies that transitory income shocks do
not transmit into household consumption. In addition, men’s fixed labor sup-
ply implies that men’s transitory shocks do not transmit into female labor
supply or earnings. The corresponding theoretical transmission parameters k
are 0 and, as a consequence, their empirical counterparts must be statistically
insignificantly different from 0. This provides the basis for a specification test.
In addition, the model postulates same transmission parameters of men’s
permanent shocks into female labor supply and earnings, and that ky2,u2 −
kh2,u2 = 1 and ky,u1 = sit, both directly testable in the data.
Bringing the empirical counterparts of these conditions together, I propose
the following specification test.
Proposition (Model specification test). If the following moment restrictions
are (jointly or separately) rejected in the data
(a) E(kh2,u1) = 0
(b) E(ky2,u1) = 0
(c) E(kc,u1) = 0
(d) E(kc,u2) = 0
(e) E(ky2,v1)− E(kh2,v1) = 0
(f) E(ky2,u2)− E(kh2,u2) = 1
(g) E(ky,u1)− E(sit) = 0
then the model of section 3.2 is not consistent with observed household be-
haviour.
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Obviously the model of section 3.2 is rather stylized and that makes its
empirical rejection likely. Relaxing the additive separability between consump-
tion and labor supply will likely improve the chances that the model passes a
(modified) specification test. Indeed there is ample empirical evidence against
the separability of consumption and leisure (eg. Browning and Meghir, 1991).
Relaxing such strong separability will introduce two additional preference
parameters, the (Frisch) elasticity of consumption with respect to female wage
and the (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply with respect to the price of consump-
tion. Moments of the cross-sectional distribution of the former parameter can
be identified by the covariation between consumption and wages like in section
3.3.3.1 for ψi. Lack of variation in the price of consumption impedes identifica-
tion of the distribution of the latter, although symmetry of the Frisch matrix
of substitution effects may provide additional identifying equations.
Finally, endowing men with an endogenous labor choice, and allowing
that to be nonseparable from consumption and women’s labor supply, will
introduce a number of additional parameters, such as men’s own-wage labor
supply elasticity or their labor supply elasticity with respect to women’s wages.
The cross-sectional distribution of most such elasticities is identified through
variation in men’s and women’s wages following the logic developed in section
3.3.3.1.
3.4.2 Unobserved Preference Heterogeneity
The model specification test above does not provide any indication as to
whether the data provide evidence for unobserved preference heterogeneity
or not. A simple intuitive way to test for such heterogeneity is based on the
variance of the labor supply elasticity ψi whose identification was presented in
section 3.3.3.1.
Proposition (Preference heterogeneity test). If the cross-sectional variance
of the own-wage labor supply elasticity is statistically insignificantly different
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from 0, namely if the data cannot reject
Var(ψi) = 0,
then there is evidence against cross-household heterogeneity in ψi.
The preference heterogeneity test only involves the labor supply elasticity
ψi as the distribution of φi is not identified without variation in the price
of consumption (section 3.3.3.2). This obviously renders the test partial. A
possible failure to reject Var(ψi) = 0 is not informative about unobserved
preference heterogeneity in φi and, similarly, a rejection of Var(ψi) = 0 does
not necessarily also imply heterogeneity in φi.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the transmission of income shocks into consump-
tion across households that exhibit unobserved preference heterogeneity. The
chapter develops a tractable life-cycle model for household consumption, sav-
ings, and labor supply. I introduce a general form of unobserved heterogeneity
through allowing preferences to be household-specific (and nonseparable from
heterogeneity) even conditional on observable characteristics. I obtain ana-
lytical expressions for consumption and earnings as functions of, among other
things, income shocks and household-specific consumption and labor supply
elasticities. To do so, I rely on Taylor approximations to the household life-
time budget constraint and first-order conditions as in Blundell and Preston
(1998).
I present theoretical conditions with straightforward empirical counter-
parts that deliver identification of the cross-sectional distribution of (consump-
tion, labor supply) elasticities with respect to wages if panel data on consump-
tion, earnings, and hours are available. Identification does not depend on any
specific parametrization of household preferences or their distribution. I show
that identification of (consumption, labor supply) elasticities with respect to
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the price of consumption, including the consumption substitution elasticity, is
not feasible from the afoementioned analytical expressions without variation
in the real price of consumption.
Appendix A
Appendix to
Wages and Family Time
Allocation
A.1 Data: Sample Selection and Variables
Chapter 1 uses information from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
I select men and women aged 25 to 65 from the core sample (‘Survey Research
Center’) between years 1980 and 2009. I split this into two distinct and non-
overlapping samples: (i) a major sample of households of continuously married
men and women throughout the years they’re observed, and (ii) a minor sample
of singles of both genders. Below I describe the two samples in detail.
Major PSID sample I follow households headed by a married or
permanently cohabiting opposite-sex couple. I require that these households
are stable in that they do not experience any compositional changes in the
head couple such as divorce or remarriage. Compositional changes regarding
children are permitted. Currently I follow one cohort of households only. I
define this cohort as those households whose male spouse (male head of the
household in the PSID) is born between years 1943 and 1955 (implying he is
between 25 and 37 years old in 1980). Given that the age difference between
him and his spouse in approximately two thirds of households in this cohort
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does not exceed ±3 years, I do not explicitly condition on similar years of
birth for the female spouse. I drop a few households for which information
on their state of residence is ambiguous (these may be households that reside
outside the US for part of the survey year). I also drop households with one or
more spouses being farmers (hard to trust their earnings), disabled or students
(because their time allocations may be constrained by their circumstances), or
households for which labor earnings of a working spouse fall below 1% or above
99% of the (gender- and time-specific) distribution. The resulting dataset is
an unbalanced panel of 1279 households observed over at least two consecutive
years. More than 55% of households are observed for at least 10 years and
more than 30% for at least 20.1
Hourly wages are calculated as annual labor earnings over annual hours
of work for those working. To account partly for measurement error in wages
I only use the central 96% of the wage distribution for each gender after ex-
cluding those who work less than 10 hours per year. Figure A.1 in this ap-
pendix plots median and mean wages by gender. Annual labor earnings are
self-reported gross earnings from all jobs and include salaries, bonuses, over-
time, tips etc. Around 1993 the definition of earnings changes slightly and
the available measure excludes some previously included minor components of
earnings (such as the labor part of business income).2 I remove inflation from
all monetary values using the All-Urban-Consumers CPI.
Annual hours of work are defined as total work hours across all jobs in a
given year including overtime. I assume that hours reported at one point in
the year are evenly allocated over the year. I discretise the amount of time
women put into market work (see table 1.2) using a 3-point distribution: not
working (0-10 annual hours modeled as 0 hours), working part-time (10-1000
annual hours modeled as 4 daily hours in a 5-day 50-week annual schedule),
1The proportion of households that are ‘stable’, among all households satisfying the
other selection criteria laid out in this paragraph, is approximately 81%.
2Despite this, the PSID officially treats men’s earnings series as consistent over time.
For female earnings two different series are provided (one prior to 1993 and one after). I
combine the two into a single female series.
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and working full time (more than 1000 annual hours modeled as 8 daily hours).
There is sufficient bunching of hours in the data to justify the above discrete
approximation.
Household work is defined on a weekly basis as time spent on cooking,
cleaning, and “doing other work around the household”. I discretise the
amount of time put into household work using a separate 2-point distribu-
tion for each gender: for men, ‘low’ hours (up to 2 hours weekly modeled
as 0.4 hours/day in a 5-day week) or ‘low middle’ hours (more than 2 hours
weekly modeled as 1.6 daily hours); for women ‘high middle’ hours (up to 15
hours weekly modeled as 3 daily hours in a 5-day week) or ‘maximum’ hours
(more than 15 modeled as 6 daily hours). Again, there is sufficient bunching
of household hours in the data to justify these discrete approximations and
the precise choice of modeling hours.
Age of the youngest child is classified in four groups to reflect the way
stochastic fertility is modeled in section 1.3.3: an age 0 in the data indicates
the absence of a child younger than 18 years old (modeled as Nt = 1), ages
1 − 4 indicate a child less than 5 years (Nt = 2), ages 5 − 9 indicate a child
at least 5 but less than 10 years old (Nt = 3), and ages 10− 17 indicate older
children up to 18 years old (Nt = 4).
Minor PSID sample This sample consists of single men and women
and mimics many of the selection criteria applied to the major PSID sample
above. I select individuals who report having been divorced or separated, work
in the labor market (as I require information on their earnings), and whose
earnings do not fall below 1% or above 99% of the (gender- and time-specific)
distribution. I drop a few individuals for which information on their state
of residence is ambiguous (these may reside outside the US for part of the
survey year), farmers (hard to trust their earnings), or those with missing
information on their education (required for the projections of earnings). The
resulting dataset consists of 4561 divorced male-year and 7614 divorced female-
year observations. I define and deflate annual labor earnings like above.
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Figure A.1: Evolution of wages with mean age of household head
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Notes: This figure plots median and mean hourly wages by gender for married people over their
life-cycle. One cohort only is depicted; mean age on the horizontal axis coincides with calendar
time (1980-2009) and this is partly responsible for the continuous growth of wages in the graph.
Only the central 96% of the wage distribution by gender and mean age (year) is used. A 95%
confidence interval appears in gray shade.
Source: Major PSID sample.
A.2 Model: Public and Private Consumption
This appendix extends the model in section 2.2 to allow spouses to consume
public as well as private consumption goods. In this case, individual j has
preferences U˜j given by
U˜j
(
Q, qj, lj; zj
)
where qj is the private (rival) consumption good. The rest of the notation
remains like in the main text. One can think of the private good as, for
example, own clothing and the public good as food at home or children’s
expenditure.
The household problem during the working period of life is given by (1.1)-
(1.7) after replacing individual preferences with U˜j and the budget constraint
(1.3) with
At +
2∑
j=1
wjthjt = Kt + pt
2∑
j=1
qjt + CCt
(
h2t, Nt
)
+
At+1
1 + r
.
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Here pt is the relative price of the private good at t after normalizing the price
of the public good to 1 in every period. The set of state variables is unaffected
but the set of choice variables Ct is augmented to include q1t and q2t.
Preferences can be parameterized by
U˜j
(
Qt, qjt, ljt; zjt
)
=
1
1− γ
(
αj
(
Qt/s(Nt)
)1−γ
+ (1− αj)q1−γjt
)
×exp (gj(ljt; zjt))
which is a straightforward extension of (1.8). The leisure sub-utility gj(·)
remains unchanged. Here αj serves as the utility share of public consumption
which may depend on observables such as the presence or age of the youngest
child in the family.
The extension to private consumption does not alter the fundamentals of
the problem: the problem still is a typical mixture of discrete (time-use) and
continuous choices (public and private consumption, savings). The solution al-
gorithm is not complicated significantly: for each optimal public consumption-
savings bundle, and conditional on a time-use choice, the marginal rates of sub-
stitution between the private consumption goods and between public-private
consumption deliver the optimal quantities for q1 and q2. The separability
between public and private consumption facilitates the solution. However, the
algorithm is more time-consuming as one now has to search for the best Q and
(with the use of the marginal rates of substitution) for the optimal q1 and q2
given some future assets and then repeat this along a grid of future assets (i.e.
two-dimensional instead of one-dimensional ‘table look-up’).
For identification of αj one needs information on private goods for each
spouse as well as public consumption goods. The Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey in the US provides information on clothing expenditure by gender. How-
ever this tends to be a tiny proportion of total household expenditure and it
is unclear which other goods reported therein could serve as private.
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A.3 Estimation: Exogenous Blocks
Wages To obtain estimates of the second moments of shocks I run a Minimum
Distance estimation matching the empirical covariance matrix of log wages
to its theoretical counterpart. I illustrate the main points of this estimation
referring to time t as calendar time but recall that calendar time coincides with
mean age of the household head given the focus on one cohort only. From the
major PSID sample I collate the vector W˜ = (W˜1980,W˜1981, . . . ,W˜2009)
′ where
W˜t =

E[(∆ lnw1t)2]
E[∆ lnw1t∆ lnw1t+1]
E[(∆ lnw2t)2]
E[∆ lnw2t∆ lnw2t+1]
E[∆ lnw1t∆ lnw2t]
E[∆ lnw1t∆ lnw2t+1]
E[∆ lnw2t∆ lnw1t+1]

, t ∈ [1980, 2009]
Due to the parametrization in (1.10), I ignore any auto-covariances of order
higher than 1. In the PSID these are insignificantly different from 0 anyway.
The theoretical counterpart of W˜t is W(ϑ) and is a function of the second
moments of shocks over the life-cycle (parameter ϑ). An estimate of ϑ is
ϑˆ = arg min
ϑ
(W˜ −W(ϑ))′I(W˜ −W(ϑ))
where I is the identity matrix. The estimates of ϑ appear in table A.1 alongside
their standard errors; to calculate those I adopt the block bootstrap with 500
replications.
The point-estimates in table A.1 are not used directly as inputs to the
structural model. To reduce the effect of measurement error, I replace the
point-estimates with 5-point two-sided moving averages (suitably adapted to
deal with corners); a similar approach is taken by French (2005). The original
point-estimates of the variances of men’s and women’s permanent shocks, as
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Figure A.2: Actual and smoothed variances of permanent shocks
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Notes: This figure plots the estimates of the variance of permanent shocks for each spouse (scatter
points) as well as 5-point two-sided moving averages that pass through the scatters. The central
96% only of the wage distribution by gender and year is used for estimation.
Source: Major PSID sample and own calculations.
well as the refined ones, appear graphically in figure A.2 in this appendix.
Child care costs I calibrate cchrate at a constant $6.59 (expressed in
2010 dollars) throughout the 1980-2009 period; see section 1.5.1 in the main
text for details. Whenever this rate is below the real federal minimum wage,
I update cchrate to reflect this. Essentially the hourly wage of child care
workers in the model decreases relative to that of the general population (of
both men and women) reflecting -what seems to be- a consensus that child care
has steadily become less expensive in the last 3 decades. Finally, I calculate
the probability of a family facing positive child care costs by counting the
number of families in a given fertility state who report non-zero such costs
(the PSID collects information on child care expenditure after 1988). This
is done separately by calendar year. In years when child care expenditure is
missing from the PSID I use the probabilities estimated in the closest period
when data are available.
Table A.2 in this appendix reports the hourly rate of child care over time as
well as the estimated probabilities of positive child care costs for the relevant
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fertility states Nt = 2 (youngest child younger than 5 years) and Nt = 3
(youngest child between 5 and 10 years). Households in fertility states Nt = 1
and Nt = 4 are modeled to not require formal child care. This is confirmed by
the data (but not reported in table A.2).
Normalization of the initial Pareto weight To project lifetime
earnings if spouses get divorce, I first pool earnings of divorcees for all years
and ages; I do so separately by gender. The data come from the minor PSID
sample described above. I regress earnings on race, education, a quadratic
polynomial in age and their interactions. This is regression (1.15) in the main
text and the results appear in table A.3 in this appendix. These results use
information on divorcees between years 1980-1989 because I normalize intra-
family bargaining power in the first 10 years of the family life-cycle only. Using
the estimates from (1.15) I project lifetime earnings for each married spouse
in the event of divorce and I use these projections to form a proxy for intra-
family bargaining power (see section 1.5.3 in the main text for details). Table
A.4 below reports how the derived intra-family bargaining power of the male
spouse correlates with a number of characteristics of each partner.
A.4 Estimation: Model Fit and Overidentifi-
cation
The following two tables present the full set of targeted moments used in the
structural estimation (see section 1.5.2 in main text). The tables report the
values of the moments in the data as well as their counterparts from the model.
In addition, figure A.3 reports the values of 64 non-targeted joint dynamic
moments of time allocation. These are transition probabilities between time
allocations and periods of time, namely probabilities that an individual engages
in a given time allocation conditional on what they or their partner did one
or two periods in the past. These moments, even though not targeted in the
simulated method of moments estimation, are well aligned along or around the
45-degree line (this line indicates a prefect match).
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Table A.1: Second moments of wage shocks
I. Permanent shocks II. Transitory shocks
Year
Mean
age
head
Men Women
Covari-
ance
Men Women
Covari-
ance
1980 30
0.0281 0.0792 0.0081 0.0214 0.0546 0.0039
(0.0080) (0.0226) (0.0080) (0.0058) (0.0164) (0.0052)
1981 31
0.0476 0.0573 -0.0009 0.0253 0.0710 0.0060
(0.0107) (0.0200) (0.0079) (0.0055) (0.0211) (0.0051)
1982 32
0.0275 0.0335 0.0097 0.0226 0.0697 0.0037
(0.0079) (0.0211) (0.0073) (0.0046) (0.0228) (0.0063)
1983 33
0.0388 0.0646 0.0093 0.0176 0.0602 -0.0019
(0.0071) (0.0194) (0.0075) (0.0045) (0.0155) (0.0047)
1984 34
0.0307 0.0621 0.0062 0.0254 0.0380 -0.0010
(0.0070) (0.0146) (0.0064) (0.0052) (0.0127) (0.0049)
1985 35
0.0349 0.0571 0.0121 0.0239 0.0725 -0.0045
(0.0062) (0.0169) (0.0081) (0.0051) (0.0161) (0.0049)
1986 36
0.0207 0.0351 0.0102 0.0305 0.0737 -0.0032
(0.0061) (0.0146) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0155) (0.0051)
1987 37
0.0306 0.0575 0.0172 0.0253 0.0789 -0.0017
(0.0065) (0.0249) (0.0059) (0.0048) (0.0251) (0.0038)
1988 38
0.0230 0.0229 0.0108 0.0290 0.0638 -0.0053
(0.0062) (0.0153) (0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0123) (0.0045)
1989 39
0.0229 0.0466 0.0099 0.0337 0.0199 0.0027
(0.0060) (0.0122) (0.0050) (0.0073) (0.0071) (0.0044)
1990 40
0.0250 0.0704 0.0043 0.0178 0.0408 0.0055
(0.0064) (0.0177) (0.0058) (0.0049) (0.0089) (0.0041)
1991 41
0.0347 0.0437 0.0084 0.0259 0.0466 -0.0010
(0.0059) (0.0116) (0.0064) (0.0060) (0.0092) (0.0039)
1992 42
0.0261 0.0540 0.0165 0.0469 0.0343 -0.0118
(0.0097) (0.0147) (0.0070) (0.0101) (0.0097) (0.0053)
1993 43
0.0363 0.0669 0.0243 0.0673 0.0566 -0.0032
(0.0123) (0.0143) (0.0072) (0.0116) (0.0123) (0.0059)
1994 44
0.0188 0.0506 0.0173 0.0595 0.0885 0.0035
(0.0085) (0.0175) (0.0069) (0.0125) (0.0165) (0.0055)
1995 45
0.0136 0.0227 0.0071 0.0337 0.0514 0.0011
(0.0077) (0.0135) (0.0063) (0.0057) (0.0099) (0.0044)
1996 46
0.0160 0.0429 0.0128 0.0106 0.0589 -0.0017
(0.0055) (0.0128) (0.0071) (0.0032) (0.0139) (0.0058)
1997 47
0.0194 0.0214 -0.0004 0.0413 0.0628 0.0083
(0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0040) (0.0101) (0.0118) (0.0051)
1999 49
0.0156 0.0155 0.0024 0.0436 0.0494 -0.0048
(0.0046) (0.0061) (0.0028) (0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0042)
2001 51
0.0266 0.0212 0.0057 0.0522 0.0359 0.0112
(0.0083) (0.0062) (0.0033) (0.0102) (0.0065) (0.0063)
2003 53
0.0149 0.0285 0.0034 0.0571 0.0415 -0.0049
(0.0052) (0.0087) (0.0036) (0.0126) (0.0091) (0.0059)
2005 55
0.0425 0.0171 0.0019 0.0621 0.0411 -0.0003
(0.0103) (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0155) (0.0067) (0.0051)
2007 57
0.0238 0.0399 0.0032 0.0430 0.0390 0.0054
(0.0075) (0.0078) (0.0038) (0.0129) (0.0105) (0.0059)
2009 59
0.0342 0.0232 0.0008 0.0431 0.0304 -0.0004
(0.0091) (0.0069) (0.0053) (0.0098) (0.0123) (0.0102)
Notes: The table presents minimum distance estimates of the variances of permanent and transi-
tory shocks over time, as well as their covariances between spouses. Block I refers to permanent
shocks; block II refers to transitory shocks. Within each block the first column is men’s variance
of the shock, the second column is women’s variance, and the third column is the covariance be-
tween the two. Block bootstrap standard errors from 500 replications are reported in parentheses.
Source: Major PSID sample and own calculations.
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Table A.2: Child care costs: price and probabilities
Probability child care expenditure > 0
Year
Hourly rate
(in $2010)
Fertility state
Nt = 2
Fertility state
Nt = 3
1980 8.71 59.07% 40.32%
1981 8.20 59.07% 40.32%
1982 8.04 59.07% 40.32%
1983 7.57 59.07% 40.32%
1984 7.33 59.07% 40.32%
1985 7.03 59.07% 40.32%
1986 6.79 59.07% 40.32%
1987 6.67 59.07% 40.32%
1988 6.59 59.07% 40.32%
1989 6.59 56.47% 45.56%
1990 6.59 60.34% 43.17%
1991 6.59 57.66% 42.11%
1992 6.80 60.93% 42.97%
1993 6.61 51.30% 41.74%
1994 6.59 55.85% 48.70%
1995 6.59 59.69% 47.13%
1996 6.59 59.13% 47.89%
1997 6.60 58.58% 45.39%
1998* 7.00 56.05% 45.25%
1999 6.89 53.52% 45.10%
2000* 6.74 52.28% 43.34%
2001 6.59 51.04% 41.58%
2002* 6.59 49.99% 43.01%
2003 6.59 48.95% 44.44%
2004* 6.59 49.25% 41.44%
2005 6.59 49.56% 38.43%
2006* 6.59 50.19% 40.07%
2007 6.59 50.82% 41.70%
2008* 6.59 50.64% 40.14%
2009 6.63 50.45% 38.58%
Notes: This table presents the hourly rate of child care in 2010 dollars (column 2) alongside the
probability of a family reporting positive child care expenditure by fertility state (columns 3 and
4). Only the relevant fertility states are reported. In years when child care expenditure is missing
from the PSID (prior to 1988) I use the probabilities estimated in the closest period when data
are available. *In even years after 1997, when the PSID did not collect data, I use the mid-point
of probabilities in adjacent years.
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Table A.3: Earnings regressions: male and female divorcees
Dependent variable: Annual Earnings
I. Male divorcees II. Female divorcees
Regressors: Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Age 4269.56 [0.005] 807.36 [0.292]
Age2 -50.71 [0.006] -8.44 [0.330]
Race (black) 45811.67 [0.717] -25464.03 [0.123]
Race (other) 287579.56 [0.018] 19119.09 [0.667]
Educ. (high school) 24278.46 [0.557] -30085.92 [0.103]
Educ. (some college) 54787.30 [0.240] -43205.38 [0.029]
Educ. (college) 80539.48 [0.124] 42461.88 [0.130]
Educ. (post-college) -13021.28 [0.826] -88158.37 [0.005]
Race (black) × Age -3309.25 [0.657] 874.94 [0.282]
Race (other) × Age -17150.95 [0.006] -1014.91 [0.658]
Race (black) × Age2 41.97 [0.698] -5.98 [0.533]
Race (other) × Age2 245.77 [0.001] 9.80 [0.729]
Educ. (high school) × Age -718.35 [0.727] 1939.59 [0.028]
Educ. (some college) × Age -2747.19 [0.254] 2654.67 [0.006]
Educ. (college) × Age -3009.72 [0.235] -1759.51 [0.193]
Educ. (post-college) × Age 1491.24 [0.622] 5652.83 [0.000]
Educ. (high school) × Age2 9.57 [0.695] -22.70 [0.023]
Educ. (some college) × Age2 47.91 [0.110] -29.94 [0.007]
Educ. (college) × Age2 40.81 [0.164] 27.26 [0.082]
Educ. (post-college) × Age2 -13.05 [0.727] -66.13 [0.000]
Cons. -50450.89 [0.096] 1033.31 [0.949]
R-Square 0.201 0.204
Regression p value 0.000 0.000
Obs. (singles in 1980-1989) 1201 1915
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates and p-values from linear regressions of divorcees’ earn-
ings on a set of individual characteristics. These include: a quadratic polynomial in age, race
and education dummies, and their interactions with the age polynomial. Race takes on three
values for: ‘white’ (omitted), ‘black’, and ‘other’. Education takes on five values for ‘less than
high school’ (omitted), ‘high school’, ‘some (less than) college’, ‘college’, and ‘post college’. The
regressions are carried out separately by gender using years 1980-1989 of the minor PSID sam-
ple described in Appendix A.1. The number of observations reflects the number of male/female
divorcees-year observations in 1980-1989.
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Table A.4: Married men’s initialized bargaining power: correlation with
spousal attributes
Dependent variable:
men’s bargaining power
Regressors: Coeff. p-value
Educ. Male (high school) 0.080 [0.000]
Educ. Male (some college) 0.179 [0.000]
Educ. Male (college) 0.168 [0.000]
Educ. Male (post-college) 0.144 [0.000]
Educ. Female (high school) -0.082 [0.000]
Educ. Female (some college) -0.110 [0.000]
Educ. Female (college) -0.176 [0.000]
Educ. Female (post-college) -0.187 [0.000]
Race Male (black) -0.031 [0.000]
Race Male (other) 0.143 [0.000]
Race Female (black) -0.053 [0.000]
Race Female (other) 0.055 [0.000]
Age Male 0.006 [0.000]
Age Male2 -0.000 [0.000]
Age Female -0.007 [0.000]
Age Female2 0.000 [0.000]
Cons. 0.622 [0.000]
Obs. (couples in 1980-1989) 5970
Notes: This table presents estimates and p-values of the correlations (linear regressions) between
the derived intra-family bargaining power of married men and a number of characteristics of each
spouse. These include: education dummies, race dummies, and a quadratic polynomial in age.
Education of either spouse takes on five values for ‘less than high school’ (omitted), ‘high school’,
‘some (less than) college’, ‘college’, and ‘post college’. Race of either spouse takes on three values
for: ‘white’ (omitted), ‘black’, and ‘other’. The number of observations reflects the number of
married household-year observations in 1980-1989.
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Table A.5: Targeted moments: proportions men
fertility state 1 fertility state 2
Data Model Data Model
Mean age head: 30-39
‘Low middle’ household work 0.732 0.704 0.734 0.713
Mean age head: 40-49
‘Low middle’ household work 0.680 0.681 0.784 0.749
Mean age head: 50-59
‘Low middle’ household work 0.705 0.705 0.679 0.737
fertility state 3 fertility state 4
Data Model Data Model
Mean age head: 30-39
‘Low middle’ household work 0.686 0.716 0.620 0.585
Mean age head: 40-49
‘Low middle’ household work 0.742 0.694 0.693 0.752
Mean age head: 50-59
‘Low middle’ household work 0.673 0.728 0.786 0.738
Notes: This table reports the values of men’s targeted moments in the data and the model
simulations. These moments are proportions of married men engaging in ‘low-middle’ household
work by men’s mean age and family composition. For the definition of ‘low middle’ household
work refer to table 1.2 in the main text.
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Figure A.3: Non-targeted moments: transition probabilities
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Notes: This figure plots 64 non-targeted joint dynamic moments of time allocation in the data
(horizontal axis) against their model counterparts (vertical axis). These moments are transition
probabilities, namely probabilities Prob
[
spousej time allocationt | spousek time allocationt−s
]
that an individual of gender j engages in a given time allocation conditional on what
they (j = {1, 2}) or their partner (k = {1, 2}) did s = 1 or s = 2 periods in
the past. For men: spouse1 time allocationt = {‘low middle’ household work}; for women:
spouse2 time allocationt = {FT market work, PT market work, ‘maximum’ household work}.
Appendix B
Appendix to
Consumption Dynamics and
Allocation in the Family
B.1 Frisch Elasticities
There are 9 Frisch (λ-constant) elasticities for each spouse j in the family (see
Table 2.1 in the main text for verbal descriptions). The analytical expressions
for these elasticities are
ηj,h,w ≡ ∂Hj
∂Wj
Wj
Hj
∣∣∣∣
λ-const.
= D−1j
Uj,Hj
Hj
(Uj,KKUj,CjCj − U2j,KCj)
ηj,h,pc ≡ ∂Hj
∂P c
P c
Hj
∣∣∣∣
λ-const.
= D−1j
Uj,Cj
Hj
(Uj,KCjUj,KHj − Uj,KKUj,CjHj)
ηj,h,pk ≡
∂Hj
∂P k
P k
Hj
∣∣∣∣
λ-const.
= D−1j
Uj,K
Hj
(Uj,KCjUj,CjHj − Uj,CjCjUj,KHj)
ηj,c,w ≡ ∂Cj
∂Wj
Wj
Cj
∣∣∣∣
λ-const.
= D−1j
Uj,Hj
Cj
(Uj,KHjUj,KCj − Uj,KKUj,CjHj)
ηj,c,pc ≡ ∂Cj
∂P c
P c
Cj
∣∣∣∣
λ-const.
= D−1j
Uj,Cj
Cj
(Uj,KKUj,HjHj − U2j,KHj)
ηj,c,pk ≡
∂Cj
∂P k
P k
Cj
∣∣∣∣
λ-const.
= D−1j
Uj,K
Cj
(Uj,KHjUj,CjHj − Uj,KCjUj,HjHj)
ηj,k,w ≡ ∂K
∂Wj
Wj
K
∣∣∣∣j
λ-const.
= D−1j
Uj,Hj
K
(Uj,KCjUj,CjHj − Uj,KHjUj,CjCj)
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ηj,k,pc ≡ ∂K
∂P c
P c
K
∣∣∣∣j
λ-const.
= D−1j
Uj,Cj
K
(Uj,KHjUj,CjHj − Uj,KCjUj,HjHj)
ηj,k,pk ≡
∂K
∂P k
P k
K
∣∣∣∣j
λ-const.
= D−1j
Uj,K
K
(Uj,CjCjUj,HjHj − U2j,CjHj)
The partial effects are calculated at the individual level (not the household
level) keeping everything else fixed and λ constant in expectation. Dj is the
determinant of the hessian matrix of Uj and is given by
Dj = Uj,KK
(
Uj,CjCjUj,HjHj − U2j,CjHj
)
− U2j,KCjUj,HjHj − U2j,KHjUj,CjCj + 2Uj,KHjUj,KCjUj,CjHj .
Uj,xj is the first-order and Uj,xjχj is the second-order partial derivative of Uj
with respect to xj, χj = {K,Cj, Hj}, j = {1, 2}. The partial derivatives are i-
and t-specific but I suppress such subscripts to ease the notation.
From Phlips (1974, section 2.4) the matrix of substitution effects after a
marginal-utility-of-wealth-compensated price change is
− dHj
dWj
− dCj
dWj
− dK
dWj
dHj
dP c
dCj
dP c
dK
dP c
dHj
dPk
dCj
dPk
dK
dPk
 = λjI3H−1j (B.1)
where λj is the Lagrange multiplier on the sequential budget constraint from
the budget-constrained maximization of individual j’s utility function Uj (‘in-
dividual problem’). I3 is a 3× 3 identity matrix and Hj is the hessian matrix
of Uj. One can obtain the matrix of substitution effects by totally differenti-
ating the intra-temporal first order conditions of the individual problem with
respect to prices and noting that ∆λ = 0 in expectation.1
As the right hand side of (B.1) is a 3×3 symmetric matrix (the Hessian is
symmetric by Young’s theorem and standard regularity assumptions on Uj), it
follows that
dHj
dP c
= − dCj
dWj
,
dHj
dPk
= − dK
dWj
, and
dCj
dPk
= dK
dP c
. Simple manipulations
1The first order conditions of the individual problem are Uj,K = λjP
k, Uj,Cj = λjP
c,
Uj,Hj = −λjWj , and the Euler equation.
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yield the restrictions on the Frisch elasticities that are used for identification
of the household structure (sections 2.2.4.1-2.2.4.2).
B.2 Approximations to First Order Conditions
In this appendix I show how I approximate the first order conditions of the
household problem, given by (2.8). For convenience suppose that Uj(Kit, Cjit, 1−
Hjit; zjit) = Uj(K˜it, C˜jit, 1 − H˜jit) where K˜it = Kit exp(−
∑
j z
K
jit
′
ζKjt ), C˜jit =
Cjit exp(−zCjit′ζCjt), and H˜jit = Hjit exp(−zHjit′ζHjt ). zKjit, zCjit, and zHjit are spouse-
specific covariates, such as race, age, or education.
Consider the first order condition for H1it; applying logs and taking a first
difference in time yields
∆ ln
(
−U1,H1(K˜it, C˜1it, H˜1it)
)
= ∆ lnλit + ∆ lnW1it −∆ lnµ1it.
A first order Taylor approximation to ln(−U1,H1(K˜it, C˜1it, H˜1it)) about K˜it−1,
C˜1it−1, H˜1it−1 yields
∆ ln
(
−U1,H1(K˜it, C˜1it, H˜1it)
)
≈ U1,H1K
U1,H1
∆K˜it +
U1,H1C1
U1,H1
∆C˜1it +
U1,H1H1
U1,H1
∆H˜1it.
(B.2)
All partial derivatives in (B.2) are evaluated at K˜it−1, C˜1it−1, and H˜1it−1.
The first order conditions for H2it, C1it, and C2it are all approximated in
a similar way. All four of them together are
U1,H1K
U1,H1
∆K˜it +
U1,H1C1
U1,H1
∆C˜1it +
U1,H1H1
U1,H1
∆H˜1it ≈ ∆ lnλit + ∆ lnW1it −∆ lnµ1it
(B.3)
U2,H2K
U2,H2
∆K˜it +
U2,H2C2
U2,H2
∆C˜2it +
U2,H2H2
U2,H2
∆H˜2it ≈ ∆ lnλit + ∆ lnW2it −∆ lnµ2it
(B.4)
U1,C1K
U1,C1
∆K˜it +
U1,C1C1
U1,C1
∆C˜1it +
U1,C1H1
U1,C1
∆H˜1it ≈ ∆ lnλit + ∆ lnPt −∆ lnµ1it
(B.5)
B.2. Approximations to First Order Conditions 202
U2,C2K
U2,C2
∆K˜it +
U2,C2C2
U2,C2
∆C˜2it +
U2,C2H2
U2,C2
∆H˜2it ≈ ∆ lnλit + ∆ lnPt −∆ lnµ2it.
(B.6)
As I do not observe cross-sectional variation in Pt, I assume ∆ lnPt = 0 (or
equivalently, aggregate shocks are captured by conditioning year dummies).
The approximation to the first order condition for Kit is trickier as it
involves both partners’ marginal utilities. Applying logs and taking a first
difference in time yields
∆ ln
(
µ1itU1,K(K˜it, C˜1it, H˜1it) + µ2itU2,K(K˜it, C˜2it, H˜2it)
)
= ∆ lnλit.
I approximate ln
(
µ1itU1,K(K˜it, C˜1it, H˜1it)+µ2itU2,K(K˜it, C˜2it, H˜2it)
)
about K˜it−1,
C˜jit−1, H˜jit−1, j = {1, 2}, and I get
∆ ln
(
µ1itU1,K(K˜it, C˜1it, H˜1it) + µ2itU2,K(K˜it, C˜2it, H˜2it)
)
≈ (µ1it−1U1,K + µ2it−1U2,K)−1
×
(
∆
(
µ1itU1,K(K˜it, C˜1it, H˜1it)
)
+ ∆
(
µ2itU2,K(K˜it, C˜2it, H˜2it)
))
≈ νit−1 (µ1it−1U1,K)−1 ∆
(
µ1itU1,K(K˜it, C˜1it, H˜1it)
)
+ (1− νit−1) (µ2it−1U2,K)−1 ∆
(
µ2itU2,K(K˜it, C˜2it, H˜2it)
)
≈ νit−1
(
∆ lnµ1it + ∆ lnU1,K(K˜it, C˜1it, H˜1it)
)
+ (1− νit−1)
(
∆ lnµ2it + ∆ lnU2,K(K˜it, C˜2it, H˜2it)
)
where νit−1 = µ1it−1U1,K(µ1it−1U1,K +µ2it−1U2,K)−1 is a mixture of preferences
(marginal utilities of the public good) and bargaining power. Again, all partial
derivatives are evaluated at t − 1 values of the relevant variables. Expanding
lnUj,K(K˜it, C˜jit, H˜jit), j = {1, 2}, follows the same logic as in (B.2). Combining
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the results I get (
νit−1
U1,KK
U1,K
+ (1− νit−1)U2,KK
U2,K
)
∆K˜it+
νit−1
(
U1,KC1
U1,K
∆C˜1it +
U1,KH1
U1,K
∆H˜1it
)
+
(1− νit−1)
(
U2,KC2
U2,K
∆C˜2it +
U2,KH2
U2,K
∆H˜2it
)
≈
∆ lnλit − νit−1∆ lnµ1it − (1− νit−1)∆ lnµ2it.
(B.7)
I solve the system of equations (B.3)-(B.7) for ∆K˜it, ∆C˜jit, and ∆H˜jit
(j = {1, 2}, 5 equations in 5 choice variables) and I get approximate analytical
expressions for the growth of labor supply and consumption as functions of the
growth rates of wages, bargaining power, and the marginal utility of wealth.
Given that µ1it + µ2it = 1 (see section 2.2.1.1), I approximate ∆ lnµ2it ≈
−µ˜it−1∆ lnµ1it where µ˜it = µ1itµ2it , so the aforementioned analytical expressions
become 
∆K˜it
∆C˜1it
∆C˜2it
∆H˜1it
∆H˜2it

≈Mit

∆ lnW1it
∆ lnW2it
∆ lnµ1it
∆ lnλit
 (B.8)
where Mit is a 5× 4 matrix of loading factors.2
Equation (B.8) is still not very useful empirically because it involves the
unobserved growth in the marginal utility of wealth ∆ lnλit. To help charac-
terize this object I apply a second order Taylor approximation to the Euler
equation in (2.8). Let exp(ρ) = 1
β(1+r)
for an appropriate ρ. I approximate the
exponential function evaluated at λit+1 about lnλit + ρ and I get
exp(lnλit+1) ≈ exp(lnλit + ρ) + exp(lnλit + ρ)(∆ lnλit+1 − ρ)
+ exp(lnλit + ρ)
1
2
(∆ lnλit+1 − ρ)2
2As matrix Mit constitutes an intermediate output towards the solution of the household
problem, I do not present its elements in detail but I can make them available upon request.
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= λit exp(ρ)[1 + ∆ lnλit+1 − ρ+ 1
2
(∆ lnλit+1 − ρ)2].
Taking expectations at time t and noting that λit exp(ρ) = Etλit+1 (the Euler
equation) yields Et∆ lnλit+1 ≈ ρ − 12Et(∆ lnλit+1 − ρ)2 which in turn can be
written as
∆ lnλit+1 ≈ ωit+1 + it+1 (B.9)
with ωit+1 = ρ − 12Et(∆ lnλit+1 − ρ)2 and it+1 an expectations error with
Etit+1 = 0. A log-linearization of the intertemporal budget constraint, pre-
sented in appendix B.3, will help relate the components of ∆ lnλit+1 to spousal
wage shocks.
Using equations (2.10) in the main text and (B.9) above, together with the
assumption that transitory wage shocks do not shift intra-family bargaining
power, I write equation (B.8) as

∆K˜it
∆C˜1it
∆C˜2it
∆Y˜1it
∆Y˜2it

≈

αk,w1 + βk,w1 αk,w2 + βk,w2 αk,w1 αk,w2 αk,λ
αc1,w1 + βc1,w1 αc1,w2 + βc1,w2 αc1,w1 αc1,w2 αc1,λ
αc2,w1 + βc2,w1 αc2,w2 + βc2,w2 αc2,w1 αc2,w2 αc2,λ
αy1,w1 + βy1,w1 αy1,w2 + βy1,w2 αy1,w1 αy1,w2 αy1,λ
αy2,w1 + βy2,w1 αy2,w2 + βy2,w2 αy2,w1 αy2,w2 αy2,λ


v1it
v2it
∆u1it
∆u2it
ωit + it

(B.10)
where I replace hours of market work by earnings using the identity Yjit =
WjitHjit, j = {1, 2}. To obtain (B.10) I have assumed away variation in any
distribution factor in (2.10). The transmission parameters β above, which
reflect the difference between the impact of permanent and transitory wage
shocks on household outcomes (conditional on ∆ lnλit), capture the bargaining
effects of permanent wages shocks, i.e. the effects through shifting intra-family
bargaining power. The transmission parameters are reported analytically in
appendix B.4.
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B.3 Approximation to Intertemporal Budget
Constraint
Let F (ψ) = ln
∑J
s=0 expψs with ψ = (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψJ)
′; a first order Taylor
approximation of F (ψ) around ψ0 yields
F (ψ) ≈ ln
J∑
s=0
expψ0s +
J∑
s=0
expψ0s∑S
s=0 expψ
0
s
(
ψs − ψ0s
)
.
Consider the left hand side of the intertemporal budget constraint implied
by (2.5); that is given by Ai0 +E0
∑T
t=0
W1itH1it
(1+r)t
+E0
∑T
t=0
W2itH2it
(1+r)t
. Making this
look similar to F (ψ) above, I define
FLH(ψ) = ln
[
exp(lnAi0) +
T∑
t=0
exp
(
ln
W1itH1it
(1 + r)t
)
+
T∑
t=0
exp
(
ln
W2itH2it
(1 + r)t
)]
where, in this case, J = 2T + 2 and
ψs =

lnAis s = 0
lnW1is−1H1is−1 − (s− 1) ln(1 + r) s = 1, . . . , T + 1
lnW2is−(T+2)H2is−(T+2) − (s− (T + 2)) ln(1 + r) s = T + 2, . . . , 2T + 2.
Also define
ψ0s =

E−1 lnAis s = 0
E−1 lnW1is−1H1is−1 − (s− 1) ln(1 + r) s = 1, . . . , T + 1
E−1 lnW2is−(T+2)H2is−(T+2) − (s− (T + 2)) ln(1 + r) s = T + 2, . . . , 2T + 2
Di0 = exp(E−1 lnAi0) +
T∑
k=0
exp
(
E−1 ln
W1ikH1ik
(1 + r)k
)
+
T∑
k=0
exp
(
E−1 ln
W2ikH2ik
(1 + r)k
)
pii0 =
exp(E−1 lnAi0)
Di0
si0 =
∑T
k=0 exp(E−1 lnW1ikH1ik − k ln(1 + r))
Di0 − exp(E−1 lnAi0)
θjit =
exp(E−1 lnWjitHjit − t ln(1 + r))∑T
k=0 exp(E−1 lnWjikHjik − k ln(1 + r))
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where E−1 defines expectations at time t = −1 (while the intertemporal budget
constraint covers periods 0 through T ).
Parameter pii0 is approximately equal to the (t = −1)-expected ratio of
financial wealth at t = 0 over total human and financial wealth in the household
over the period between t = 0 and t = T .3 si0 is the (t = −1)-expected ratio
of the male spouse’s lifetime human wealth over total lifetime human wealth
in the household. θjit, j = {1, 2}, is the (t = −1)-expected ratio of spouse j’s
earnings at t over the same person’s lifetime human wealth.
Expanding the left hand side of the intertemporal budget constraint around
ψ0 and taking expectations conditional on an information set I, where such
information set includes information known at t = −1, I get
EIFLH(ψ) ≈ EIFLH(ψ0) + exp(E−1 lnAi0)
Di0
(EI − E−1) lnAi0
+
T∑
t=0
exp(E−1 lnW1itH1it − t ln(1 + r))
Di0
(EI − E−1) lnW1itH1it
+
T∑
t=0
exp(E−1 lnW2itH2it − t ln(1 + r))
Di0
(EI − E−1) lnW2itH2it
EIFLH(ψ) ≈ EIFLH(ψ0) + pii0(EI − E−1) lnAi0
+ (1− pii0)si0
T∑
t=0
θ1it(EI − E−1)(∆ lnY1it + lnY1it−1)
+ (1− pii0)(1− si0)
T∑
t=0
θ2it(EI − E−1)(∆ lnY2it + lnY2it−1),
where (EI − E−1)χ = EI(χ)− E−1(χ) for a generic variable χ.
Replacing ∆ lnYjit by its analytical expression in (B.10) (note that (EI −
E−1)∆ lnYjit = (EI−E−1)∆Y˜jit because changes in the observable characteris-
tics are in the spouses’ information sets and therefore canceled out by the first
difference EI −E−1), assuming that each spouse’s current earnings are negligi-
ble compared to their expected lifetime earnings,4 placing ωit in the spouses’
3By ‘lifetime human wealth’ I refer to expected lifetime earnings over t = 0, . . . , T .
4This implies that θjit ≈ 0, j = {1, 2}, and transitory shocks to current earnings do not
shift the intertemporal budget constraint.
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information sets, and taking a first difference of EIFLH(ψ) across I : t = 0
and I : t = −1, I get
(E0 − E−1)FLH(ψ)
≈ (1− pii0)si0
(
(αy1,w1 + βy1,w1)v1i0 + (αy1,w2 + βy1,w2)v2i0 + αy1,λi0
)
+ (1− pii0)(1− si0)
(
(αy2,w1 + βy2,w1)v1i0 + (αy2,w2 + βy2,w2)v2i0 + αy2,λi0
)
.
Similarly for the right hand side of the intertemporal budget constraint,
define
FRH(ψ) = ln
[
T∑
t=0
exp
(
ln
Kit
(1 + r)t
)
+
T∑
t=0
exp
(
ln
PtCit
(1 + r)t
)]
ψs =
 lnKis − s ln(1 + r) s = 0, . . . , TlnPs−(T+1)Cis−(T+1) − (s− (T + 1)) ln(1 + r) s = T + 1, . . . , 2T + 1.
Also define
ξit =
∑T
k=0 exp(E−1 ln
Kik
(1+r)k
)∑T
k=0 exp(E−1 ln
Kik
(1+r)k
) +
∑T
k=0 exp(E−1 ln
PkCik
(1+r)k
)
as the (t = −1)-expected share of lifetime family expenditure on the public
good over total lifetime family expenditure on all goods between t = 0 and
t = T .
I follow the same procedure as for the left-hand side and I get
(E0 − E−1)FRH(ψ)
≈ ξi0
(
(αk,w1 + βk,w1)v1i0 + (αk,w2 + βk,w2)v2i0 + αk,λi0
)
+ (1− ξi0)ϕi,−1
(
(αc1,w1 + βc1,w1)v1i0 + (αc1,w2 + βc1,w2)v2i0 + αc1,λi0
)
+ (1− ξi0)(1− ϕi,−1)
(
(αc2,w1 + βc2,w1)v1i0 + (αc2,w2 + βc2,w2)v2i0 + αc2,λi0
)
.
Here ϕit =
C1it
Cit
is the male spouse’s share of private consumption at t. ϕit
enters the result because ∆ lnCit ≈ ϕit−1∆ lnC1it + (1− ϕit−1)∆ lnC2it.
Noting that the budget constraint must balance, I bring the two sides
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together and solve for i0 to get
i0 ≈ `w1i0 v1i0 + `w2i0 v2i0 (B.11)
where
`w1i0 = (1/`
λ
i0)
(
ξi0(αk,w1 + βk,w1)
+ (1− ξi0)
(
ϕi,−1(αc1,w1 + βc1,w1) + (1− ϕi,−1)(αc2,w1 + βc2,w1)
)
− (1− pii0)si0(αy1,w1 + βy1,w1)− (1− pii0)(1− si0)(αy2,w1 + βy2,w1)
)
`w2i0 = (1/`
λ
i0)
(
ξi0(αk,w2 + βk,w2)
+ (1− ξi0)
(
ϕi,−1(αc1,w2 + βc1,w2) + (1− ϕi,−1)(αc2,w2 + βc2,w2)
)
− (1− pii0)si0(αy1,w2 + βy1,w2)− (1− pii0)(1− si0)(αy2,w2 + βy2,w2)
)
`λi0 = (1− pii0)(si0αy1,λ + (1− si0)αy2,λ)
− ξi0αk,λ − (1− ξi0)(ϕi,−1αc1,λ + (1− ϕi,−1)αc2,λ).
For a generic period t the mapping between it and the permanent shocks
v1it and v2it looks alike. One has to follow the same steps, the only difference
being that the budget constraint must start counting at t (rather than 0) and
the difference in expectations must be Et − Et−1.
Similar arguments can be used to show that an approximation to single
j’s intertemporal budget constraint, the sequential version of which appears
in (2.15), results in a mapping from permanent shock vjis to the innovation to
the single’s marginal utility of wealth jis, given by jis = `
s
jitvjis. Here
`sjit =
ξjisηj,k,w + (1− ξjis)ηj,c,w − (1− pijis)(1 + ηj,h,w)
(1− pijis)
∑
ηj,h − ξjis
∑
ηj,k − (1− ξjis)
∑
ηj,c
(B.12)
and the notation is as follows:
∑
ηj,h = ηj,h,w + ηj,h,pc + ηj,h,pk ;
∑
ηj,c =
ηj,c,w + ηj,c,pc + ηj,c,pk ;
∑
ηj,k = ηj,k,w + ηj,k,pc + ηj,k,pk ; ξjis is j’s ratio of
public to total expected expenditure as single; pijis ≈ Assetsjis/(Assetsjis +
Earnings as Singlejis) is j’s financial wealth relative to his/her total financial
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and human wealth as single.
B.4 Transmission Parameters
In this appendix I report the transmission parameters of wage shocks into
household outcomes, namely the elements of matrix Tit in (2.9). Less com-
pactly, (2.9) can be written as

∆kit
∆cit
∆y1it
∆y2it
 ≈

αk,w1 + βk,w1 + γk,w1 αk,w2 + βk,w2 + γk,w2 αk,w1 αk,w2
αc,w1 + βc,w1 + γc,w1 αc,w2 + βc,w2 + γc,w2 αc,w1 αc,w2
αy1,w1 + βy1,w1 + γy1,w1 αy1,w2 + βy1,w2 + γy1,w2 αy1,w1 αy1,w2
αy2,w1 + βy2,w1 + γy2,w1 αy2,w2 + βy2,w2 + γy2,w2 αy2,w1 αy2,w2


v1it
v2it
∆u1it
∆u2it

(B.13)
where Tit is the 4× 4 matrix on the right-hand side.
I obtain (B.13) directly from (B.10) after replacing it by (B.11) (ωit ≡ ωt
is absorbed by the conditioning observables) and collapsing individual private
consumption into total private consumption using (2.11). The left-hand side
vectors of outcome variables in (B.10) and (B.13) are equivalent because ∆kit =
∆K˜it = ∆ lnKit −
∑
j ∆(z
K
jit
′
ζKjt )−
∑
j ∆(αk,wjx
W
jit
′
ζWjt ) (and similarly for the
other variables).
Permanent and transitory wage shocks induce static effects on outcomes;
these effects are captured by the α’s. The static effects summarize the standard
substitution effects that a price change (in this case a wage change) induces
through tilting the static budget constraint. In addition, permanent shocks in-
duce bargaining effects through their impact on intra-family bargaining power;
these effects are captured by the β’s. Finally, permanent shocks also induce
wealth/income effects through shifting the intertemporal, and therefore also
the static, budget constraint and impacting on the revisions to the marginal
utility of wealth λ; such effects are captured by the γ’s.
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Static effects
On ∆kit : αk,w1 = νit−1η2,k,pkη1,k,w(1/η¯k,pk)
: αk,w2 = (1− νit−1)η1,k,pkη2,k,w(1/η¯k,pk)
On ∆c1it : αc1,w1= η1,c,w − (1− νit−1)η1,c,pkη1,k,w(1/η¯k,pk)
: αc1,w2= (1− νit−1)η1,c,pkη2,k,w(1/η¯k,pk)
On ∆c2it : αc2,w1= νit−1η2,c,pkη1,k,w(1/η¯k,pk)
: αc2,w2= η2,c,w − νit−1η2,c,pkη2,k,w(1/η¯k,pk)
On ∆cit : αc,w1 = ϕit−1αc1,w1 + (1− ϕit)αc2,w1
: αc,w2 = ϕit−1αc1,w2 + (1− ϕit)αc2,w2
On ∆y1it : αy1,w1= 1 + η1,h,w − (1− νit−1)η1,h,pkη1,k,w(1/η¯k,pk)
: αy1,w2= (1− νit−1)η1,h,pkη2,k,w(1/η¯k,pk)
On ∆y2it : αy2,w1= νit−1η2,h,pkη1,k,w(1/η¯k,pk)
: αy2,w2= 1 + η2,h,w − νit−1η2,h,pkη2,k,w(1/η¯k,pk)
Bargaining effects
On ∆kit : βk,w1 = ηµ,w1βk
: βk,w2 = ηµ,w2βk
On ∆c1it : βc1,w1 = ηµ,w1βc1
: βc1,w2 = ηµ,w2βc1
On ∆c2it : βc2,w1 = ηµ,w1βc2
: βc2,w2 = ηµ,w2βc2
On ∆cit : βc,w1 = ϕit−1βc1,w1 + (1− ϕit)βc2,w1
: βc,w2 = ϕit−1βc1,w2 + (1− ϕit)βc2,w2
On ∆y1it : βy1,w1 = ηµ,w1βy1
: βy1,w2 = ηµ,w2βy1
On ∆y2it : βy2,w1 = ηµ,w1βy2
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: βy2,w2 = ηµ,w2βy2
Wealth effects
On ∆kit : γk,w1 = αk,λ`
w1
it
: γk,w2 = αk,λ`
w2
it
On ∆c1it : γc1,w1 = αc1,λ`
w1
it
: γc1,w2 = αc1,λ`
w2
it
On ∆c2it : γc2,w1 = αc2,λ`
w1
it
: γc2,w2 = αc2,λ`
w2
it
On ∆cit : γc,w1 = ϕit−1γc1,w1 + (1− ϕit)γc2,w1
: γc,w2 = ϕit−1γc1,w2 + (1− ϕit)γc2,w2
On ∆y1it : γy1,w1 = αy1,λ`
w1
it
: γy1,w2 = αy1,λ`
w2
it
On ∆y2it : γy2,w1 = αy2,λ`
w1
it
: γy2,w2 = αy2,λ`
w2
it
where
η¯k,pk = (1− νit−1)η1,k,pk + νit−1η2,k,pk
αk,λ = (1/η¯k,pk)
(
η1,k,pkη2,k,pk + νit−1η2,k,pk(η1,k,pc + η1,k,w)
+ (1− νit−1)η1,k,pk(η2,k,pc + η2,k,w)
)
αc1,λ = η1,c,pc + η1,c,w
+ (1/η¯k,pk)
(
η1,c,pkη2,k,pk + (1− νit−1)η1,c,pk(−η1,k,pc + η2,k,pc − η1,k,w + η2,k,w)
)
αc2,λ = η2,c,pc + η2,c,w
+ (1/η¯k,pk)
(
η2,c,pkη1,k,pk − νit−1η2,c,pk(−η1,k,pc + η2,k,pc − η1,k,w + η2,k,w)
)
αy1,λ = η1,h,w + η1,h,pc
+ (1/η¯k,pk)
(
η1,h,pkη2,k,pk + (1− νit−1)η1,h,pk(−η1,k,pc + η2,k,pc − η1,k,w + η2,k,w)
)
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αy2,λ = η2,h,w + η2,h,pc
+ (1/η¯k,pk)
(
η2,h,pkη1,k,pk − νit−1η2,h,pk(−η1,k,pc + η2,k,pc − η1,k,w + η2,k,w)
)
βk = ν˜it−1η1,k,pkη2,k,pk(1/η¯k,pk)− νit−1η2,k,pk(1/η¯k,pk)(η1,k,pc + η1,k,w)
+ µ˜it−1(1− νit−1)η1,k,pk(1/η¯k,pk)(η2,k,pc + η2,k,w)
βc1 = ν˜it−1η1,c,pkη2,k,pk(1/η¯k,pk)− η1,c,pc − η1,c,w
+ (1− νit−1)η1,c,pk(1/η¯k,pk)(η1,k,pc + µ˜it−1η2,k,pc + η1,k,w + µ˜it−1η2,k,w)
βc2 = ν˜it−1η2,c,pkη1,k,pk(1/η¯k,pk) + µ˜it−1η2,c,pc + µ˜it−1η2,c,w
− νit−1η2,c,pk(1/η¯k,pk)(η1,k,pc + µ˜it−1η2,k,pc + η1,k,w + µ˜it−1η2,k,w)
βy1 = ν˜it−1η1,h,pkη2,k,pk(1/η¯k,pk)− η1,h,w − η1,h,pc
+ (1− νit−1)η1,h,pk(1/η¯k,pk)(η1,k,pc + µ˜it−1η2,k,pc + η1,k,w + µ˜it−1η2,k,w)
βy2 = ν˜it−1η2,h,pkη1,k,pk(1/η¯k,pk) + µ˜it−1η2,h,w + µ˜it−1η2,h,pc
− νit−1η2,h,pk(1/η¯k,pk)(η1,k,pc + µ˜it−1η2,k,pc + η1,k,w + µ˜it−1η2,k,w)
ν˜it = (1− νit)µ˜it − νit.
Recall that the Frisch elasticities are presented in table 2.1 and defined in
appendix B.1; also νit = µ1itU1,K(µ1itU1,K + µ2itU2,K)
−1, µ˜it =
µ1it
µ2it
, and `w1it &
`w2it are defined in appendix B.3.
Whenever a transmission parameter involves ν, µ, `w1 , `w2 , or functions
of them, then such parameter must be i- and t-specific. Such subscripts are
removed here for simplicity of the notation; they are, however, implied.
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B.5 Measurement Error in Consumption
Table B.1: Estimates of consumption mea-
surement error
(1) (2)
separable nonseparable
Couples
c 0.0808 0.0827
(0.0032) (0.0030)
k 0.0404 0.0339
(0.0023) (0.0038)
Single males
c1 0.0557
(0.0126)
k1 0.0561
(0.0093)
Single females
c2 0.0554
(0.0144)
k2 0.0474
(0.0097)
Notes: The table presents the GMM estimates of the vari-
ance of measurement error in private and public consump-
tion. Block bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses
based on 1,000 bootstrap replications. Column 1 presents
the estimates when the public good is additively separable
from private consumption and leisure; column 2 presents
the estimates when it is nonseparable.
Appendix C
Appendix to
Consumption Inequality across
Heterogeneous Families
C.1 Approximations to First Order Conditions
Utility from consumption and disutility from labor are affected by observed
taste shifters Zit such as education or age of spouses. Suppose the effect
of such taste shifters enters utility as Ui(Cit,Zit) = U˜i(Cit exp(−Z′itηC)) and
Vi(H2it,Zit) = V˜i(H2it exp(−Z′itηH)). For simplicity, denote C˜it = Cit exp(−Z′itηC)
and H˜2it = H2it exp(−Z′itηH).
Assuming an internal optimal, the first-order conditions of household
problem (3.1) are
[Cit] : U˜
′
i(C˜it) exp(−Z′itηC) = λit
[H2it] : V˜
′
i (H˜2it) exp(−Z′itηH) = λitW2it
[Ait+1] : β(1 + r)Etλit+1 = λit
where U˜ ′i and V˜
′
i denote first-order derivatives.
Applying logs to the first-order condition for consumption and taking a
first difference in time yields ∆ ln U˜ ′i(C˜it) − ∆Z′itηC = ∆ lnλit. A first-order
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Taylor approximation of U˜ ′i(C˜it) around C˜it−1 yields ∆ ln U˜
′
i(C˜it) ≈ 1φi∆ ln C˜it
where φi = U˜
′
i(C˜it−1)/U˜ ′′i (C˜it−1)C˜it−1 is the consumption substitution elasticity, i.e.
the (Frisch) elasticity of consumption with respect to consumption’s own price.
Combining the two I get
∆ ln C˜it − φi∆Z′itηC ≈ φi∆ lnλit
∆cit ≈ φi∆ lnλit
where ∆cit = ∆ ln C˜it − φi∆Z′itηC (consumption net of observables).
The approximation to the first-order condition for hours of work follows
a similar procedure.
The approximation to the first-order condition for assets (the Euler equa-
tion) is more involved as it pertains to future expectations. Let exp(%) =
1/β(1+r) for an appropriate %. I apply a second-order approximation to the
exponential function exp(·), evaluated at lnλit+1, around lnλit + % to get
exp(lnλit+1) ≈ exp(lnλit + %)
(
1 + (∆ lnλit+1 − %) + 1
2
(∆ lnλit+1 − %)2
)
.
Taking expectations at time t and noting that Etλit+1 = λit exp(%) (the Euler
equation) implies
Et
(
∆ lnλit+1 − %+ 1
2
(∆ lnλit+1 − %)2
)
≈ 0
which in turn implies
Et∆ lnλit+1 ≈ %− 1
2
Et(∆ lnλi,t+1 − %)2
∆ lnλit+1 ≈ %− 1
2
Et(∆ lnλit+1 − %)2 + εit+1
∆ lnλit+1 ≈ ωit+1 + εit+1.
The first term ωit+1 = %− 12Et(∆ lnλit+1−%)2 captures household precautionary
motives; the second term εit+1 is the expectation error at t + 1 and captures
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idiosyncratic revisions to λit made by the household when income shocks hit.
C.2 Approximation to Intertemporal Budget
Constraint
Let F (ξ) = ln
∑J
s=0 exp ξs for ξ = (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξJ)
′. A first-order Taylor ap-
proximation around ξ0 is
F (ξ) ≈ ln
J∑
s=0
exp ξ0s +
J∑
s=0
exp ξ0s∑J
s=0 exp ξ
0
s
(
ξs − ξ0s
)
.
The intertemporal budget constraint of household i in problem (3.1) is
Ait +
T−t∑
s=0
Y1it+s +W2it+sH2it+s
(1 + r)s
=
T−t∑
s=0
Cit+s
(1 + r)s
.
To ease the notation I will drop cross-sectional subscript i temporarily.
Left hand side: The logarithm of the left hand side is
FLH(ξ) = ln
[
exp(lnAt) +
T−t∑
s=0
exp
(
ln
Y1t+s +W2t+sH2t+s
(1 + r)s
)]
.
Let
ξs =
ln (Y1t+s +W2t+sH2t+s)− s ln(1 + r) for s = 0, . . . , T − tlnAt+s−(T−t+1) for s = T − t+ 1
and
ξ0s =
Et−1 ln (Y1t+s +W2t+sH2t+s)− s ln(1 + r) for s = 0, . . . , T − tEt−1 lnAt+s−(T−t+1) for s = T − t+ 1.
Applying the first-order Taylor approximation to FLH(ξ) and taking ex-
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pectations at t yields
EtFLH(ξ) ≈ FLH(ξ0) + exp(Et−1 lnAt)∑
(·) (Et − Et−1) lnAt
+
T−t∑
s=0
exp(Et−1 ln(Y1t+s +W2t+sH2t+s)− s ln(1 + r))∑
(·)
× (Et − Et−1) ln(Y1t+s +W2t+sH2t+s)
EtFLH(ξ) ≈ FLH(ξ0) + pit(Et − Et−1) lnAt
+ (1− pit)
T−t∑
s=0
δt+s(Et − Et−1) ln(Y1t+s +W2t+sH2t+s)
EtFLH(ξ) ≈ FLH(ξ0) + pit(Et − Et−1) lnAt + (1− pit)
×
T−t∑
s=0
δt+s(Et − Et−1)(ρt+s−1∆ lnY1t+s + (1− ρt+s−1)∆ lnW2t+sH2t+s)
where (Et − Et−1) lnAt = Et lnAt − Et−1 lnAt, and similarly for whenever
Et − Et−1 appears multiplying any variable, and
∑
(·) = exp(Et−1 lnAt) +
T−t∑
k=0
exp
(
Et−1 ln
Y1t+k +W2t+kH2t+k
(1 + r)k
)
pit =
exp(Et−1 lnAt)∑
(·)
δt+s =
exp(Et−1 ln(Y1t+s +W2t+sH2t+s)− s ln(1 + r))∑T−t
k=0 exp(Et−1 ln(Y1t+s +W2t+sH2t+s)− s ln(1 + r))
ρt+s =
Y1t+s
Y1t+s +W2t+sH2t+s
.
The notation is as follows: pit is the ‘partial insurance’ parameter (term due to
Blundell et al., 2008) and is the share of initial financial assets in the house-
hold’s expected lifetime financial and human wealth; δt is the share of fam-
ily current total earnings in their expected lifetime earnings (lifetime human
wealth); ρt is the contemporaneous ratio of male earnings over family total
earnings at t.
A first difference between EtFLH(ξ) and Et−1FLH(ξ) eliminates FLH(ξ0)
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and pit(Et − Et−1) lnAt rendering EtFLH(ξ)− Et−1FLH(ξ) ≈
(1− pit)
T−t∑
s=0
δt+s(Et − Et−1)
(
ρt+s−1∆ lnY1t+s + (1− ρt+s−1)∆ lnW2t+sH2t+s
)
Right hand side: The logarithm of the right hand side is
FRH(ξ) = ln
T−t∑
s=0
exp
(
ln
Ct+s
(1 + r)s
)
for an appropriately defined ξ. Following the same steps as for the left hand
side I get
EtFRH(ξ)− Et−1FRH(ξ) ≈
T−t∑
s=0
θt+s(Et − Et−1)∆ lnCt+s
where
θt+s =
exp(Et−1 lnCt+s − s ln(1 + r))∑T−t
k=0 exp(Et−1 lnCt+k − k ln(1 + r))
is the share of family current consumption in the household expected lifetime
consumption.
Two sides together: I bring the two sides together following Blundell
et al. (2013, p. 34) who point out that “the realized budget must balance” and,
therefore, the objects on the two sides of the log-linearized budget constraint
“have the same distribution”:
(1− pit)
T−t∑
s=0
δt+s(Et − Et−1)(ρt+s−1∆ lnY1t+s + (1− ρt+s−1)∆ lnW2t+sH2t+s)
≈
T−t∑
s=0
θt+s(Et − Et−1)∆ lnCt+s (C.1)
The approximation up to this point does not relate to the first-order condi-
tions and the specific economic problem under study. I retrieve the first-order
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conditions (3.3) and the income processes (3.2) of problem (3.1) and I substi-
tute them into equation (C.1). I bring back cross-sectional i to get
(φi − (1− piit)(1− sit)ψi) εit ≈ (1− piit) (sitv1it + (1− sit)(1 + ψi)v2it) (C.2)
where sit is approximately equal to the average expected ratio of male earnings
over family total earnings between time t and the end of the horizon, i.e.
sit ≈ Etρit and the average is taken over t, t+ 1, . . . , T for a given household i.
To obtain expression (C.2), I assume: (i) ωit+s is in the information set of
households at times t and t− 1 for all s > 0, thus (Et−Et−1)ωit+s = 0,∀s > 0,
and (ii) δt+s ≈ 0, meaning that household earnings in any single time period are
negligible when compared to lifetime earnings. The last assumption implies
that transitory shocks to earnings or wages do not shift the intertemporal
budget constraint and, therefore, do not induce wealth effects.
If one further assumes that the households have negligible accumulated
assets compared to their lifetime financial and human wealth, as is likely the
case for young households, then piit ≈ 0 and expression (C.2) can be written
εit ≈ 1
φi − (1− sit)ψi (sitv1it + (1− sit)(1 + ψi)v2it)
which is expression (3.4) in the main text.
C.3 Derivation of Cov(∆h2it,∆h2it+1)
From (3.5) I can write
∆h2it ≈ ψiζitsitv1it + (ψiζit(1− sit)(1 + ψi) + ψi) v2it + ψi∆u2it + ψiωit.
The covariance Cov (∆h2it,∆h2it+1) is equal to
line 1 Cov(ψiζitsitv1it, ψiζit+1sit+1v1it+1)
line 2 + Cov(ψiζitsitv1it, (ψiζit+1(1− sit+1)(1 + ψi) + ψi)v2it+1)
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line 3 + Cov(ψiζitsitv1it, ψi∆u2it+1)
line 4 + Cov(ψiζitsitv1it, ψiωit+1)
line 5 + Cov(ψiζit(1− sit)(1 + ψi) + ψi)v2it, ψiζit+1sit+1v1it+1)
line 6 + Cov(ψiζit(1− sit)(1 + ψi) + ψi)v2it, (ψiζit+1(1− sit+1)(1 + ψi) + ψi)v2it+1)
line 7 + Cov(ψiζit(1− sit)(1 + ψi) + ψi)v2it, ψi∆u2it+1)
line 8 + Cov(ψiζit(1− sit)(1 + ψi) + ψi)v2it, ψiωit+1)
line 9 + Cov(ψi∆u2it, ψiζit+1sit+1v1it+1)
line 10 + Cov(ψi∆u2it, (ψiζit+1(1− sit+1)(1 + ψi) + ψi)v2it+1)
line 11 + Cov(ψi∆u2it, ψi∆u2it+1)
line 12 + Cov(ψi∆u2it, ψiωit+1)
line 13 + Cov(ψiωit, ψiζit+1sit+1v1it+1)
line 14 + Cov(ψiωit, (ψiζit+1(1− sit+1)(1 + ψi) + ψi)v2it+1)
line 15 + Cov(ψiωit, ψi∆u2it+1)
line 16 + Cov(ψiωit, ψiωit+1).
Lines 1 and 6 are 0 because permanent shocks are serially uncorrelated;
lines 2 and 5 are 0 because permanent shocks between spouses and over time
do not co-vary, lines 3, 7, 9 and 10 are 0 because permanent and transitory
shocks do not co-vary; lines 4, 8, and 12-15 are 0 because income shocks are
mean independent of ω; finally line 16 is 0 because ω does not exhibit serial
correlation. To characterize these covariances I use results from Goodman
(1960) and Bohrnstedt and Goldberger (1969).
The only remaining non-0 line is 11 which is equal to
Cov(ψiu2it,−ψiu2it)
and is the same expression that appears in the main text (Section 3.3.3.1).
Bibliography
Abowd, J. M. and D. Card (1989). On the covariance structure of earnings
and hours changes. Econometrica 57 (2), 411–45.
Adda, J. and R. W. Cooper (2003). Dynamic Economics: Quantitative Meth-
ods and Applications. The MIT Press.
Altonji, J. G. and L. M. Segal (1996). Small-sample bias in GMM estimation
of covariance structures. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 14 (3),
353–366.
Apps, P. F. and R. Rees (1988). Taxation and the household. Journal of Public
Economics 35 (3), 355–369.
Attanasio, O., G. Berloffa, R. Blundell, and I. Preston (2002). From earn-
ings inequality to consumption inequality. The Economic Journal 112 (478),
C52–C59.
Attanasio, O., H. Low, and V. Sanchez-Marcos (2008). Explaining changes
in female labor supply in a life-cycle model. The American Economic Re-
view 98 (4), 1517–1552.
Attanasio, O. and N. Pavoni (2011). Risk sharing in private information models
with asset accumulation: Explaining the excess smoothness of consumption.
Econometrica 79 (4), 1027–1068.
Barmby, T. and N. Smith (2001). Household labour supply in Britain and
Denmark: some interpretations using a model of Pareto optimal behaviour.
Applied Economics 33 (9), 1109–1116.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 222
Becker, G. S. (1965). A theory of the allocation of time. The Economic
Journal 75 (299), 493–517.
Biddle, J. E. and D. S. Hamermesh (1990). Sleep and the allocation of time.
Journal of Political Economy 98 (5), 922–943.
Blau, D. M. (1992). The child care labor market. Journal of Human Re-
sources 27 (1), 9–39.
Blau, F. D. and L. M. Kahn (1997). Swimming upstream: Trends in the gender
wage differential in 1980s. Journal of Labor Economics 15 (1), 1–42.
Blau, F. D. and L. M. Kahn (2006). The U.S. gender pay gap in the 1990s:
Slowing convergence. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 60 (1), 45–66.
Blundell, R., P.-A. Chiappori, T. Magnac, and C. Meghir (2007). Collective
labour supply: Heterogeneity and non-participation. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 74 (2), 417–445.
Blundell, R., P.-A. Chiappori, and C. Meghir (2005). Collective labor supply
with children. Journal of Political Economy 113 (6), 1277–1306.
Blundell, R., M. C. Dias, C. Meghir, and J. M. Shaw (2013). Female labour
supply, human capital and welfare reform. NBER Working Papers 19007,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Blundell, R. and B. Etheridge (2010). Consumption, income and earnings
inequality in Britain. Review of Economic Dynamics 13 (1), 76–102.
Blundell, R., M. Graber, and M. Mogstad (2015). Labor income dynamics
and the insurance from taxes, transfers, and the family. Journal of Public
Economics 127 (C), 58–73.
Blundell, R., J. Horowitz, and M. Parey (2013). Nonparametric estimation of
a heterogeneous demand function under the slutsky inequality restriction.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 223
CeMMAP working papers CWP54/13, Centre for Microdata Methods and
Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Blundell, R., D. Kristensen, and R. Matzkin (2014). Bounding quantile de-
mand functions using revealed preference inequalities. Journal of Economet-
rics 179 (2), 112–127.
Blundell, R., H. Low, and I. Preston (2013). Decomposing changes in income
risk using consumption data. Quantitative Economics 4 (1), 1–37.
Blundell, R., T. MaCurdy, and C. Meghir (2007). Labor supply models: Un-
observed heterogeneity, nonparticipation and dynamics. In J. Heckman and
E. Leamer (Eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 6 of Handbook of
Econometrics, pp. 4667–4775. Elsevier.
Blundell, R., L. Pistaferri, and I. Preston (2008). Consumption inequality and
partial insurance. The American Economic Review 98 (5), 1887–1921.
Blundell, R., L. Pistaferri, and I. Saporta-Eksten (2015). Children, time allo-
cation and consumption insurance.
Blundell, R., L. Pistaferri, and I. Saporta-Eksten (2016). Consumption in-
equality and family labor supply. American Economic Review 106 (2), 387–
435.
Blundell, R. and I. Preston (1998). Consumption inequality and income un-
certainty. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (2), 603–640.
Blundell, R. and T. M. Stoker (2007). Models of aggregate economic relation-
ships that account for heterogeneity. In J. J. Heckman and E. E. Leamer
(Eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 6 of Handbook of Econometrics,
pp. 4609–4666. Elsevier.
Bohrnstedt, G. and A. Goldberger (1969). On the exact covariance of prod-
ucts of random variables. Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion 64 (328), 1439–1442.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 224
Bound, J., C. Brown, G. J. Duncan, and W. L. Rodgers (1994). Evidence on
the validity of cross-sectional and longitudinal labor market data. Journal
of Labor Economics 12 (3), pp. 345–368.
Bourguignon, F., M. Browning, and P.-A. Chiappori (2009). Efficient intra-
household allocations and distribution factors: implications and identifica-
tion. The Review of Economic Studies 76 (2), 503–528.
Bourguignon, F., M. Browning, P.-A. Chiappori, and V. Lechene (1993). Intra-
household allocation of consumption: A model and some evidence from
french data. Annales d’Economie et de Statistique (29), 137–156.
Bronson, M. A. (2014). Degrees are forever: Marriage, educational investment,
and lifecycle labor decisions of men and women.
Browning, M., F. Bourguignon, P.-A. Chiappori, and V. Lechene (1994). In-
come and outcomes-a structural model of intrahousehold allocation. Journal
of Political Economy 102 (6), 1067–1096.
Browning, M. and P.-A. Chiappori (1998). Efficient intra-household alloca-
tions: A general characterization and empirical tests. Econometrica 66 (6),
1241–1278.
Browning, M., P.-A. Chiappori, and A. Lewbel (2013). Estimating consump-
tion economies of scale, adult equivalence scales, and household bargaining
power. The Review of Economic Studies 80 (4), 1267–1303.
Browning, M., P.-A. Chiappori, and Y. Weiss (2014). Economics of the Family.
Cambridge Books. Cambridge University Press.
Browning, M., M. Ejrnæs, and J. Alvarez (2010). Modelling income processes
with lots of heterogeneity. Review of Economic Studies 77 (4), 1353–1381.
Browning, M., L. P. Hansen, and J. J. Heckman (1999). Micro data and general
equilibrium models. In J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford (Eds.), Handbook of
BIBLIOGRAPHY 225
Macroeconomics (1 ed.), Volume 1 of Handbook of Macroeconomics, pp. 543–
633. Elsevier.
Browning, M. and C. Meghir (1991). The effects of male and female labor
supply on commodity demands. Econometrica 59 (4), 925–951.
Campbell, J. Y. (1993). Intertemporal asset pricing without consumption data.
The American Economic Review 83 (3), pp. 487–512.
Cherchye, L., S. Cosaert, T. Demuynck, and B. De Rock (2015). Noncooper-
ative household consumption with caring.
Cherchye, L., B. De Rock, and F. Vermeulen (2012). Married with children:
A collective labor supply model with detailed time use and intrahousehold
expenditure information. The American Economic Review 102 (7), 3377–
3405.
Cherchye, L., B. D. Rock, A. Lewbel, and F. Vermeulen (2015). Sharing
rule identification for general collective consumption models. Economet-
rica 83 (5), 2001–2041.
Cherchye, L., B. D. Rock, and F. Vermeulen (2009). Opening the black box
of intrahousehold decision making: Theory and nonparametric empirical
tests of general collective consumption models. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 117 (6), 1074–1104.
Cherchye, L., B. D. Rock, and F. Vermeulen (2011). The revealed preference
approach to collective consumption behaviour: Testing and sharing rule
recovery. Review of Economic Studies 78 (1), 176–198.
Chiappori, P.-A. (1988). Rational household labor supply. Economet-
rica 56 (1), 63–90.
Chiappori, P.-A. (1992). Collective labor supply and welfare. Journal of Po-
litical Economy 100 (3), 437–467.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 226
Chiappori, P.-A. (1997). Introducing household production in collective models
of labor supply. Journal of Political Economy 105 (1), 191–209.
Chiappori, P.-A. (2011). Collective labor supply with many consumption
goods. Review of Economics of the Household 9 (2), 207–220.
Chiappori, P.-A., M. C. Dias, and C. Meghir (2015). The marriage market,
labor supply and education choice. NBER Working Papers 21004, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Chiappori, P.-A. and I. Ekeland (2006). The micro economics of group behav-
ior: general characterization. Journal of Economic Theory 130 (1), 1–26.
Chiappori, P.-A. and I. Ekeland (2009). The microeconomics of efficient group
behavior: Identification. Econometrica 77 (3), 763–799.
Chiappori, P.-A., B. Fortin, and G. Lacroix (2002). Marriage market, divorce
legislation, and household labor supply. Journal of political Economy 110 (1),
37–72.
Chiappori, P.-A. and M. Mazzocco (2014). Static and intertemporal household
decisions.
Chiappori, P.-A. and C. Meghir (2014). Intrahousehold inequality. NBER
Working Papers 20191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Cosaert, S. and T. Demuynck (2014). Nonparametric welfare and demand
analysis with unobserved individual heterogeneity. Research Memorandum
010, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
(GSBE).
Dauphin, A., A.-R. El Lahga, B. Fortin, and G. Lacroix (2011). Are children
decision-makers within the household? The Economic Journal 121 (553),
871–903.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 227
Del Boca, D., C. Flinn, and M. Wiswall (2014). Household Choices and Child
Development. Review of Economic Studies 81 (1), 137–185.
Donni, O. (2003). Collective household labor supply: nonparticipation and
income taxation. Journal of Public Economics 87 (5), 1179–1198.
Dunbar, G. R., A. Lewbel, and K. Pendakur (2013). Children’s resources in
collective households: Identification, estimation, and an application to child
poverty in Malawi. The American Economic Review 103 (1), 438–471.
Eckstein, Z. and O. Lifshitz (2011). Dynamic female labor supply. Economet-
rica 79 (6), 1675–1726.
Eckstein, Z. and K. I. Wolpin (1989). Dynamic labour force participation of
married women and endogenous work experience. The Review of Economic
Studies 56 (3), pp. 375–390.
Ferna´ndez, R. and J. C. Wong (2014). Divorce risk, wages and working wives:
A quantitative life-cycle analysis of female labour force participation. The
Economic Journal 124 (576), 319–358.
Fong, Y.-F. and J. Zhang (2001). The identification of unobservable indepen-
dent and spousal leisure. Journal of Political Economy 109 (1), 191–202.
Fortin, B. and G. Lacroix (1997). A test of the unitary and collective models
of household labour supply. The Economic Journal 107 (443), 933–955.
Francesconi, M. (2002). A joint dynamic model of fertility and work of married
women. Journal of Labor Economics 20 (2), 336–380.
French, E. (2005). The effects of health, wealth, and wages on labour supply
and retirement behaviour. Review of Economic Studies 72 (2), 395–427.
Gemici, A. (2011). Family migration and labor market outcomes.
Goodman, L. (1960). On the exact variance of products. Journal of the
American Statistical Association 55 (292), 708–713.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 228
Gottschalk, P. and R. Moffitt (2009). The rising instability of U.S. earnings.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 23 (4), 3–24.
Gourieroux, C., A. Monfort, and E. Renault (1993). Indirect inference. Journal
of Applied Econometrics 8, S85–S85.
Greenwood, J., A. Seshadri, and M. Yorukoglu (2005). Engines of liberation.
The Review of Economic Studies 72 (1), 109–133.
Guvenen, F. (2007). Learning your earning: Are labor income shocks really
very persistent? American Economic Review 97 (3), 687–712.
Heathcote, J., F. Perri, and G. Violante (2010). Unequal we stand: An empir-
ical analysis of economic inequality in the United States, 1967-2006. Review
of Economic Dynamics 13 (1), 15–51.
Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten, and G. L. Violante (2014). Consumption and
labor supply with partial insurance: An analytical framework. American
Economic Review 104 (7), 2075–2126.
Horowitz, J. L. (2001). The bootstrap. In J. Heckman and E. Leamer (Eds.),
Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 5 of Handbook of Econometrics, pp. 3159
– 3228. Elsevier.
Hyslop, D. R. (2001). Rising U.S. earnings inequality and family labor sup-
ply: The covariance structure of intrafamily earnings. American Economic
Review 91 (4), 755–777.
Jappelli, T. and L. Pistaferri (2010). The consumption response to income
changes. Annual Review of Economics 2 (1), 479–506.
Johnson, S. G. The NLopt nonlinear-optimization package.
Kaelo, P. and M. Ali (2006). Some variants of the controlled random search
algorithm for global optimization. Journal of Optimization Theory and Ap-
plications 130 (2), 253–264.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 229
Kaplan, G. and G. Violante (2010). How much consumption insurance beyond
self-insurance? American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2 (4), 53–87.
Keane, M. P. (2011). Labor supply and taxes: A survey. Journal of Economic
Literature 49 (4), 961–1075.
Keane, M. P. and K. I. Wolpin (2010). The role of labor and marriage markets,
preference heterogeneity, and the welfare system in the life cycle decisions of
black, hispanic, and white women. International Economic Review 51 (3),
851–892.
Kiefer, N. M. (1984). Microeconometric evidence on the neoclassical model of
demand. Journal of Econometrics 25 (3), 285–302.
Knowles, J. A. (2013). Why are married men working so much? An aggregate
analysis of intra-household bargaining and labour supply. The Review of
Economic Studies 80 (3), 1055–1085.
Kocherlakota, N. R. (1996). Implications of efficient risk sharing without com-
mitment. Review of Economic Studies 63 (4), 595–609.
Krueger, D. and F. Perri (2006). Does income inequality lead to consumption
inequality? evidence and theory. Review of Economic Studies 73 (1), 163–
193.
Lechene, V. and I. Preston (2011). Noncooperative household demand. Journal
of Economic Theory 146 (2), 504–527.
Lewbel, A. (2001). Demand systems with and without errors. American Eco-
nomic Review 91 (3), 611–618.
Lewbel, A. and K. Pendakur (2008). Estimation of collective household models
with engel curves. Journal of Econometrics 147 (2), 350–358.
Ligon, E., J. P. Thomas, and T. Worrall (2002). Informal insurance ar-
rangements with limited commitment: Theory and evidence from village
economies. Review of Economic Studies 69 (1), 209–44.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 230
Lise, J. and S. Seitz (2011). Consumption inequality and intra-household
allocations. The Review of Economic Studies 78 (1), 328–355.
Lise, J. and K. Yamada (2014). Household sharing and commitment: Evidence
from panel data on individual expenditures and time use. In 2014 Meeting
Papers, Number 152. Society for Economic Dynamics.
Lundberg, S. (1985). The added worker effect. Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 3 (1), 11–37.
MaCurdy, T. E. (1982). The use of time series processes to model the error
structure of earnings in a longitudinal data analysis. Journal of Economet-
rics 18 (1), 83–114.
Manser, M. and M. Brown (1980). Marriage and household decision-making:
A bargaining analysis. International Economic Review 21 (1), 31–44.
Matzkin, R. L. (2003). Nonparametric estimation of nonadditive random func-
tions. Econometrica 71 (5), 1339–1375.
Matzkin, R. L. (2008). Identification in nonparametric simultaneous equations
models. Econometrica 76 (5), 945–978.
Mazzocco, M. (2007). Household intertemporal behaviour: A collective charac-
terization and a test of commitment. The Review of Economic Studies 74 (3),
857–895.
Mazzocco, M., C. Ruiz, and S. Yamaguchi (2014). Labor Supply, Wealth Dy-
namics and Marriage Decisions. 2014 meeting papers, Society for Economic
Dynamics.
McElroy, M. B. and M. J. Horney (1981). Nash-bargained household decisions:
Toward a generalization of the theory of demand. International Economic
Review 22 (2), 333–349.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 231
Meghir, C. and L. Pistaferri (2004). Income variance dynamics and hetero-
geneity. Econometrica 72 (1), 1–32.
Meghir, C. and L. Pistaferri (2011). Earnings, consumption and life cycle
choices. In O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Eco-
nomics, Volume 4 of Handbook of Labor Economics, pp. 773–854. Elsevier.
O’Neill, G. and M. O’Connell (2001). State estimates of child care establish-
ments: 1977-1997. Population Division Working Papers 55, U.S. Bureau of
the Census.
Phlips, L. (1974). Applied Consumption Analysis. Advanced textbooks in
economics. North-Holland.
Rowan, T. H. (1990). Functional stability analysis of numerical algorithms.
Ph. D. thesis, Department of Computer Sciences, University of Texas at
Austin.
van der Klaauw, W. (1996). Female labour supply and marital status decisions:
A life-cycle model. Review of Economic Studies 63 (2), 199–235.
Vermeulen, F. (2006). A collective model for female labour supply with non-
participation and taxation. Journal of Population Economics 19 (1), 99–118.
Vermeulen, F., O. Bargain, M. Beblo, D. Beninger, R. Blundell, R. Carrasco,
M.-C. Chiuri, F. Laisney, V. Lechene, N. Moreau, M. Myck, and J. Ruiz-
Castillo (2006). Collective models of labor supply with nonconvex budget
sets and nonparticipation: A calibration approach. Review of Economics of
the Household 4 (2), 113–127.
Voena, A. (2015). Yours, mine, and ours: Do divorce laws affect the intertem-
poral behavior of married couples? American Economic Review 105 (8),
2295–2332.
Whitebook, M., D. Phillips, and C. Howes (1993). National child care staffing
study revisited: Four years in the life of center-based child care.
